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Telstra's Falsified BCI Report 2

 

Malfeasance, Felonious, and Illicit Dealings

 

Absent Justice - Bell Canada International

I believe you are taking the most appropriate course of action

I have never received a written response from BCI, but the Canadian government ministers’ office wrote back on 7 July 1995, noting:

"In view of the facts of this situation, as I understand them, I believe you are taking the most appropriate course of action in contacting BCI directly with respect to the alleged errors in their test report, should you feel that they could assist you in your case."   

 

On pages 23-8 of the letter, Graham Schorer (COT spokesperson) provided Sue Laver (the current 2024 Telstra Corporate Secretary) with damning evidence. It shows that Telstra knowingly submitted false information to the Senate Committee on Notice while Ms Laver and Telstra were assuring the chair of the Senate legislation committee that there was nothing wrong with the BCI test conducted at Cape Bridgewater.

This false information was provided to the Senate regardless of whether the Senate requested it to be supplied on notice. Additionally, the two documents dated January 1998 (refer to (Scrooge - exhibit 62-Part One ([document|1836]) confirm that Telstra knew in January 1998 that the BCI information, later provided to the Senate in October 1998, had to have been false. It is concerning that no one within Telstra has been held accountable for supplying false Cape Bridgewater BCI results to the Senate on notice. Had Telstra not provided this false information to the Senate on notice and acknowledged the accuracy of my claims, the Senate would have addressed all the BCI matters in 1998, the same BCI matters I am now highlighting on absentjustice.com in 2024.

 

On pages 23-8 of the letter, Graham Schorer (COT spokesperson) clearly provided Sue Laver (the current 2024 Telstra Corporate Secretary) with damning evidence. It shows that Telstra knowingly submitted false information to the Senate Committee on Notice while Ms Laver and Telstra were assuring the chair of the Senate legislation committee that there was nothing wrong with the BCI test conducted at Cape Bridgewater.

This false information was provided to the Senate regardless of whether the Senate requested it to be supplied on notice. Additionally, the two documents dated January 1998 (refer to (Scrooge - exhibit 62-Part One confirm that Telstra knew in January 1998 that the BCI information, later provided to the Senate in October 1998, had to have been false. It is concerning that no one within Telstra has been held accountable for supplying false Cape Bridgewater BCI results to the Senate on notice. Had Telstra not provided this false information to the Senate on notice and acknowledged the accuracy of my claims, the Senate would have addressed all the BCI matters in 1998, the same BCI matters I am now highlighting on absentjustice.com in 2024.

 

BELL CANADA INTERNATIONAL (BCI) TESTS

Background

Telstra agreed with the government communications regulator AUSTEL (now ACMA) to appoint Bell Canada International Inc. (BCI) to carry out an independent study into the capability of the service lines and exchanges that Alan Smith had alleged were malfunctioning. This initially involved Alan Smith and three other COT claimants.

AUSTEL and Telstra however, agreed to a deal that allowed BCI to test only the network service lines going into the local exchanges that serviced those four businesses. They were not required to test the lines from the various local exchanges to the four individual COT businesses. Instead, Telstra had assured AUSTEL (as is shown in the official AUSTEL COT Cases Report of April 1994) that they would carry out a special type of ‘service verification testing’ (SVI tests) from the local exchanges to the COT business premises. This way the arbitrator could be absolutely sure that all of the COT businesses (the number had now grown to five) were operating up to the regulator’s standards.

Telstra had promised that Alan’s business, along with the other COT Cases, that the problem known as the Difficult Network Fault (DNF) would definitely be included in this special verification testing process. However no such tests were ever performed on Alan's service lines and/or the lines running into the Cape Bridgewater telephone exchange.

There are some critical issues that mean the tests cannot have been conducted as claimed by BCI and Telstra and that may imply that some correspondence from BCI was falsified or that Telstra falsified it themselves in their so far successful attempt to disprove COT claims.

The TEKELEC/CCS7 monitoring system could not have been used in the Cape Bridgewater Exchange

In the report produced by BCI, they claimed to have run 13,500 tests calls from Melbourne INTO the Cape Bridgewater exchange using the Ericsson CCS7 monitoring equipment, within the exchange, to receive those calls. They claimed a 99.8% success rate.

However, this cannot have happened, as the Cape Bridgwater exchange cannot operate the Ericsson CCS7 monitoring equipment. This has been confirmed by Brian Hodge MBA in a technical report dated 27th July, 2007 (refer Main Evidence File No/3). Mr Hodge concludes that BCI could not have generated their 13,000 tests through CCS7 equipment at the Cape Bridgewater RCM, because that RCM could not accommodate the Ericsson CCS7 monitoring equipment. See Brian Hodges report Exhibit 42 (BCI).

However, the equipment WAS set up in the Warrnambool exchange, which could not have been used to test these particular lines, and which was not mentioned in any report.

Two sets of tests could not have been conducted simultaneously

In addition, Telstra was running their own testing INTO the Cape Bridgewater exchange, between 28 October 1993 to 8 November 1993 from the hours of 8 am to 10 pm, using a NEAT testing unit. For 4 of the 5 days which Telstra alleged BCI had performed their testing at Cape Bridgewater, Telstra themselves were running a series of Tests for AUSTEL. Is it possible to have the two tests running simultaneously using the same single incoming number given that the NEAT process must hold the lines open for 120 seconds before the next tests is generated, and in the case of the BCI tests that system would have need fifteen seconds between each successful call to re generate the next call? In addition, the same telephone number, 055 267211, was alleged to have been used for both the Telstra and BCI tests, which were apparently being conducted simultaneously. This would seem to be highly unlikely.

Several of the letters from BCI were not on official BCI letterhead

More doubt can be raised about the BCI evidence as several of the letters used in evidence by Telstra were not on BCI letterhead. At the least BCI should have been asked to replicate them on letterhead, but this was not requested.

Conclusion

The only possible conclusion is that the BCI tests were never conducted at the Cape Bridgewater exchange. Even had different equipment been used, the two tests could not have occurred simultaneously.

Another uncomfortable possibility presents itself, that BCI did not actually write some of the letters produced in evidence, or if they did, were trying to distance themselves by not using official letterhead.

Despite these anomalies, the BCI test results were used by Telstra to support their arbitration defence of Alan Smith's claims, without explanation of the deficiencies and omissions.
Documentary Evidence

Between May and September 2015, the Hon Tony Abbott, Prime Minister office and various Coalition ministers including the Australian Federal Police have been provided on Exhibit AS-001 BCI Report and AS-002 BCI Telstra’s M.D.C Exhibits 1 to 46 BCI  that confirm the many statements I have made in my website absentjustice.com.   

Neither the Prime Minister's office, the aforementioned Coalition ministers of the AFP have refuted the BCI evidence provided.

 

 

Exhibit #

Type of correspond-ence

Date

From

To

Summary of content

Commentary

1

Letter

29th September 1993

Bell Canada International Inc

General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

This person was to be appointed to the investigation.

On page 4 of this letter, are the references to his qualifications.

With thirty-three years of line and staff experience, had previously handled other international consultation works for BCI.

Note that Exhibits 1 – 7 are sent by three different BCI consultants to Telstra

All correspondence is on official letterhead, which includes the BCI postal address in Ontario, Canada and the Telex/fax and telephone numbers.

2

Letter

30th September 1993

Director Sales & Marketing Asia Pacific, Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

This letter is included here to show that, when BCI write to Telstra it was on their letterhead.

However, the two alleged BCI letters that Telstra submitted to the Senate Estimates Committee 'On Notice', in which BCI stated only one minor type error had occurred in the Cape Bridgewater tests, were not written on BCI letterhead. This raises a doubt as to their authenticity.

3

Fax

5th November 1993

Director, Business Development, Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra

Brisbane

Letter discusses the BCI qualified technical consultant who would head the BCI study in Australia.

4

Fax with letter

5th November 1993

Fax with attached letter from  Director Sales & Marketing Asia Pacific, Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

Letter discusses the qualified technical consultant who would head the BCI study in Australia.

5

Letter

30th November 1993

BCI Director Sales & Marketing Asia Pacific, Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

This letter discusses further tests that might be conducted by BCI while he was still in Australia.

6

Letter

14th December 1993

Consultant at Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

Consultant (on behalf of BCI) is answering criticism from Telstra regarding the way BCI carried out their assignment in Australia.

7

Letter

14th December 1993

Consultant from Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

Consultant (on behalf of BCI) is answering criticism from Telstra regarding the way BCI carried out their assignment in Australia.

8

Letter

11th August 1995

Consultant for  Bell Canada International Inc

To Telstra's arbitration liaison officer

This letter refers to a previous letter mistakenly attributed to Telstra, dated 6th September 1994.

The letter was actually from Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane, not from Telstra's Arbitration Liaison officer.

The letter dated 11th August from the BCI consultant who supposedly did the tests , was written in response to allegations previously made by Alan Smith that during and after the arbitration process, that the Cape Bridgewater BCI tests were fundamentally flawed.

In this letter BCI  states that the BCI report included an incorrect date (5th November 1993) but maintains that this does not “… affect the validity of the testing process or the test results”.

In the first paragraph, the ZBCI consultant states: “I am sorry for the late reply but I did not receive your correspondence dated September 6, 1994 concerning the anomaly found in the date of the test call records.”

Although this letter was written to Telstra's arbitration liaison officer , the letter dated September 6, 1994 was from Telstra’s General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane, not from Telstra's arbitration liaison officer (Exhibit 9).

This letter was not on BCI letterhead which gives some reason to doubt its authenticity.

Alan Smith has also been able to show that another type of testing was being carried out over four of the five days of BCI testing and that none of the BCI test calls on the four days in question, the 4th, 6th, 8th and 9th November 1993, could have been carried out as shown in the BCI report. (See the introduction).

In simple terms, the lines would have been too congested.

 

9a

Internal email

20th June 1994

Chief Engineer for, Telstra

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane Telstra and others

This email notes

Re Cape Bridgewater BCI tests: “…It would appear that there is an error of some sort in the report of the testing from Richmond on the afternoon of the 5/11/93.

FOI folio N00040

This email refers to a letter from Alan Smith doubting the testing process used by BCI.

9b

Letter, 2 pages

6th September 1994

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

To the consultant who supposedly did the Cape Bridgewater

Bell Canada International Inc

This letter confirms that at least one set of BCI tests conducted at Cape Bridgewater were impracticable – in other words, they could not have been carried out.

FOI folio N00005 and N00006

9c

Internal email

23 August 1994

Telstra's, Technical Support

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

This email confirms the same set of BCI tests were impracticable – ie they could not have been carried out as claimed, both because the equipment they claimed to have used could not be operated in that exchange and because other testing was happening simultaneously.

FOI folio N00037

10

Letter

NOT Dated

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

BCI Director Sales & Marketing Asia Pacific, Bell Canada International Inc

Telstra's  General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane did sign the letter.This letter shows Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Brisbane and BCI consultant regularly communicated during this period.

In this BCI consultants' letter dated 11th August 1995 (Exhibit 8), he states: “…I also reviewed my personal travel log to verify the times and dates of my movements from Melbourne to Portland during the testing period”.

He does not make any reference to the actual dates or times he travelled to Portland, and he makes no reference to travelling to Cape Bridgewater at all, even though this is where the tests were being generated to.

11

Signed witness statement

12th December 1994

Prepared by a Telstra employee, in support of Telstra’s arbitration defence of Alan Smith’s claim.

 

On page two of this document this employee  states: “In addition to this testing system, I made arrangements to utilise CCS7 call data which was derived from equipment set up at the Warrnambool AXE exchange.” 

The CCS7 equipment was set up in the Warrnambool exchange (120 kilometres from Cape Bridgewater) because neither the Portland Exchange nor the Cape Bridgewater RCM could accommodate this equipment. see Exhibit 11 and Exhibit 42 (BCI) 

12

signed witness statement

8th December 1994

prepared by another Telstra consultant in support of Telstra’s arbitration defence of Alan Smith’s claim.

 

On page 4 of this document this employee  states: “At the beginning of our second investigation of Mr Smith’s telephone service, we placed CCS7 testing equipment at the Warrnambool exchange because the Portland Exchange, despite being an AXE digital exchange, does not utilise CCS7 signalling and could not facilitate CCS7 testing.” 

This supports Brian Hodges report of 27th July 2007, which states that BCI could not have generated their alleged 13,000 tests calls to the CCS7 equipment at Cape Bridgewater RCM, because as this Telstra’ consultant concludes, the RCM “… could not facilitate CCS7 testing.”

13

Copy of the BCI Addendum Report

10th November 1993

Prepared by BCI in relation to John Main (Glen Waters Fish Farm) and Alan Smith (Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp)

 

On the bottom of page two of this report BCI state: “…As shown in 15.13 and 15.23 the Tekelec CCS7 monitoring system was used to monitor all CCS7 links terminating to the homing exchanges of the two COT clients.”

In the case of Alan Smith, how could BCI have generated their 13,000 tests calls through the CCS7 links terminating to the homing exchange, when the CCS7 equipment couldn’t be used at that the Cape Bridgewater RCM?

14

Internal Telstra document

No Date

Telstra

To AUSTEL

This document discusses tests between18 Oct 93 to 8 Nov 93 regarding the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp.

It confirms that, between 28th October 1993 and 8th November 1993, Telstra themselves (NOT BCI) were conducting their own tests.

It has since been established in the official government regulatory AUSTEL COT Cases report of April 1994 point 11.12 that BCI only tested the lines into the exchanges of the COT Cases and did not do the testing from the exchange to the customer premises

AUSTEL allowed Telstra to test the exchange lines to the COT Case businesses premises under special conditions called verification testing which would be conducted once those COT cases were in a settlement arbitration process.

Telstra did not test those lines even though they advised the arbitrator under oath that they did. This is a separate issue detailed in the report titled “Service Verification Tests” that will be available for scrutiny on absentjustice.com.

15a

Letter

10 November 1993

Telstra Network Manager

John MacMahon, General Manager for Consumer Affairs, AUSTEL

This letter confirms from the statement on page one, paragraph 3: "Each test call is held for 100 seconds to conduct transmission tests and detect drop-outs etc. This holding the line open for 100 seconds between each test call would have made it impossible for any other type of testing to have been conducted at the same PTAR testing station/ number 055 267211 during the date of 28th October and 8thNovember 1993, which BCI alleged they conducted their test on 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 November 1993 

 

Note: no other test call can be generated to the same PTARS test number while NEAT testing is being performed.

15b

Internal Telstra Memo 

15 Nov 1993

Telstra's Network Manager

Telstra's General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane

This letter notes at point 2: “…In the case of NEAT testing calls had to be generated in low traffic periods in order to achieve and adequate sample size in the time available.

This tends to confirm that NEAT and the BCI testing could not have been conducted simultaneously.

16

Official AUSTEL COT Report

13th April 1994

AUSTEL

The Communications Minister Michael Lee MP

Page 157 confirms that NEAT testing was being carried out to 055 267211 between 28th October and 8th November 1993, between 0800 and 2200 hours, on each of those days.

Even if the CCS7 monitoring equipment could be operated at the Cape Bridgewater RCM, the testing could not have been performed between 4th and 8th November 1993, because they would have clashed with the NEAT testing (see also Brian Hodges’ report dated 27th July 2007).

17

Senate Hansard records

26th September 1997

 

 

These two documents, pages 108 and 109 from Senate Hansard records of 26th September 1997, ask the same questions regarding the BCI tests.

Senator Schacht asked, in a question ‘on notice’, to see a copy of the same BCI letter referred to at Exhibit 8.

 

18

Internal Telstra fax

7 July 1993

A second Telstra network engineer

 

This fax confirms that a delay of at least fifteen seconds is required between each test call performed to the PTARS 055 267211 line into the RCM at Cape Bridgewater

FOI folio K03888

This contributes to the case that both sets of tests, the Telstra and the BCI, could not have been conducted simultaneously.

19a and 19b

Summary document

 

Alan Smith

 

Using the date of the alleged BCI tests to 055 267211 on 5/11/93, Alan Smith has attached a brief summary of his own, using the two separate sets of tests that BCI allege terminated to the same 055 267211 PTARS over a particular period.

This summary shows that it was not possible for these tests to have been carried out as BCI claim. 

Exhibit 9(a) shows that Telstra advised the relevant BCI consultant that: “Specifically, the start and finish times for the test run from Richmond digital exchange (RCMX), test line 03 428 8974, to Portland exchange, Cape Bridgewater RCM (CBWR) number range, test line 055 267211, (detailed in section 15.23 of the report) are impracticable.”

Exhibit 9(b), a Telstra internal email, discusses the same set of impracticable tests, noting however: “As Rudi and Gerry (BCI consultants) intended to go to Portland to see to see the exchange and RCM, travelling on Friday afternoon 5/11/93, they ensured that a TRT run from Richmond had ceased and that a run from South Yarra had commenced with no troubles before they left Melbourne at about 12.45 that day. They made a call from Warrnambool exchange to ensure the run from South Yarra was terminated, but have no notes to confirm the date and time of the call.”

The ‘Gerry’ referred to here is the relevant BCO consultant (Exhibit 9(b)).

Note: in the first paragraph of BCI consultants letter (Exhibit 8), he states “I also reviewed my personal travel log to verify the times and dates of my movements from Melbourne to Portland during the testing period”, but gives no time and date details. 

20

Letter

9th December 1993

Cliff Mathieson, AUSTEL

To Telstra's Manager of Commercial

This letter states: “Having regard to the above, I am of the opinion that the BCI report should not be made available to the assessor(s) nominated for the COT Cases without a copy of this letter being attached to it.”

Note:  In BCI letter dated 14th December 1993, to Telstra’s  General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane Exhibit 6 (BCI), a further BCI personal  states: “The purpose of this letter, is to respond to comments made in Austel’s letter to Mr Ian Campbell dated 9 December 1993. Finally, Austel’s statement in the letter that in its “opinion” the BCI report should not be made available to the assessors(s) nominated for the COT Cases without a copy of this letter being attached to it.”

 

21

Draft of Letter

15th December 1993

Telstra's General Manger

Robin Davey, Chairman, AUSTEL

This draft letter discusses some of the shortfalls in the BCI tests.

on page one of this letter Mr Campbell refers to a letter dated 9th December 1993, from Cliff Mathieson (Exhibit 20). On the last page of this letter Mr Campbell states: “Considering the above circumstances, Telecom cannot agree to attach a copy of AUSTEL’s letter of 9 December to the BCI report if the latter is made available to the assessors(s) nominated for the CoT Cases.” 

A hand-written note at the bottom of document A00407 points to the 9th December 1993 letter from AUSTEL, and notes: “…there is a multitude of inaccuracies. This is a s’ment (statement) to c’fim (confirm?) Austel that we (T) (Telstra) will not provide assessor with all the facts.”

FOI folio A00404 to A00407

Alan Smith did not receive this letter from Telstra's General manager of Commercial until after Telstra had submitted their defence of Alan’s claim: the handwritten note had already been added.

22

Letter

2nd May 1994

 Arbitrator

Arbitration Resource Unit Manager

The letter states, in the last paragraph on page one:

“I am anxious for these matters to proceed as expeditiously as possible. In the circumstances I believe it would be appropriate for the Resource Unit to familiarise itself with documentation which will unquestionably be placed in evidence, namely: (1). Bell Canada International Inc, Report to Telecom”, 1 November 1993; (3) Telecom Australia, “Response to Coopers & Lybrand Report and Bell Canada International Report”, December 1993.”

 

23

Letter

18th July 1994

Arbitrator

 Arbitration Resource Unit Manager

“On the 13 July 1994, the Resource Unit requested copies of the Bell Canada Report, the Coopers & Lybrand Report and the Telecom response to these reports.”

 

24

Letter

11th August 1994

Arbitrator

Alan Smith

This letter lists the documents Dr Hughes had received from Telstra regarding the BCI information.

Note:  This list does not include the letter dated 9th December 1993, from AUSTEL’s Cliff Mathieson (Exhibit 20), which Mr Mathieson stated should be provided to the assessors(s) nominated for the COT Cases.

This implies that the Resource Unit did not see Cliff Mathieson’s letter of 9th December 1993. Exhibits 9(a), 9(b), 22, 23 and 24 suggest that the arbitration resource unit were unaware that Telstra had actually acknowledged internally that the BCI Addendum Cape Bridgewater Report was impracticable and that neither the resource unit nor Dr Hughes ever saw AUSTEL’s letter of 9th December 1993.

25

Letter

29 June 1995

Alan Smith’s Solicitors, Taits of Warrnambool

Cliff Mathieson, Chief Engineer, AUSTEL?

This letter asks relevant questions regarding both the BCI tests performed at Cape Bridgewater during November 1993, and the NEAT testing carried out on the same dates.

 

26

Letter

12 July 1995

Cliff Mathieson, AUSTEL

Taits of Warrnambool?

This letter responds to the Taits letter (Exhibit 25):  “…The tests to which you refer were neither arranged nor carried out by AUSTEL. Questions relating to the conduct of the tests should be referred to those who carried them out or claim to have carried them out.”

 

27a

Official COT Report

13th April 1994

AUSTEL

Hon Michael Lee MP, Minister for Communications

Page 243, point 11.8, the author states: “AUSTEL had written to Telecom informing it that the claim in the Bell Canada International report to the effect that Telecom’s customers received a grade of service that meets global standards goes too far because the study was an inter-exchange study only and did not extend to the customer access network – AUSTEL had agreed to the study being so limited on the basis that other monitoring it had requested Telecom to undertake on AUSTEL’s behalf should provide AUSTEL with the data on the efficacy of the customer access network.” 

The Telstra document at Exhibit 14 relates to the NEAT testing conducted to the RCM at Cape Bridgewater, noting: “An investigation has been carried out into the service supplied to customer Mr Alan Smith of Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp. In accordance with the AUSTEL Directive date 12 August 93, paragraph 16 calls to and from the customers service etc”. 

This confirms that AUSTEL were party to the NEAT testing process.

Exhibit 15(a), Telstra’s internal memo dated 15th November 1993, states: “In response to the letter from Mr J MacMahon to (Telstra)  of 11 November 1993 on the issue of the hours over which the COT test call program was conducted, the following explanation and comments are given”.

Exhibit 15(b), Telstra’s letter dated 4th November 1994 to AUSTEL’s John MacMahon, also discusses the NEAT testing process, so why did AUSTEL advise Alan’s Lawyers differently?

28a

Letter

27 April 1994

Telstra's Arbitration Liaison Officer

Robin Davey, Chairman, AUSTEL

This letter states: “Attached for your information, an updated draft of the standard Verification Tests for use in Telecom’s Public Switched Telephone Network. The tests have been prepared in consultation with Mr Cliff Mathieson of AUSTEL and will form the basis for determining whether an individual telephone service is operating satisfactorily. I would appreciate your confirmation that the tests have met all the requirements of AUSTEL for Service Verification Tests. Once agreement has been reached of these Verification Tests, Telecom will be in a position to commence the testing of the services associated with COT customers, and ensure they meet the agreed standard for a satisfactory service.” 

“AUSTEL had agreed to the study being so limited on the basis that other monitoring it had requested Telecom to undertake on AUSTEL’s behalf should provide AUSTEL with the data on the efficacy of the customer access network.

The service Verification Tests (SVTs) referred to in this letter were created as a result of the trade-offs agreed to between AUSTEL and Telstra, SEE Exhibit 27a (BCI).

It has been well documented in the Verification Issues Part 1 that Telstra used the results of the Service Verification Tests carried out at Alan Smith’s premises during his arbitration as part of their arbitration defence, even though they already knew that the tests were deficient.

Exhibits 27(a) and 28(a) show that:

·      AUSTEL had stated that the BCI tests were limited.

·      Telstra had confirmed that the tests to the customer access network (i.e. the SVTs), in particular the tests to Alan Smith’s premises, were not performed correctly.

This means that the service line to Alan Smith’s business was not tested, either during the limited BCI testing that did not take the customer access network into consideration, or in the Service Verification Testing (SVT) that AUSTEL warned Telstra was deficient.

28b

Letter

21st August 1995

Telstra's Arbitration Liaison Offecer

Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman

This letter discusses the relevant BCI letter at Exhibit 8. Third paragraph it notes: "I enclose a copy of the letter dated 11 August 1995 from (name deleted) of Bell Canada International to me in which responds to Telstra's letter to BCI of 6 September 1994.”

As administrator of Alan Smith's arbitration, he TIO should have noticed the many inaccuracies in the BCI  11 August letter and acted upon them.

Note:

Alan Smith had already provided enough evidence that the BCI report was fundamentally flawed, to the TIO by 22 June 1995.

The TIO's office should have, at least by the date of this letter from Telstra's liaison officer on 21 August 1995, investigated the Telstra and BCI reports thoroughly in the light of that evidence.

If he had paid attention to that evidence and understood the matter properly, he should have acted on that evidence. His failure to do so might be considered an attempt to pervert the course of justice.

Exhibit #

Type of corres-pondence

Date

From

To

Summary of content

Commentary

29

Letter

22nd August 1995

Alan Smith

Hon Michael Lee MP, Minister for Communications

This letter discusses Alan Smith’s concerns about the flawed BCI tests

Issues arising out of Exhibits 28, 29 and 30

By the time the TIO had received this letter dated 30th August 1995, from the Minister’s office (Exhibit 30 -  please note the TIO hand-written note to the arbitration Special Counsel, the TIO had already received information dated 21st June 1995, from the arbitrators, which had incorporated Alan’s Smith’s letter dated 20th June 1995 and attachments, regarding the flawed BCI tests.

As an independent administrator, the TIO should have:

·      correctly investigated Alan Smith’s letter of June 21st to the Arbitrator, and

·      investigated the suspect letter allegedly written by the relevant BCI consultant Exhibit 8 (BCI)

In Exhibit 28, Telstra’s Arbitration consultant states: “I refer (the Arbitrator) letter to you dated June 1995, which enclosed a copy of a facsimile from Mr Smith to (the Arbitrator) dated 20 June 1995, The Arbitrator copied this letter to Telstra.”

This shows that, six weeks after Dr Hughes had deliberated on Alan Smith’s arbitration, he was still corresponding with Telstra on the same BCI issues neither he nor Telstra addressed during Alan Smith’s arbitration.

30

Letter

30th August 1995

Hon Michael Lee MP, Minister for Communications

Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman

This letter states: “Mr Smith wrote to the Minister in relation to his ongoing dispute with Telstra about the Bell Canada testing process at Cape Bridgewater. I am referring these facsimiles to you in view of your responsibility for the Casualties of Telstra (COT) arbitrations.”

31

2 Letters

28th and 29th October 1997

Telstra

Pauline Moore Secretary  of Senate

These letters confirm that Telstra gave Ms Pauline Moore, Secretary of the Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee, a number of documents relating to the BCI report, including one of the letters from the relevant BCI consultant.

Note: In the above Exhibit 17 (BCI), it is confirmed that Senator Schacht put a question on notice to the Senate Estimates Committee, asking for the relevant Cape Bridgewater (BCI) letter see Exhibit 8 (BCI) be provided to the Senate, and is directly related to the information Telstra provided to Ms Pauline Moore, Exhibit 31(BCI)

32

Senate Document

26th September 1997

Senate Document

Questions raised on notice in the Senate Estimates Committee

This document is headed “Senator Ron Boswell”

It lists various questions regarding the BCI report, which were put on notice to the Senate. 

At point 5, Senator Boswell asks: “Why did Telstra knowingly use the addendum BCI Report Cape Bridgewater in Arbitration when Telstra was aware that the report was flawed?”

At point 6 he asks: “Why did Telstra not advise the Arbitrator, the administrator or the COT cases that the BCI Report was flawed?”

 

33

Senate Document

26 September 1996

Senate Document

Questions raised on notice in the Senate Estimates Committee

Telstra responds to the questions listed above (Appendix 2):  “Telstra has not at any time believed that the BCI Report was flawed.  In relation to the allegations made by Mr Smith that the BCI Report was flawed, Telstra notes that Mr Smith raised these allegations with the Arbitrator during his arbitration and with the Administrator.”

NOTE:  Telstra did not actually answer Senator Boswell’s question instead deflecting it without confirming that they knowingly withheld their knowledge that the BCI tests were fundamentally flawed from the arbitrator.

34

Senate Document

Submitted by Telstra on and around the date of 28 Oct 1997

Telstra

Senate Committee

The following is Telstra’s further reply to various questions: 

“The only inaccuracies in the BCI report which Telstra is aware of is an apparent clash in the dates of two sets of testing to the Portland Exchange, Cape Bridgewater RCM (CBWR) number range, test line 055 267 211, see section 15.23 of the BCI Report.”

Telstra then refers to the BCI Cape Bridgewater letter of 6th September 1995 and introduces yet another letter from the referred to as ‘attachment 7’ also from the same relevant BCI consultant.

Attachment 8 is the letter from the relevant BCI consultant  that was not on letterhead and which is referred to above as Exhibit 8 (BCI). It is addressed to Telstra's arbitration liaison officer (also discussed below). The second letter referred to by Telstra from the relevant BCI consultant, is dated 10th August 1995, to Telstra’s internal solicitor see Exhibit 36, below.

35

Questions of Notice from Senate Estimates Hearing, Hansard Page 139.

Between 26 Sept and 28 Oct 1997

Senate documents discussing questions raised with Telstra

Questions answered by Telstra

A record of a question on notice to the Senate by Senator Schacht, and Telstra’s response which refers to the two attached letters from BCI to Telstra

Senator Schacht:  “...In relation to the complaints by the CoTs that the Bell Canada International Report was fabricated could Telstra provide a copy of a letter from Bell Canada International to Telstra?”

Answer: Telstra:  “...Copies of a letter dated 10 August, 1995 from (the relevant consultant) of Bell Canada International to Telstra and a letter dated 11 August, 1995 from Bell Canada International to Telstra are Attachment 1.”

 

 

 

 

Exhibit #

Type of correspond-ence

Date

From

To

Summary of content

Commentary

36a

Letter

10th August 1995

The original BCI Cape Bridgewater consultant

Senior Solicitor, Telstra Corporation Limited

These two letters are general correspondence about the case, but they do not appear to make much sense in context.

In these letters, the BCI consultant apparently strongly condemns Alan Smith’s allegations regarding BCI work in Australia.

However, neither of these two letters is on a BCI letterhead.

Also, in these two letters there is an evident level of confusion expressed by the relevant BCI consultant relating to two different matters:

·      He is unlikely to have gone to either Cape Bridgewater or Portland, as his testing equipment could not be operated at either exchange. If he had conducted any testing at all, it would have been done from the Warrnambool exchange which is not mentioned in the letters.

·      He seems to be unclear who had written what letter to him. He is replying to letter from General Manager, Network Operations, Telstra, Brisbane, by sending two replies, one to Telstra's internal solicitor and one to Telstra's Arbitration Liaison Officer, neither of whom sent the original letter to which he was replying.

Why would a large corporation allow such important letters to be sent on plain paper?

36b

Letter

11th August 1995

Relevant BCI consultant

Telstra's Arbitration liaison officer

37a

[What kind of document?]

26 Sept to 26 Oct 1997

Senator Boswell, question

 

 

 

 

Senator Boswell, question

 

Telstra - questions on notice

 

 

 

 

Telstra - questions on notice

“What was the nature of the CoT cases’ complaints concerning the Bell Canada International Report (the BCI Report)?  Please list the names of the CoT case members and specific complaints.”

 

“Did the Arbitrator refer to the BCI report in his awards?”

Telstra responded by providing the names of four of the COT claimants, Smith, Love, Gillan and Garms.  Telstra attached to this reply the sections of the arbitrators Arbitration Awards that recorded the BCI report as being accepted into evidence.

Since the BCI letter dated August 10th 1995 to Mr Armstrong, included a strong condemnation of Alan Smith’s allegations regarding the BCI Cape Bridgewater work in Australia, why didn’t Telstra's Arbitration Liaison Officer provide the TIO with a copy of this letter too?

Could it be that the letter to Telstra's solicitor didn’t actually exist in August 1995 but was manufactured in September or October 1997 to add more ‘punch’ to Telstra’s replies to questions from the Senate?

 

37b

Three documents

28th October 1997

by Telstra

Ms Pauline Moore, Secretary Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee

These three documents were part of a number of attachments provided

“…As previously advised, enclosed are Attachments associated with Senate responses provided to your Office yesterday.”

These three pages are from Dr Hughes’ 11th May 1995 Award in the Alan Smith arbitration matter confirming the that Bell Canada International Inc, tests were accepted as evidence by the arbitrator.

 

38a

Document

[Was this a composite document of letters etc?]

20 June 95

Alan Smith’s original letter to the arbitrator

Ms Pauline Moore, Secretary Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts Legislation Committee

Telstra referred to this document in their reply to Senator Boswell’s question. It includes letters from Alan Smith to Dr Hughes dated 20th June 1995, in which Alan questions Dr Hughes’ handling of the BCI issues during his arbitration.

 

38b

Letter

21 June 1995

Arbitrator

TIO

Another letter referred to by Telstra in their answer to Senator Boswell.

The letter is from the Arbitrator to TIO on 21st June 1995, noting:

“…I do not believe I have jurisdiction over this matter any longer, nor do I consider it appropriate for me to enter into correspondence with either of the parties regarding the conduct of the proceedings or matters which may or may not have come to light subsequently to the delivery of my award.”

 

39

Fax

22nd June 1995

TIO Special Counsel No (1)  

TIO Special Counsel No (2)

This letter discusses the Arbitrator's letter of 21st June re Alan Smith noting:

“…Could you please have a look at (the Arbitrators)  letter to (the TIO)  dated 21 June ’95 re Alan Smith. John wants to discuss it on Monday, and what the approach should be re parties seeking to revisit issues post Arb’n (Arbitration). His position is not to open the can of worms.” 

This letter was written by the arbitrator in response to Alan Smith’s letter to him on 20th June 1995, which attached a number of documents, including FOI documents, that Alan received two weeks after his arbitration on 26th May 1995 see Exhibits 9-b and Exhibit 9-c.  

One has to question what the ”can of worms” is and why they are reluctant to open it.

40

Statutory Declaration

6th November 1995

Signed by John Main

 

“…I spoke to (name deleted) from the Telecommunications Ombudsman’s Office at approximately midday today. She advised me that the Bell Canada International Inc Report to Telecom Australia dated 1 November 1993 and the addendum dated 10 November 1993 were flawed documents.”

Note:

TIO Special Counsel No (1) had faxed the arbitrator's’ letter of 21st June 1995 to TIO Special Counsel No (2)  on 22nd June 1995, see above, Exhibit 39, recommending that they not ‘open the can of worms’.

It appears as though the TIO and the TIO Special Counsel, thought it more appropriate NOT to investigate the flawed BCI tests than to risk further exposing Telstra’s use of the flawed BCI tests.

41

Letter

7th August 1995

TIO

Alan Smith

This letter is also related to the Arbitrators 21st June 1995 letter and the ‘can of worms’ noting:

“…You have also complained that on 26 May 1995 you received further FOI documents from Telstra which you state, would have assisted your claim significantly. In particular, you claim the further FOI documents released confirmed that Telstra internally acknowledged to Bell Canada International Inc (“BCI”) that your complaints were correct in suggesting that the BCI testing of your telephone service was “fabricated” as the testing could not and did not take place as reported in the BCI Addendum Report; As Administrator of the FTAP, I have a duty to ensure the integrity of the procedure. Your complaints go to this issue”

Alan Smith has not received any official response from either Telstra or the TIO as to why Telstra has been allowed to use known flawed arbitration material in defence of their customer complaints.

 

42

Report

27 July 2007

Brian Hodge MBA

Commissioned by Graham Schorer COT Spokesperson to review the Telstra and BCI claims

This report prepared by Brian Hodge MBA, has also been included in a separate document that deals solely with the Service Verification Tests (SVT) Part 1.

It concludes that both Telstra’s SVT and BCI Cape Bridgewater tests were fundamentally flawed.

See absentjustice.com Main Evidence File No/3

 

43a

Copy

25th February 1994

Senate Hansard page 140

 

The two pages confirm that Senator Alston, Shadow Minister for Communications and Senator Ron Boswell (National Party) ask AUSTEL’s Chairman, Robin Davey during this Senate Estimates Committee hearing:

[P 140]

Senator ALSTON – “…It was rhetorical. Are you able to indicate whether you have detected or identified any discrepancies in the BCI’s report on Telecom’s network or will that be the subject of your report”?

Mr Davey – “…It will be the subject matter in our report. The main comment that I make on the BCI report at this point – indeed we have conveyed this to Telecom and it has taken action to correct what we saw as the major limitations in the BCI report – is, namely, that it focused on the exchange to exchange quality of service that Telecom was offering at that point. It did not extend from the exchange to the customer’s premises.”

Senator ALSTON – “…It seems an extraordinary omission, does it not”?

Mr Davey – “…Not really.” …And then…”As I recall it, it used words to the effect that “Bell Canada International has cleared our network. In other words, it said its network was given a clean bill of health whereas its exchanges had been given a clean bill of health – not its complete network, as the ordinary person would understand it.”

Senator ALSTON – “…So that was the least description of reality, was it”?

Mr Davey – “…It was less accurate than it should have been.”

 

43b

Copy

25th February 1994

Senate Hansard pages 142

 

[P 142]

Senator BOSWELL – “…Can you give this committee an assurance that your report will address the problems that have happened in the past, and that we will never face this situation again”?

Mr Davey – “… The report will clearly address the deficiencies in the past and what should be done to ensure that it does not happen in the future.”

 

44

Transcript of interview

22nd September 1994

Commonwealth Ombudsman representatives John Wynack and James Hind

with representatives from AUSTEL/ACMA John McMahon and Bruce Matthews

This transcript confirms:

[p10] MR McMAHON notes: “…No, but I mean let’s say the – you’re talking about the BCI supplementary inter-exchange network. Now, the – that was a matter of conducting some traffic tests in a range of exchanges and the document itself shows that they were – that the tests were run in December.”

[p11] MR WYNACK: “…Those were the reports of the BCI tests. Did you ever examine the raw data on which those reports were based?”

MR McMAHON: “…I don’t believe so.”  …and …” Yes, the background was BCI had undertaken some technical tests and the COT cases themselves and AUSTEL’s technical people had some reservations about them and as a result of those reservations Telecom and BCI do those supplementary tests and the rotary hunting tests. So my recollection is that those reservations were reservations which arose from viewing the original report rather that the technical data itself, you know, the detailed technical data.”

 

45

Hand written note

6/7

TIO  Special Counsel No (1)

 

This hand written note from the TIO Special Counsel No (1)  dated (6/7) appears to coincide with Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 (BCI) and would be July 1995.

Alan Smith had requested the TIO provide advice of the mailing address of Bell Canada International. In this note the incorrect address and contact details is provided

Alan Smith had requested the TIO provide advice of the mailing address of Bell Canada International.

The address given by Telstra which notes: Bell Canada International 1000 de la Gauchetiere Bureaue 1100 Montreal Quebec H3B478 (Fax 0011 1 514 392 2424) is not the address that Telstra and/or Bell Canada International people used during the period they corresponded together.

Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9-b (BCI) show the BCI offices are in Ottawa Canada, so why was Alan Smith provided with this number?

Attempts to use the fax number provided failed. At the very least, this shows that the TIO representative, i.e. TIO Special Counsel No (1 and 2) was not paying much attention to the very real concerns of the CoT cases.

46

Herald Sun article

 

 

 

Article headlined Brave need protection

“PUBLIC servants should receive some “public interest” protection as well as protection for disclosing corruption and illegal behaviour under proposals before the Federal Government. “Accountability is a fundamental underpinning of democracy,” Senator Faulkner said.”

 

BCI Telstra’s M.D.C Exhibits 1 to 46

 

 

 

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This deceitful behaviour is a form of betrayal, reminiscent of a Judas kiss involving secret dealings and betrayal. Such conduct, marked by dishonesty and deceit, fosters a corrupt environment and is tantamount to, if not worse than, double-dealing and deceiving those who trust the government. It represents pure malevolence.

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“…your persistence to bring about improvements to Telecom’s country services. I regret that it was at such a high personal cost.”

The Hon David Hawker MP

“Only I know from personal experience that your story is true, otherwise I would find it difficult to believe. I was amazed and impressed with the thorough, detailed work you have done in your efforts to find justice”

Sister Burke

“Only I know from personal experience that your story is true, otherwise I would find it difficult to believe. I was amazed and impressed with the thorough, detailed work you have done in your efforts to find justice”

Sister Burke

“I am writing in reference to your article in last Friday’s Herald-Sun (2nd April 1993) about phone difficulties experienced by businesses.

I wish to confirm that I have had problems trying to contact Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp over the past 2 years.

I also experienced problems while trying to organise our family camp for September this year. On numerous occasions I have rung from both this business number 053 424 675 and also my home number and received no response – a dead line.

I rang around the end of February (1993) and twice was subjected to a piercing noise similar to a fax. I reported this incident to Telstra who got the same noise when testing.”

Cathy Lindsey

“…the very large number of persons that had been forced into an arbitration process and have been obliged to settle as a result of the sheer weight that Telstra has brought to bear on them as a consequence where they have faced financial ruin if they did not settle…”

Senator Carr

“A number of people seem to be experiencing some or all of the problems which you have outlined to me. …

“I trust that your meeting tomorrow with Senators Alston and Boswell is a profitable one.”

Hon David Hawker MP

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