Introduction to Chapter 2
It is crucial to present the following information, which will serve as an introduction to Chapter 2. This information reveals that, as early as 1992 and 1993, the government communications authority secretly corroborated my arbitration claims regarding persistent telephone faults. A comprehensive report from AUSTEL, dated March 1994, further confirms that my claims were taken seriously and were not considered frivolous. For more insights, please refer to the section titled "Minimizing Telstra's Liability," where I delve deeper into the implications of this validation.
Minimizing Telstra's liability
It is important to note before AUSTEL did their investigation into my complaints, I provided them with a comprehensive log of my phone complaints, which my claim advisors Plummer and Pullinger later also to Dr Gordon Hughes (the arbitrator hearing my case Alan Smith v s Telstra) on 15 June 1994 as an interim to my arbitration submission (see File - 7 to 9-A - AS-CAV Exhibit 1 to 47 and File 108 - AS-CAV Exhibit 92 to 127).
However, the arbitrator concealed this 'comprehensive chronology of my complaints' from his technical arbitration resource unit. The 30 April 1995 report Chapter 1 - The Conspiracy states, "A comprehensive log of Mr Smith's complaints does not appear to exist." After my arbitration on 11 May 1995, it cost me over $52,000 in fees paid directly to Plummer & Pullinger, my arbitration claim advisors. Both advisors were ex-senior Detective Sargants in the Queensland police force. One of the two partners later became a Senator in the John Howard government on behalf of the Queensland National Party. Fifty thousand dollars ($52,000) was a lot of money for me to pay Plummer & Pullinger, who, on my behalf, appointed a technical consultant, George Close and Associates, to oversee the technical issues they had been prepared as an attachment to this submission. That extra fee of $25,000.00 plus travelling expenses brought the overall cost of my submission to $80.00.00.
This amount of eighty thousand dollars did not include my legal fees leading up to the arbitration process, which commenced in November 1993, my appeal fees or my forensic accountant costs of DMR Corporate, which was $55.000. My overall costs were more than $300,000.00, and the arbitrator's advisors warned him there was no: "comprehensive log of Mr Smith's complaints does not appear to exist."
Suppose Plummer & Pullinger had forgotten to courier the most crucial document of my entire arbitration process, i.e., a comprehensive log of Mr Smith's complaints. Why didn't the arbitrator write to me asking for a copy? Why did the arbitrator allow his technical consultants, DMR & Labe, to investigate my fault complaints if there was no log of those complaints? How could they start such an investigation if no such log existed?
At the request of the government communications regulator AUSTEL (now ACMA) towards the end of 1993, I provided them with a condensed version of my comprehensive log of complaints, which I had prepared from Ericsson AXE and Ericsson testing equipment which Coopers & Lybrand when visiting my business between 7 and 10 October 1993 during their audit of the Portland AXE Ericsson telephone exchange and the non-manned Cape Bridgewater switching facility telephone exchange which utilized a grossly deficient Ericisson testing facility. Robert Nasson, a partner of Coopers & Lybrand (now called PWC), appears to have changed his original findings regarding the grossly deficient Ericsson after receiving the following letter from Telstra, and I quote:
AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings, dated March 1994, confirms that between Points 2 to 212, the government public servants who investigated my ongoing telephone problems found my claims against Telstra validated. One does not have to be a genius to understand that had the arbitrator been provided AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings, his award on my financial business losses would have been substantially higher than he awarded on a claim that did not have a comprehensive log over the six-year period which AUSTEL used in which to derive at their findings as AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings shows.
Government records (see Absentjustice-Introduction File 495 to 551) show AUSTEL's adverse findings were provided to Telstra (the defendants) one month before Telstra and I signed our arbitration agreement. I did not get a copy of these same findings until 23 November 2007, 12 years after the conclusion of my arbitration, which was outside the statute of limitations for me to use those government findings in which to appeal the arbitrator award.
Page 2 – "Mr Smith has had an ongoing complaint about the level of service for some time .....customer was originally connected to an old RAX exchange, which had limited junctions brtween Portland and Cape Bridgewater, Thus congestion was a problem for all customers on the Cape Bridgewater exchnage. The exchange was up graded to an RCM parented back to the Portland AXE 104".
Page 10 – “Whilst Network Investigation and Support advised that all faults were rectified, the above faults and record of degraded service minutes indicate a significant network problem from August 1991 to March 1993.”
Point 23 – “It is difficult to discern exactly who had responsibility for Mr Smith’s problems at the time, and how information on his problems was disseminated within Telecom. Information imparted by the Portland officer on 10 February 1993 of suspected problems in the RCM “caused by a lighting (sic) strike to a bearer in late November” led to a specialist examination of the RCM on March 1993. Serious problems were identified by this examination.”
Adequacy of Response
Point 25 – "It should also be noted that during the period of time covered by this chronology of significance events it is clear
- Telecom had conducted extensive testing
- Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp frequestly reported problems with the quality of telephone service
- both the camp and Telecom were receiving confirmation of reported from other network users
- major faults were identified more through persitense reporting of probles by customer than through testing of the network
- customers in the Cape Bridgewater area also complaining of similar problems
Point 26 – "The chronology of significant events demonstrates that Telecom conducted estensive testing and Telecom rectified faults without delay when faults were identified. It is clear however, that
- Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp was exposed to significant network problems over an extended period of time
- Telecom testing did not not detect all of the network problems affecting Mr Smith".
Telecom's Approach to reaching Settlement
Point 27 – "As is discussed under allegation in more detail throughout this document, Telecom's failure to adequately identify Mr Smith's network problems challenges the bases of Senior Telecom Management's approach to the resolution of Mr Smith's complaints and his claims for compensation etc, etc
Point 29 – "A fundamental issue underlying Telecom's settlement with Mr Smith was the question of whether Telecom had taken reasonable steps to comprehensively diagnose the standard of Mr Smith's telephone service. This is an important point as settlement took place on the bases that both parties agreed Mr Smith was receiving an acceptable standard of service at the time of settlement. Mr Smith maintains he was under considerable financial pressure to reach settlement, leading him to accept Telecom's assurances of his services at the time of settlement."
Point 32 – "Telecom's communications with Mr Smith in the months prior to settlement uniformaly argued that the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp was at an acceptable level and that Telecom was capable of rapidly rectifying faults as they occured."
Point 42 – “Some important questions are raised by the possible existence of a cable problem affecting the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp service. Foremost of these questions is why was the test call program conducted during July and August 1992 did not lead to the discovery of the cable problem. Another important question is exactly how the cable problem would have manifested in terms of service difficulties to the subscriber.”
Point 44 – “Given the range of faults being experienced by Mr Smith and other subscribers in Cape Bridgewater, it is clear that Telecom should have initiated more comprehensive action than the test call program. It appears that there was expensive reliance on the results of the test program and insufficient analysis of other data identifying problems. Again, this deficiency demonstrated Telecom’s lack of a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to resolution of Mr Smith’s problems.”
Point 46 –“File evidence clearly indicates that Telecom at the time of settlement with Mr Smith had not taken appropriate action to identify possible problems with the RCM . It was not until a resurgence of complaints from Mr Smith in early 1993 that appropriate investigative action was undertaken on this potential cause In March 1993 a major fault was discovered in the digital remote customer multiplexer (RCM) providing telephone service to Cape Bridgewater holiday camp. This fault may have been existence for approximately 18 months. The Fault would have affected approximately one third of subscribers receiving a service of this RCM. Given the nature of Mr Smith’s business in comparison with the essentially domestic services surrounding subscribers, Mr Smith would have been more affected by this problem due to the greater volume of incoming traffic than his neighbours.”
Point 47 –“Telecom's ignorance of the existence of the RCM fault raises a number of questions in regard to Telecom's settlement with Smith. For example, on what bases was settlement made by Telecom if this fault was not known to them at this time? Did Telecom settle with Mr Smith on the bases that his complaints , of faults were justified without a full investigation of the validity of these complaints, or did Telecom settle on the basis of faults substantiated to the time of settlement? Wither criteria for settlement would have been inadequate, with the later critera disadvantaging Mr Smith, as knowledge of the existence of more faults on his service may have led to an increase in the amount offered for settlement of his claims".
Point 48 – “AUSTEL has been hampered in assessing Telecom’s dealings with Mr Smith by Telecom’s failure to provide files relating to Mr Smith’s complaints.”
Point 49 –: "As a result of Telecom's failure to provide file documentation relating to Mr Smith some of the following conclusions are consequently based on insufficient information. The information which is avaialble however, demonstates that on a number of issues Telecom failed to keep Mr Smith informed on matters fundamental to the assessment of his complaints".
Point 71 –: “AUSTEL has not been provided with the documents on which the conclusion in this briefing summary were reached, such as fault reports from other Cape Bridgewater subscribers over this period or the details of the final selector fault. It would have been expected that these documents would have been retained on file as background to the summary. It can only be assumed that they are contained within the documentation not provided to AUSTEL.”
Point 76 – “One disturbing matter in relation to Mr Smith’s complaints of NRR is that information on other people in the Cape Bridgewater area experiencing the problem has been misrepresented from local Telecom regional manager to more senior manager.”
Point 86 – “From examination of Telecom’s documention concerning RVA messages on the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp there are a wide range of possible causes of this message.”
Point 109 – The view of the local Telecom technicians in relation to the RVA problem is conveyed in a 2 July 1992 Minute from Customer Service Manager – Hamilton to Managers in the Network Operations and Vic/Tas Fault Bureau:
- “Our local technicians believe that Mr Smith is correct in raising complaints about incoming callers to his number receiving a Recorded Voice Announcement saying that the number is disconnecte. They believe that it is a problem that is occurring in increasing numbers as more and more customers are connected to AXE. (AXE – Portland telephone exchange)”
Point 115 –“Some problems with incorrectly coded data seem to have existed for a considerable period of time. In July 1993 Mr Smith reported a problem with payphones dropping out on answer to calls made utilising his 008 number. Telecom diagnosed the problem as being to “Due to incorrect data in AXE 1004, CC-1. Fault repaired by Ballarat OSC 8/7/93, The original deadline for the data to be changed was June 14th 1991. Mr Smith’s complaint led to the identification of a problem which had existed for two years.”
Point 130 – “On April 1993 Mr Smith wrote to AUSTEL and referred to the absent resolution of the Answer NO Voice problem on his service. Mr Smith maintained that it was only his constant complaints that had led Telecom to uncover this condition affecting his service, which he maintained he had been informed was caused by “increased customer traffic through the exchange.” On the evidence available to AUSTEL it appears that it was Mr Smith’s persistence which led to the uncovering and resolving of his problem – to the benefit of all subscribers in his area”.
Point 140 – “It should be noted that AUSTEL’s investigation of matters relating to the RCM problem has been hampered by Telecom’s failure to make available to AUSTEL a file specifically relating to the Pairs Gains Support investigation of the RCM. The file was requested by AUSTEL on 9 February 1994.”
Point 153 –“A feature of the RCM system is that when a system goes “down” the system is also capable of automatically returning back to service. As quoted above, normally when the system goes “down” an alarm would have been generated at the Portland exchange, alerting local staff to a problem in the network. This would not have occurred in the case of the Cape Bridgewater RCM however, as the alarms had not been programmed. It was some 18 months after the RCM was put into operation that the fact the alarms were not programmed was discovered. In normal circumstances the failure to program the alarms would have been deficient, but in the case of the ongoing complaints from Mr Smith and other subscribers in the area the failure to program these alarms or determine whether they were programmed is almost inconceivable.”
Point 158 – “The crucial issue in regard to the Cape Bridgewater RCM is that assuming the lightning strike did cause problems to the RCM om late November 1992 these problems were not resolved till the beginning of March 1993, over 3 months later. This was despite a number of indications of problems in the Cape Bridgewater area. Fault reports from September 1992 also indicate that the commencement of problems with the RCM may have occurred earlier than November 1992. A related issue is that Mr Smith’s persistent complaints were almost certainly responsible for an earlier identification of problems with the RCM than would otherwise have been the case.”
Point 160 – “It should be noted that it is hoped that a number of issues in regard to the Cape Bridgewater RCM will be clarified when Telecom provides the documentation requested by AUSTEL.”
Point 169 –" Documentation reviewed indicates that other network users attached to the Cape Bridgewater exchange did report problems similar to those experienced by Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp. It is also clear that problems identified in the area would have impacted on other network users as well as Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp."
Point 209 – “Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp has a history of service difficulties dating back to 1988. Although most of the documentation dates from 1991 it is apparent that the camp has had ongoing service difficulties for the past six years which has impacted on its business operations causing losses and erosion of customer base.”
Point 210 – “Service faults of a recurrent nature were continually reported by Smith and Telecom was provided with supporting evidence in the form of testimonials from other network users who were unable to make telephone contact with the camp.”
Point 211 – “Telecom testing isolated and rectified faults as they were found however significant faults were identified not by routine testing but rather by the persistence-fault reporting of Smith”.
Point 212 – “In view of the continuing nature of the fault reports and the level of testing undertaken by Telecom doubts are raised on the capability of the testing regime to locate the causes of faults being reported.”
I must submit the information bove before the absentjustice.com reader starts Chapter 2, because as the above example shows, the government had secretly found my later abirritation claims validated. AUSTEL's 1992 and 1993 investigations into my first assessment process facilitated by AUSTEL should have found my claims validated in 1992, had the forenenscly researched Telstra's Portland and Cape Bridgewater telephone exchange logbooks. Had they done so, the casualties of the Telstra saga might have been assessed as more important than the government acknowledged it was.
Reading Chapter 2 below will show the reader this COT story needs to be viewed on its merit.
Chapter 2
Casualties of Telstra
Back to 1992 and 1993, when Sister Maureen Burke IBVM, the Principal of Loreto College in Ballarat, visited the holiday camp to discuss the activities I had organised for the Children, Karen, my partner who had joined me three years after my marriage break up to Faye, had heard of a restaurant in Melbourne suffering the same phone problems that were crippling my business. It seemed then that Sister Maureen Burke IBVM was around at some of my very difficult times when trying to run a telephone-dependent business without a reliable phone service.
I felt a great comfort in hearing this and knew I needed to meet the owner. Making phone contact with the restaurant was difficult; eventually, I got through to Sheila Hawkins, proprietor of The Society restaurant in Bourke Street, in the centre of the city. We arranged to meet, and I travelled to Melbourne in early August.
It was so good to talk to someone who experienced similar problems. And there were more of us. Sheila knew of Ann Garms, who ran the Tivoli Theatre Restaurant in Brisbane, who was also having serious telephone problems. Back in Cape Bridgewater, I rang Ann to discover she was coming to Melbourne the following week to register her own complaints with Austel, the Australian Telecommunications Regulator. We arranged to meet together with Sheila. I went into the city again for the meeting, where Ann mentioned another Brisbane business in similar trouble — a car parts company run by Maureen Gillen. Like Ann's business, Maureen's was trunked off the Fortitude Valley exchange. Sheila, meanwhile, had contacted Graham Schorer, who somehow ran the Golden Courier Service out of North Melbourne — despite a very bad phone service.
Finally, our little group gathered together at Sheila's restaurant in Bourke Street, except for Maureen, who couldn't make the journey from Brisbane. It was Sheila who suggested we call ourselves COT — Casualties of Telstra. This was one of her last actions with the group as she withdrew shortly after due to ill-health.
At the top of the list of problems we held in common were those three little words: 'No fault found.' It wasn't just that we all had to put up with ongoing service faults. Telstra's evasion of responsibility in this regard made those faults a nightmare. Telstra had a duty to deliver us service up to a recognised network standard, and by failing to 'find' their faults, they were effectively avoiding carrying out their statutory obligation.
In October 1992, COT had its first official meeting with Telstra at the Ibis Hotel in Melbourne. We were a united and optimistic group of small-business telephone users on our way down the path to justice. We had no idea what a long haul we were in for. Indeed, this first meeting felt eminently successful. Telstra sent three executives; they treated us courteously, and we felt that our claims were being taken seriously. We were seen and treated as a concerned group of small-business people who Telstra had consistently ignored. We asked for Austel (the government regulator) to be the 'honest broker' in our matters, and the executives agreed to this. They took the documentary evidence we had brought, and at the end of the meeting, we were left with a sense that it was all soon to be resolved.
After that initial meeting, there were a number of meetings with Telstra and Austel. Based as he was in the city, Graham Schorer was the COT representative. Under pressure from Austel, Telstra was acknowledging that faults existed, though they still held back from admitting the scale of faults we knew to be true — and indeed, as it turned out, that they too knew it to be true.
Guaranteed to Network standard
Meanwhile, in July 1992, I was obliged to ask Telstra to guarantee that my phone service was up to standard. A bus service wanted such a guarantee (in case of urgent communication needs) before it would contract to bring groups to the Camp. Although I did not see how Telstra could guarantee such a thing based on current performance, I thought a guarantee might have some use as leverage.
Not one but two guarantees eventually arrived (in the event both were too late to secure the contract with the bus company). The first stated that my phone service was indeed 'up to network standard':
Whilst our recent tests indicate that your service is now performing to normal network standards, I am initiating a further detailed study of all the elements of your service and the tests which have been conducted. 1 September 1992 AS12 file AS-CAV Exhibit 1 to 47
The second stated:
We believe that the quality of your service can be guaranteed and although it would be impossible to suggest that there would never be a service problem we could see no reason why this should be a factor in your business endeavours. 18 September 1992 AS13 file AS-CAV Exhibit 1 to 47
Now I need to jump ahead of myself here. Material that I did not have access to at the time now reveals something of what was going on in the telephone exchange while my business was sinking.
In 1994 we COT members all ended up involved in arbitrations with Telstra. According to the rules of arbitration, Telstra had a legal obligation to provide us with relevant documents under the Freedom of Information Act.
You will hear a lot more about this in due course, not least about the unreasonable time it took for FOI document requests to be delivered (often years too late). Enough to say here, that in an FOI release in mid-1994, I received documents referring to the general congestion problem at Cape Bridgewater.
The second paragraph of a document titled 'Subject PORTLAND – CAPE BRIDGEWATER PCM HBER' of 12 July 1991 was of particular interest:
When the 'A' direction of system 2 was initially tested, 11,000 errors per hour were measured. In the 'B' direction, approximately 216 errors per hour were measured, 72 errors per hour is the specified number allowable.
This level of error was, in fact, known at least as early as February 1990, the very time my complaints were being stonewalled. And nor was it acknowledged to me at the time of writing (July 1991). And in the new exchange, the problems continued, as another document, titled 'Portland — Cape Bridgewater — RCM System' showed, referring to the information logged in March 1993, long after Telstra had first reported these massive error rates:
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Initial error counter readings, Portland to Cape Bridgewater direction: |
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System 1 |
System 2 |
System 3 |
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SES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
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DM |
45993 |
3342 |
2 |
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ES |
65535 |
65535 |
87 |
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At this stage we had no idea over what period of time these errors had accumulated. 12 July 1993 (AS30 file AS-CAV Exhibit 1 to 47 |
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The second page of this document explains why they 'had no idea over what period of time these errors had accumulated':
The alarm system on all three RCM systems had not been programmed. This would have prevented any local alarms being extended back to Portland.
They didn't know how long these errors had been accumulating because, from 18 August 1991, when the new exchange (RCM) was installed at Cape Bridgewater, the fault alarm system had been left unconnected. Since this was an unmanned exchange, no one could know when faults occurred — except, of course, us poor, defenceless customers.
Meaning that in September 1992, when Telstra management had written to me stating that the quality of my telephone service was guaranteed as up to network standard, they had failed to realise that this alarm had not been connected. Even the local telephone technicians were oblivious to the call loss due to the unconnected alarm system in the exchange. What kind of investigation into the faults I had reported over several years does this demonstrate? A farcical one. How, for several years, could they fail to notice that the alarm wasn't connected?
A compensation deal
The formation of COT had come not a moment too soon for me. The frustration of struggling with problems that seemed immune to complaints and about which I could do nothing but complain could finally be shared. I had lost faith in my own judgement by this time; I had let down two different partners who had trusted me, and I was now borrowing from friends just to keep the Camp running on a day-to-day basis. Through all of this, of course, the phone faults implacably continued.
The COT group continued to negotiate with Austel and Telstra. In late 1992, our combined pressure finally produced results: Telstra approached me with a proposal for a compensation payout, which included a confidentiality agreement to the effect that I would not disclose the value of any settlement which resulted from this. I signed this agreement on 11 December 1992, and I have honoured my word not to disclose the amount of the payout without prior approval by Telstra.
That same day, I went to Telstra's city fault centre, where the area general manager and I began a long discussion regarding the extent of my financial losses over the four and a half years since I first complained about the phones. This manager and I were the only people involved in this discussion. I provided her with copies of numerous letters I had received from clients and tradespeople, describing their experiences trying to ring me. I explained how I had calculated the sum of my losses.
On a number of occasions, the manager left me alone to examine the documents she had given me. As she left on the first occasion, she explained that she would close the door so I could read in private and added that I was free to use the telephone if I needed to discuss anything with my advisors. There was a direct outside line available at all times, so I wouldn't need to speak to an operator within the building. I made use of the phone a couple of times to ring Karen and talk over the offer; together, we calculated how much I needed to repay her.
The documents provided by the manager were mostly hand-written and included copies of the so-called 'guarantees' I had received. According to one of the documents. Points 73 to 109 AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings shows there was only a 'single' fault, lasting only three weeks, that triggered the recorded message (RVA) that my number was not connected. This document claimed that the RVA probably caused me to lose only about 50% of all incoming calls over these three weeks. Other documents referred to a minor fault in the phone exchange at Heywood, plus some other minor faults which may have contributed to some call loss. The manager told me Telstra agreed to accept responsibility for these faults if I agreed to their offer.
I protested and reeled off again the continuing and constant complaints I had been getting from customers. Her response was a simple 'take it or leave it': this was Telstra's last offer, she told me, and the only other avenue I could follow would be court proceedings. Her final comment was along the lines that, 'Telstra has more time than you have money to fund court proceedings.' Reluctantly, but feeling I had no other choice, I accepted. My reluctance was well justified.
By August 1993 came my first bundle of FOI documents from Telstra. In it, astonishingly, it was a Telstra minute of 2 July 1992, which revealed that local Telstra technicians regarded my complaints as correct about the 'service disconnected' RVA on my line. Not only that, the observation was made that the problem 'is occurring in increasing numbers as more and more customers are connected …' Senator Alston raised this document in Senate Estimates in February 1994, demanding a response from Austel. No response was forthcoming, and nowhere else did this revelation gather any advance for my cause, i.e.:
Ericsson AXE faulty telephone exchange equipment (2)
“Our local technicians believe that Mr Smith is correct in raising complaints about incoming callers to his number receiving a Recorded Voice Announcement saying that the number is disconnected.
“They believe that it is a problem that is occurring in increasing numbers as more and more customers are connected to AXE.” False Witness Statement File No 3-A
To further support my claims that Telstra already knew how severe my Ericsson Portland AXE telephone faults were, can best be viewed by reading Folios C04006, C04007 and C04008, headed TELECOM SECRET Front Page Part Two 2-B, which states:
“Legal position – Mr Smith’s service problems were network related and spanned a period of 3-4 years. Hence Telecom’s position of legal liability was covered by a number of different acts and regulations. … In my opinion Alan Smith’s case was not a good one to test Section 8 for any previous immunities – given his evidence and claims. I do not believe it would be in Telecom’s interest to have this case go to court.
“Overall, Mr Smith’s telephone service had suffered from a poor grade of network performance over a period of several years; with some difficulty to detect exchange problems in the last 8 months.”
And two years later, I received a copy of an FOI document headed by Telecom Secret. AS5 file AS 1 to 47 This was a copy of the notes brought by the manager to the settlement meeting. The opening page, reproduced here, shows all too clearly that Telstra knew how solid my case was. The manager had blatantly misled me into agreeing to sign.
My acceptance of the offer notwithstanding, I continued to experience faults in my phone service. Particularly call drop-outs when part-way through a conversation, the line would simply go dead, and short duration rings when the phone would ring once or twice and then stop, with no one there if we picked up the receiver. Finally, in October of 1992, the area general manager arranged for two testing machines (called 'Elmi' machines) to be installed, one at the local Cape Bridgewater exchange and the other at my office.
When the COT Cases exposed this Ericsson AXE call loss rate to AUSTEL (the then government communications regulator), AUSTEL (now ACMA) instigated an investigation into these AXE exchange faults and uncovered some 120,000 COT-type complaints were being experienced around Australia. Exhibit Introduction File No/8-A to 8-C) shows AUSTEL’s Chairman Robin Davey received a letter from Telstra’s Group General Manager, suggesting he alter that finding:
For example, at point 4 on page 3, Telstra writes:
“The Report, when commenting on the number of customers with Cot-type problems, refers to a research study undertaken by Telecom at Austel’s request. The Report extrapolates from those results and infers that the number of customers so affected could be as high as 120,000.
However, at point 2 on page 1 of Telstra’s letter 9 April 1994, Telstra writes:
“In relation to point 4, you have agreed to withdraw the reference in the Report to the potential existence of 120,000 COT-type customers and replace it with a reference to the potential existence of “some hundreds” of COT-type customers”.
The fact that on this occasion, on 9 April 1994, Telstra (the defendants) were able to pressure the Government Regulator to change their original findings in the formal April 1994 AUSTEL COT Case report is alarming, to say the least. Worse is that when AUSTEL released it into the public domain, the report states that AUSTEL only uncovered 50 or more COT-type complaints.
50 COT-type customer AXE complaints in comparison to 120,000 COT-type customer AXE complaints is one hell of a lie told by the government to its citizens who voted them into power.
False Reporting
For a government regulator to reduce their findings from 120.000 COT-type complaints to read just 50 or more COT-type customer complaints is one hell of a lie told to its citizens. Were the government's downplaying of the Ericsson AXE fault complaints part of the overall collusion, which involved the purchasing of Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd, who often worked on government contracts?
Because the faulty Ericsson AXE telephone equipment played such an important part in the COT Cases 1994 to 1999 arbitration procedure, I have introduced it here along with the selling off of Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd (the arbitration technical unit) to Ericsson, the very corporation it had been commissioned to investigate, during the COT arbitrations.
How can an Australian company like Lane be sold off during an Australian government-endorsed arbitration to a Swedish International telecommunications company it is investigating? If this is not collusion and corruption of the worst possible kind, then what is?
Australia must be the only country in the Western world that allows a witness (Lane Telecommunications Ptd Ltd) was a witness to what the COT claimants and arbitrator had uncovered against Ericsson to be purchased by the very same company who were officially under investigation. This purchase bought the silence of Lane once the money was in the bank. The career politician again had closed their eyes to this collusion, regardless of how unethical all this had become, with one aim in mind to ensure the COT Cases were "stopped at all costs" from proving their arbitration claims pages 36 and 38 Senate -Senate - Parliament of Australia.
I believe the Australian government should answer the following questions: How long was Lane Telecommunications in contact with Ericsson, the major supplier of telecommunication equipment to Telstra, before Ericsson purchased Lanes? Is there a link between Lane ignoring my Ericsson AXE claim documents and the purchase of Lane by Ericsson during the COT arbitration process? Is there a sinister link between the government communications media regulator ACMA denying me access to the Ericsson AXE documentation, which I lawfully tried to gain access to during my two government Administrative Appeal Tribunal hearings in 2008 and 2011 Chapter 9 - The ninth remedy pursued and Chapter 12 - The twelfth remedy pursued?
The latest 2019/2020 5G Ericsson partnership with Telstra is relevant to all Australian Telstra subscribers; however, it is also relevant that the same subscribers visit my website, absentjustice.com, where you can see that my claims against Telstra and Ericsson are valid.
Purchasing all of Lane Telecommunications' COT-related arbitration files (during the COT arbitrations) was a most significant coup for both Telstra and Ericsson because all of the arbitration technical information Lane had acquired as a witness during the COT arbitrations, which were stored in Lane's computer system as well as in hard copy records belonged to Ericsson once they owned Lane.
What the Australian government appears not to have considered when they allowed Lane to be sold off during our government-endorsed arbitrations is that Lane had signed a Confidentiality Arbitration Agreement in which each of the COT claimants also signed agreeing under no circumstances, they would disclose to a third party any information they obtained during the COT arbitrations. Here, Lane is the main arbitration witness allowed to sell that confidential acquired information to Ericsson, whom Lane had been assigned to investigate.
it is on record that when Lane together with Telstra and I visited the Portland Ericsson AXE telephone exchange and the Cape Bridgewater unmanned switching exchange on 6 April 1995, both Lane and Telstra would not allow me to view the Portland Ericsson AXE log book. It is most important I attach here the following link. Although dated 1996, all Ericsson exchanges had their own logbooks (see page 20 > http://www.wedophones.com/Manuals/EricssonNotInService/AXE%20Operation%20And%20Maint%. It is also on record that the arbitrator would not access this logbook under the arbitration discovery process. Even the Commonwealth Ombudsman (during my arbitration) tried to acquire this same logbook using my FOI applications but was unsuccessful.
If the hackers mentioned on our webpage Hacking Julian Assange/Chapter One were Julian Assange and his friend, and it is very likely it was them, then why hasn't the Australian Government understood what the hackers wanted to share with us COT cases? He did not ask for payment in sharing what he and his friends had uncovered concerning Telstra’s ailing copper wire network, as would have been the case if he had been a common criminal. He wanted us to have a fair arbitration hearing, and that was all. Had we used the information on offer, then the arbitrator would have been compelled to demand that Telstra fix its degraded Ericsson exchange equipment instead of bringing down his findings, which did not disclose the true extent of the corroded network that was destroying the COT cases' businesses and numerous other telephone dependent businesses throughout Australia.
This part of the story is of my battle with the first and second Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman and the Australian Government, a battle that has twisted and turned since 10 November 1993 through elected governments, government departments, regulatory bodies, the judiciary and the Australian telecommunications giant Telstra. This part of the COT story commenced on December 1993 TIO Evidence File No 3-A, an internal Telstra email (FOI folio A05993) dated 10 November 1993, from Chris Vonwiller to Telstra’s corporate secretary Jim Holmes, CEO Frank Blount, group general manager of commercial Ian Campbell and other important members of the then-government owned corporation. The subject is Warwick Smith – COT cases, and it is marked as CONFIDENTIAL:
Exhibit TIO Evidence File No 3-A confirms that two weeks before the TIO was officially appointed as the administrator of the Fast Track Settlement Proposal FTSP, which became the Fast-Track Arbitration Procedure (FTAP) he was providing the soon-to-be defendants (Telstra) of that process with privileged, government party room information about the COT cases. Not only did the TIO breach his duty of care to the COT claimants, he appears to have also compromised his own future position as the official independent administrator of the process.
I reported four calls dropping out at 1.20, 1.40, 2.00 and 3.00
Why didn't AUSTEL investigate the ELMI Tapes I provided them in August 1993, which were inadvertently left in Telstra's Briefcase on 3 June 1993, which confirmed on 13 October 1992 that Telstra had lied about the ongoing drop-out calls to my business which the ELMI tapes show arrived. Still, Telstra stated the Tapes did not record this activity when the tapes show otherwise. Who within the government communications regulatory office concealed these wrongs by Telstra (see directly below)?
On 13 October 1992, I reported four calls dropping out at 1.20, 1.40, 2.00 and 3.00, and an occasion when I had answered the phone to find a deadline. Despite the Elmi machines, the Telstra technicians found no faults that they could detect as they had in so many instances before. What was going on?
I raised these Elmi non-connected calls with AUSTEL (as a matter of public interest) twelve months later after I proved to AUSTEL's John MacMahon that Bell Canada International Inc (BCI tests) could not have possibly conducted their testing at the Cape Bridgewater Addendum RCM switching exchange. And here Telstra was again lying about their testing at the Cape Bridgewater RCM switching exchange, this time regarding the failed Elmi testing AS11 file AS 1 to 47.
It was two years before I got any elucidation from Telstra, and even then, it shed no light on the matter. In 1994, in a bundle of FOI documents I received was a hand-written file note stating: -
'We had the Elmi disconnected at the RCM and were installing it at Mr Smith's house, and the CCAS showed no evidence of above 1.20, 1.40, 2.00 and 3.00.' AS11 file AS 1 to 47.
This was simply not the case at all; I knew they were not installing it at my house at this time; it was already installed. So I asked Telstra to supply their Elmi print-outs from September–October 1992. Some weeks later, many documents arrived, including tapes that show that the call drop-outs and deadlines that I had experienced appeared on Telstra's monitoring equipment (CCAS) records as answered calls at approximately 1.30 pm and 3 pm.
I could not fathom why a local technician would state that the Elmi equipment was disconnected at the exchange and installed at my house when these two print-outs show that it was installed and operating at both locations incorrectly. I could only assume that all this reflected the competence and capacity of Telstra's fault centre, as well as the accuracy of their records and reportage. That thought alone was very worrying when you are reliant on the telephone.
And now I began to suspect that there might not be a simple answer to the phone faults, just waiting to be discovered and fixed. It looked as if the problems were endemic throughout the organisation and its infrastructure.
As I struggled from the end of 1992 to the New Year of 1993, I began to wonder if 'settling' with Telstra had been such a good idea. Nothing had changed. I had been forced to re-finance, incurring more set-up fees, and because I still couldn't afford to maintain the Camp properly the place was looking decidedly abandoned. I felt as if I had been abandoned too. Both the buildings and I were tired, run-down and in need of a facelift!
The other COT members were no better off. Maureen and Ann had also accepted settlements directly from Telstra, while Graham had his through the courts. And for each of us, poor and faulty phone service continued unabated.
My only source of strength at this time was from my fellow COT members. One Saturday evening, a couple of Scotches left me in tears of complete frustration. I knew I was easily capable of running the Camp as I pictured it, but instead, I was trapped in a vicious cycle. Without customers, I would soon be completely broke, but the customers couldn't reach me because the phones didn't work. Right then, Graham Schorer rang, urging me to hang in there, convinced that we would win out in the end.
Yes, some calls did get through, in what proportion I shall never know, though perhaps the rate is indicated by the following story. In personal desperation, I decided to ring Don Burnard, a clinical psychologist the COT members had contacted when we started creating the group. Dr Burnard had written a report regarding our individual conditions, noting the breakdown in our psychological defences due to the excessive and prolonged pressures we endured:
All of these clients have been subjected to persistent environmental stress as a result of constant pressure in their business and erratic patterns of change in the functioning of their telephones which were essential to the success of their businesses.
I rang Dr Burnard for support, but my conversation with his receptionist was interrupted three times by phone faults. Later I received a letter from his office, saying:
I am writing to you to confirm details of telephone conversation difficulties experienced between this office and our residence mid-morning this day, 5 May 1993. At approximately 11.30 am today Mr Alan Smith telephoned this office requesting to speak with Don Burnard. Mr Burnard was not available to take his call. During this time the telephone cut out three times. Each time Mr Smith telephoned back to continue the call.
Ann Garms and Graham Schorer had, by now, become my comrades in arms in this war we were fighting, and we had many group discussions as we tried to find a way to deal with the evasions and deceptions of Telstra management. But we were simply three small business people struggling against the might of a huge corporation. Not encouraging odds! We wondered if we could ever be in a position to expose Telstra's unethical corporate strategies and continued and apparently deliberate mishandling of our complaints. And Ann, like myself, had begun to suspect that our phone lines were being bugged. I will return to this later once we are able to provide evidence that our concerns are valid.
Early in 1993, as a spokesperson for COT, Graham Schorer met with Robin Davey, the chairman of Austel (the telecommunications industry regulator), to discuss our way forward. Austel was sympathetic to our situation. It recognised we had been let down in our settlements and sought to establish a standard of service against which Telstra's performance could be objectively measured in any future settlements.
Meanwhile, COT decided it was time to try to inform the Australian Senate of our plight. We sent submission after submission, with supporting FOI documents, and followed through with visits to Canberra, financed from our already depleted pockets, to meet with ministers who were sympathetic to our case.
By now, I had accumulated more than seventy letters from customers who had been unable to reach me by phone. This example, from a Year 7 co-ordinator for Hamilton High School (now Bainbridge College), who brought his group along every February from 1990, is typical:
“I wish to acknowledge in writing the repeated difficulty I have had contacting Alan Smith at the Cape Bridgewater convention centre by telephone. In the week 1st to 5 March, I made 5 or 6 attempted phone calls to Alan but I was unable to get through, indeed the line was 'dead'. This was extremely frustrating and had I not been aware of Alan's phone problems, I would have used another camp site”.
Astonishingly, one letter, dated 17 May 1993, was from a senior Telstra technical engineer, who wrote regarding his own experience of trying to ring me:
“On the 24/2/93, I received a phone call from a technician at Portland who stated he had been given a fault from (1100 fault dept.) indicating a customer in Ballarat had trouble calling your business 055 267 267. I then attempted to ring 055 267 267 myself, the ring was tripped after several bursts, i.e. 'answered', and I received a loud noise similar to a radio carrier noise and a very faint 'Hello'’.
At last, a second person inside Telstra acknowledged that I had a problem with the phone service! The engineer had even given me his name. Yet, in the course of their defence of my arbitration claims, Telstra proffered a Witness Statement from this man (made in December 1994) that included no reference to my ongoing telephone problems.
