Chapter Nine - Independent Assessment Process

Check out our bribery and Corruption storries part 1 and Corruption part 2. Deception, fraudulent conduct and thuggery are criminal legal abuse that can no longer be tolerated. Read about the worse type of unscrupulous and treacherous evilness. 

The Hon David Hawker, Speaker in the House of Representatives assists Alan in his independent assessment process

10th March 2006:  The Hon David Hawker writes to Alan:-

“I wish to acknowledge receipt of your correspondence dated 23 February and 27 February along with your facsimile transmissions of 6 and 9 March. I will ensure this material, including the corrected version, is forwarded to Minister Coonan…” (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See  GS-CAV 442)

17th March 2006:  David Lever writes to Alan (the day before Alan signs the Minister’s independent assessment process):-

“If the material you have provided to the Department as part of the independent assessment process indicates that Telstra or its employees have committed criminal offences in connection with your arbitration, we will refer the matter to the relevant authority.” (AS-CAV Exhibit 282 to 323 - See AS-CAV 321)

COMMENTARY:

Attached to Alan’s independent assessment claim was evidence supporting:-

• the BCI tests, allegedly conducted at the Cape Bridgewater RCM, could not have been performed at the times and dates as shown in the report;
• that regardless of Telstra being advised by the Regulator that their SVT tests carried out at Alan’s premises were deficient, they still provided the arbitrator Sworn Testaments to the contrary;
• Telstra submitting fundamentally flawed laboratory findings (TF200) to the arbitrator;
• interception and privacy issues;
• the Ericsson CCS7 testing equipment could not operate at the same time as the Ericsson Neat Testing was underway on the same line, yet the arbitrator accepted they could; and
• the Ericsson AXE 104 Portland telephone exchange suffered with problems and faults right through and after Alan’s arbitration.

Question:

Why didn’t Alan receive one piece of information surrounding the Ericsson equipment and how it was supposed to function

24th May 2006:  Senator Coonan responds to Hon David Hawker:-

“Mr Smith has indicated that he would like the terms of reference for the assessment to be wider, requiring the Department to make judgements about the fairness of the arbitration process undertaken by Dr Gordon Hughes, under the administration of the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, in 1994. While this is understandable, it is not reasonable to expect the Department or indeed any other person at this point in time to make judgements about the circumstances surrounding Mr Smith’s arbitration. The terms of reference for the assessment are therefore more forward looking, aimed at identifying whether any further dispute resolution processes may be available to be pursued by claimants and Telstra in order to resolve their disputes.” (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See  GS-CAV 445-B)

This statement by Senator Helen Coonan:-

1. Does not coincide with the commitment given by Senator Coonan’s advisor David Lever, 17th March 2006 to Alan, prior to Alan signing the agreement that:-“If the material you have provided to the Department as part of the independent assessment process indicates that Telstra or its employees have committed criminal offences in connection with your arbitration, we will refer the matter to the relevant authority.” (AS-CAV Exhibit 282 to 323 - See AS-CAV 321)
2. Does not coincide with her commitment given to Senator Barnaby Joyce:-

“As a result of my thorough review of the relevant Telstra sale legislation, I proposed a number of amendments which were delivered to Minister Coonan. In addition to my requests, I sought from the Minister closure of any compensatory commitments given by the Minister or Telstra and outstanding legal issues. …”

“The Minister has advised she will appoint an independent assessor to review the status of outstanding claims and provide a basis for these to be resolved.”

“I would like you to understand that I could only have achieved this positive outcome on your behalf if I voted for the Telstra privatisation legislation.” (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See  GS-CAV 432)

The one crucial vote the Government needed to pass the Telstra privatisation – Senator Barnaby Joyce’s vote – was given on the basis of a commitment that Senator Coonan had no intention of honouring – that an independent assessor would be appointed to assess the merits of each COT case’s claims. 

27th March 2006:  The Hon David Hawker writes to Alan:-

“A note to acknowledge receipt of your letters dated 24, 25, & 26 March pertaining to your request for an independent assessment. Thank you also for forwarding Darren Lewis’ letter of 25 March consenting to being interviewed under oath to support your claim that the phone and fax faults continued long after your arbitration.”

“Please be assured representations have been made today to the Minister for Communications and I have supplied Senator Coonan with copies of all above-mentioned letters.” (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 443)

6th September 2006:  Graham and Alan, at the invitation of Senator Helen Coonan and Senator Barnaby Joyce, attend a meeting in Parliament House, Canberra, to discuss their unresolved Telstra issues.

16th November 2006:  Senator Joyce writes to Senator Coonan:-

“I must remain with my commitment to the people involved with the CoTs cases. The commitment is representing their frustration and finding a resolution to the issue.

The resolution to the issue, is referenced in your letter of 13th September 2005, where you state ‘I agree that there should be finality for all outstanding ‘COT’ cases and related disputes. I believe that the most effective way to deal with these is for me to appoint an independent assessor to review the status of all outstanding claims.’” (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See  GS-CAV 426-A)

The link between Alan’s original letter to Mr Pinnock dated 3rd March 2006 (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 426-B and GS-CAV 426-A) is that Alan’s letter alerted Mr Pinnock to Senator Coonan’s independent assessment process and that Alan was seeking information from the TIO (under the Privacy Policy Act) for arbitration documents to help support his DCITA assessment process.

Had Mr Pinnock not misled and deceived Senator Coonan’s office, a more favourable response to the COT cases’ claims may have been forthcoming.

Alan’s letter of 3rd March 2006 states:-

“You would be aware by now that the Hon Senator Helen Coonan, Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, has agreed to appoint an independent assessor to review all the outstanding Telstra arbitration cases, including my claims. …”

“In a subsequent letter dated 12th May 2004(also attached), Philip Carruthers, TIO Business Manger [sic], advised me that my letter of 26th April 2004 to all members of the TIO Board and Council ‘…will be passed on to them by hand at the Council meeting scheduled for 19 May 2004.’”

Alan’s letter is very detailed about what he is requesting, including a copy of the section pertaining to the Council discussion on Alan’s matters scheduled for 19 May 2004

Alan has yet to receive a letter from Mr Pinnock, the TIO Board or Council regarding this matter.

However, the non-release of TIO documents to Alan, by the TIO board or Council, may well be related to the same Ted Benjamin-TIO Council, conflict-of-interest issues discussed by Senator Schacht on 26th September 1997, discussed shortly.  It appears as though the TIO Board and Council and Telstra representatives – had a closer relationship that was more than just a possible conflict of interest.

Question:

Why didn’t the TIO assist the COT cases in accessing the relevant exchange and technical information they needed to support their claims

The problems with AXE and ARE Ericsson exchanges, and other types of Ericsson equipment, are referred to in different sections of this document.  Throughout the COT arbitrations, the various claimants also reported serious problems in getting Telstra to supply relevant diary notes or fault data, relating to specific telephone exchanges, and they questioned Ericsson’s takeover of Lane Telecommunications because the COT claimants were in arbitration because of faulty Ericsson equipment.

In Alan Smith’s arbitration, David Read from Lanes Telecommunications prepared the draft Technical Report, NOT DMR Group Canada as claimed.  David Read assessed only 23 of the earliest of 200 faults included in Alan’s claim documents.  The remaining and continuing unassessed 177 faults were mostly caused by the faulty Ericsson AXE exchange.  Did Mr Read only assess 23 of Alan’s claims, and ignore the rest, because Ericsson’s takeover of Lanes was then looming?

The following quotes from a Hansard Record dated 11th February 1999 show that even the Senate smelled a rat where Ericsson was concerned:-

Senator Boswell to Telstra’s Mr Levy:

Senator BOSWELL – “The COT members still require the network and Ericsson documents. They have not received one Ericsson document. You have written to Mr Wynack and said, ‘If you want the Ericsson documents, you go to Ericssons and get them.’ Why can you not provide the Ericsson documents and why have you written a letter to Mr Wynack and said for him to go to and approach Ericssons? …

Senator BOSWELL – “They should not be hard to find. When you go out and upgrade an exchange you must have some form of plan, and that would be the Ericsson documents Ericsson are doing the job for you.” ( GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 427)

If an investigation by the Australian Government (the Senate Working Party) wasn’t able to access relevant technical exchange data, including Ericsson documents from Telstra, then what hope did any of the COT claimants have?

GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 428-A confirms the NEAT (Network Evaluation and Test) equipment was used at the RCM at Cape Bridgewater between 28th October and 8th November 1993 particularly on 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th of November when Telstra allege Bell Canada International carried out their tests.  The exhibit also proves Ericcson manufactured the NEAT equipment.

GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 429 is a copy of a letter dated 30th January 1995 from Alan to Dr Hughes, confirming Alan challenged the results of the ELMI, BCI and NEAT tests carried out between 28th October and 8th November 1993.  This letter and other CAV information provided by Alan details how, during his arbitration, both AUSTEL and Alan complained about the deficiencies in the SVTs – to no avail.  Then Brian Hodge MBE, a specialist in the field of technical testing processes (and an ex-Telstra engineer), reported on 27th July 2007 the BCI and SVTs carried out at Cape Bridgewater were fundamentally flawed, adding further weight to the allegations made by Alan and others back in 1995.

Furthermore, during Alan’s arbitration, neither Dr Hughes, FHCA DMR nor Lanes even assessed (let alone valued or commented on) Alan’s claims that the SVTs had not located the ongoing problems and faults in the telephone network.

GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 429 also shows that, throughout the arbitration process, Telstra made statements concerning the network, which must have been based on technical documents, although Telstra claimed these documents did not exist.

The three main appointments the TIO made, to assist him as an administrator of the COT arbitrations, i.e., DMR (Australia), Lane Telecommunications (Australia) and Dr Hughes, were all later fired by the TIO because of a possible conflict of interest.  Even worse, the TIO never looked into why, during the COT arbitrations, these three parties allowed themselves to be put in a position of having a conflict of interest in the first place, since they had all signed agreements to proceed with the COT arbitrations, presumably to the end.

As previously discussed, Senator Schacht referred to Ted Benjamin’s conflicts of interest on 26th September 1997 regarding the COT arbitrations debacle.  The TIO knew Telstra’s Mr Benjamin was present at TIO Council Meetings, where COT issues were discussed.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST, PART 2

DMR (Australia) – Lane (Australia) – and Dr Hughes

Earlier, we discussed the conflict of interest issues raised by the defection of Grant Campbell (the TIO’s Manager of Disputes) to Ted Benjamin’s Telstra office during the time Mr Campbell was involved in the FTSP investigation into Alan Smith’s fax and 008/1800 problems.  Although it is confirmed Mr Campbell worked in the TIO’s Office from at least January to November 1994, the first TIO Annual Report (1993/94) does not include any record of his employment.

Five separate organisations or individuals, all involved in the COT arbitrations in some way, all had a possible conflict of interest: DMR (Australia), Lane (Australia), Dr Hughes, Ted Benjamin and possibly Grant Campbell.

Questions:

1. Did Warwick Smith and/or John Pinnock, as administrators to the arbitration have a duty to advise Alan and Graham, before it was exposed in the Senate on 26th September 1997, that Telstra’s Arbitration Liaison Officer, Ted Benjamin was also a TIO Council Member?
2. Should Warwick Smith have advised the COT cases, before they signed the Arbitration Agreement, that Jim Holmes, Telstra’s Corporate Secretary (who was dealing with Graham and Alan’s settlement and arbitration issues) was also a member of the TIO Board?
3. Should the Warwick Smith segment, dated 10th November 1993, be considered with the conflict of interest issues shown here?

Regardless of the TIO Board and Council is heavily involved in the COT arbitrations, neither the TIO Board or Council launched any investigation into why the COT cases’ legal right to a fair and transparent process was so abused during their respective arbitrations.

In the Senate in-camera Hansard, dated 9th July 1998 (the Hansard Alan Smith was threatened with, perhaps, a jail sentence if he publicly reveals the content shows on page 33), Senator Schacht addresses Ted Benjamin:-

“I want to make one final comment before I go. In all my 11 years in the Senate I have never been at a public or private committee hearing where the committee has asked witnesses to swear. That is an indication of how serious we see the resolution of this matter.”

Telstra provided the Senate Committee Hearing with known-false information in their attempt to stop the Senate from investigating the flawed BCI Cape Bridgewater Addendum tests.  Had Telstra told the truth regarding the Cape Bridgewater Addendum BCI tests, Alan’s unresolved Telstra issues could have been resolved on 26th September 1997.

Deception 

When Telstra hung the COT Cases out to dry:

1. by refusing to supply all the relevant CENTROC, TRAXE and Ericsson exchange data;
2. by refusing to supply any information regarding the dates of any modifications or upgrades; and
3. by providing false information to the Senate inquiry, they achieved their aim of minimising their liability.

Had Graham received the documents that were withheld from him and had his arbitration been conducted correctly, Graham’s true losses may well have amounted to even more than his maximum estimate of $12 million.

In 2006, Graham was too sick to become involved in the fourth, allegedly independent, COT assessment process; it would now seem that he saved his money

COMMENTARY

The following points are the most important:-

• Before Graham and Alan signed for arbitration, they were told Dr Hughes drafted the Fast Track Arbitration Procedure Agreement in consultation with Frank Shelton of Minter Ellison.
• Graham and Alan were also told Frank Shelton, the President of the Institute of Arbitrators Australia, drafted the agreement totally independently of Telstra and any alterations would be agreed to by both Telstra and the COT claimants.
• The final agreement provided to Graham and Alan via William Hunt on 20th April 1994 the day before they were to sign it, only had one Confidentiality Undertaking form attached, when it was expected there would be one for the claimants and one for Telstra. Peter Bartlett explained this by saying that Telstra and the Resource Unit would provide their Confidentiality Undertaking forms separately.
• Graham and Alan signed their Confidentiality Undertaking (witnessed by Barry O’Sullivan) but they were never provided with a copy of the same form signed by Telstra, FHCA or Paul Howell of DMR (Canada). Although, in May 1994, they received a copy of one signed by Mr Blah of DMR (Australia).
• If Peter Bartlett was truly independent of Telstra and FHCA, why didn’t Alan and Graham receive Confidentiality Agreements from Telstra and FHCA in the same way they received the agreement from DMR (Australia)?
• Why did Warwick Smith and Dr Hughes refuse to give Graham and Alan a copy of Telstra’s proposed Rules of Arbitration and why did John Pinnock also refuse?
• If Frank Shelton really drafted the FTAP Agreement from the beginning, why does it mirror most of the major clauses in the Telstra proposed agreement John Pinnock provided to Pauline Moore? The duplication of Telstra’s proposed clauses indicates Minter Ellison did NOT draft the agreement at all.
• Clauses 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3 and 17 of the Confidentiality Undertaking include strong and clear directions, including the claimants, would not be allowed to discuss the conduct of the arbitration.
• Why would Frank Shelton include the clauses referred to in point (h) when the High Court of Australia’s judgement, in 1994/95, regarding ESSO Australia Resources (appellants) Plowman and others (respondent) states at 183 CLR 10:

1. “The courts have consistently viewed government secrets differently from personal and commercial secrets (67). As I stated in “The Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (68), the judiciary must view the disclosure of government information through different spectacles.” This involves a reversal of the onus of proof: the government must prove that the public interest demands non-disclosure (69).”

“This approach was not adopted by the majority of the House of Lords in British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd. (70)” and

2. “If a part to an arbitration agreement be under any obligation of confidentiality, the obligation must be contractual in original. A term imposing an obligation of confidentiality could be expressed in an arbitration agreement but such a term would be unusual. Nor is such an obligation imposed by the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vict).” (GS-CAV Exhibit 368-a to 409 - See GS 368 – b)

This information is taken from a transcript of the full High Court 1994-1995, on Appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria, re ESSO v PLOWMAN, Arbitration – Agreement – Hearing in private –Implied terms – Confidentiality of documents and information disclosed – Documents produced at direction of Arbitrator. 

IMPORTANT

Although it was the duty of the Special Counsel to ensure FHCA and Telstra both signed the Confidentiality Undertaking if they indeed did sign it, why did the COTs never see a copy?  This supports allegations the arbitration was, from the very beginning, biased towards Telstra.  The secret alterations, made to agreement clauses 10.2.2, 24, 25 and 26 before the claimants signed, but without their knowledge, further proves the whole arbitration was set up to benefit Telstra and no one else.

The ESSO v PLOWMAN confidentiality issues also show Government Agencies expect to be treated differently to the general public and ordinary commercial businesses.  This further suggests the FTAP agreement was drafted by Telstra and not Minter Ellison (see also Telstra’s Proposed Rules of Arbitration).

The comment at point (i)b, above, regarding the High Court document in relation to ESSO v PLOWMAN also suggests Frank Shelton, as the then President of the Institute of Arbitrators Australia, would have known the confidentiality rules applied to the FTAP were not standard in an Arbitration Agreement.  Thus it could be presumed he would not have included them unless directed to, either by Dr Hughes or Telstra.

This confidentiality issue is yet another example even before the agreement was signed, of the way the arbitration was designed to protect Telstra, to the detriment of the claimants.

19th January 2008:   GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 431 is a letter from Alan Smith to Ms Jodi Ross (Principal Lawyer for ACMA), alerting Ms Ross to FOI documents received by Alan.  These documents prove that, although the Minister for Communications agreed to appoint an independent assessor to assess the merits of each of the unresolved COT claims, there was never any intention to honour the commitment made to Senator Barnaby Joyce in return for his vote to privatise Telstra.

A number of internal Government emails are attached to Alan’s letter to Ms Ross.  The attachments show the rights of the claimants were not considered at all and, once again, the COT claimants’ evidence, including proof of continuing phone problems affecting their businesses, even after their arbitrations, would be buried.

The Hon David Hawker, the Speaker in the House of Representatives at the time of the alleged independent assessment process, submitted a number of claim documents to the Minister, on behalf of Alan Smith.  How does the Hon David Hawker feel now, knowing the claimed material he provided to the Minister on Alan’s behalf wasn’t assessed on its merit?

28th January 2008:  Alan writes to Ms Clair O’Reilly, ACMA.  Ms Jodi Ross advised Alan that Ms O’Reilly will be his FOI contract until 31st March 2008.  Because Alan is asking ACMA to waive all FOI charges for his latest FOI application in his 19th January 2008 letter to Ms Ross, he sends a replica of this letter, but dated 28th January 2008 to Ms O’Reilly.  Alan attaches a cheque for $75.00 as a deposit to get the FOI requests underway although he still hopes ACMA will eventually agree to waive the FOI cha

Commentary:

In the letters Alan states:-

“My involvement in this DCITA assessment process in 2006 cost me quite a few thousand dollars and it turned out to be a sham anyway, as can be seen by the attached copy of an email sent by Senator Coonan’s advisor (David Lever) to the TIO (John Pinnock) on 21st December 2005, noting that: ‘The assessment will focus on process rather than the merits of claims, including whether all available dispute resolution mechanisms have been used.’ …”

“The Federal Liberal Government clearly misled Senator Joyce in a deliberate move to secure his vote so they could pass the legislation required for the privatisation of Telstra but, once this aim had been achieved, Senator Coonan executed a ‘back-flip’ on the Government’s commitment to Senator Joyce. Mr Lever’s email is quite clear – neither he nor the Minister ever had any intention of honouring the commitment giving to Senator Joyce.”

“The ACMA, the TIO and DCITA all know that Telstra relied on fundamentally flawed and manufactured reports to support their defence of my arbitration claim, but this evidence was not referred to the relevant authority.”

“The negation of these Government guarantees is an enormous indictment against Australian democracy.”

These letters are included as Graham Schorer and Alan are concerned about the legal advice Minter Ellison provided to ACMA, the TIO and Government advisors regarding the COT arbitration process – particularly in relation to their administrative role when the Fast Track Arbitration Procedure agreement was initially being drawn up (before Graham and Alan signed it).  There are a number of questions regarding whether Minter Ellison had a vested interest in hiding some of the legitimate complaints lodged by the COT claimants.

The following dated examples shown in the Agenda, dated 9th January, 2008 discuss a number of relevant FTAP issues:-

1. 23rd February 1994: Telstra’s Steve Black wrote to Dr Hughes, re Clause 24:-

   “Telecom is of the view that Special Counsel and the Resource Unit should be accountable for any negligence on their part in relation to the arbitration process, given that these parties are acting in their capacity as experts. Therefore, this clause should not be amended so as to include an exclusion from liability for Special Counsel and the Resource Unit.” (GS 169)

2. 31st March 1994: Dr Hughes faxed Steve Black the latest draft of the FTAP Agreement (see page 1 of Telstra’s FOI Schedule dated 21st June 1996. It seems Dr Hughes did not forward the document to Graham Schorer or Graham’s solicitor, William Hunt, as he should have, as no such document was found among Graham’s documents.  Agenda – Appendix Two is page 2 of the Telstra FOI Schedule. It confirms the next document Telstra received from Dr Hughes during the FTAP arrived on 1st September, 1994.
3. 19th April 1994: Caroline Friend, Dr Hughes’ secretary, faxed a copy of the Arbitration Agreement to William Hunt and Mr Goldberg. On the fax cover sheets, she notes “Further to my telephone discussion with Mr Graham Schorer of todays [sic] date, at his request, I attach for your attention, a copy of the ‘Fast Track’Arbitration Procedure of 31st March 1994.” (GS 186-b)
4. 20th April 1994: Graham introduced Alan Smith to William Hunt and they discussed whether Graham and Alan should sign the FTAP.  Mr Hunt provided the copy of the agreement he received from Ms Friend the previous day.  Graham was adamant that he did not want to sign the agreement because it was too legalistic and did not mirror the original FTSP agreement, but Mr Hunt suggested it was probably the best they could hope for under the present circumstances.  Alan recalls Mr Hunt also stated that, if they didn’t sign the agreement then, the process would be delayed even more and “who knows where you might end up”.
5. 21st April 1994: Graham and Alan sign the FTAP agreement unaware of the removal and changes to the aforementioned clauses.  It is now established that after these faxes were sent, sometime between 3.30 pm on 20th April, 1994 and 10.00 am on 21st April 1994 someone removed clauses 25 and 26 from the document, and altered clause 24, before the document was presented to Graham Schorer and Alan Smith, on 21st April 1994, without notifying Mr Hunt, Mr Goldberg, Graham or Alan of those alterations.

   Alan and Graham believe strongly that, had Mr Hunt known clauses 25 and 26 were to be removed and clause 24 altered, without their knowledge or consent, and that removal would relieve FHCA, DMR (Australia) and the TIO’s Special Counsel of any liability for negligence, conscious or otherwise, he would never have advised Graham and Alan to sign the agreement.

6. 22nd June 1994: A fax from Pia Di Mattina, to AUSTEL’s Norm O’Doherty, was accompanied by a letter from Steve Black to Peter Bartlett, discussing a further attached draft Arbitration Agreement entitled Special Rules for Arbitration of 12 Claims Referred to Telecom by Austel.  Clause 11.2, in this version states,

   “The liability of any independent expert resource unit by the Arbitrator, for any act or omission on their part in connection with the Arbitration, shall be limited to $250,000.00.” ( GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 438)

7. 24th June 1994: Steve Black faxed a letter to AUSTEL’s acting Chair, Neil Tuckwell (copied to Warwick Smith, TIO), re Special Arbitration Procedure for Twelve Cases

“I understand that the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman spoke to you yesterday concerning the above procedure, and that the applicable rules of arbitration are now agreed. Enclosed is a copy of those rules which incorporates the final change requested by the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman.”

“I would appreciate receiving confirmation of your agreement to those rules as soon as practicable to facilitate the introduction of the procedure.”

In this document Clause 11.2 states:-

“The liability of any independent expert resource unit used by the Arbitrator, for any act or omission on their part in connection with the Arbitration, shall be limited to $250,000.00.” ( GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 439)

IMPORTANT QUESTIONS – TWO SCENARIOS

1. Steve Black’s letter to Peter Bartlett (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 438) was dated two months after Graham and Alan signed the FTAP agreement. By 22nd June 1994 Steve Black and Peter Bartlett reintroduced the $250,000 liability cap for the remaining 12 COT claimants.
2. There are similarities to versions of the FTAP agreement provided to all the COT claimants (the first four and the following 12), for assessment by their respective legal experts. However, for Graham and Alan, within the 36 hours between receiving their legal opinion and signing, the $250,000 liability cap was secretly removed.  Does this mean Graham and Alan have a moral obligation to inform the TIO of this discovery and ask the TIO
3. If the same $250.000.00 cap was also removed from the Arbitration Agreements used for remaining 12 COT arbitrations after the claimants agreed to arbitration, but before they actually signed the agreement, or
4. Was this secret alteration only made to the versions used for the first four COT arbitrations or were some of the following 12 Arbitrations Agreements selectively altered?
5. If the Special Rules For Arbitration, used to arbitrate the group of 12 claimants and clause 11.2, did remain intact and therefore any one of the 12 claimants could have used the $250,000 cap if they believed they had good grounds to do so, why were the first four COT claimants singled out and discriminated against so that they could not use the $250,000 cap in relation to the problems that are now proven in their arbitrations?
6. Is ACMA aware that someone with access to Minter Ellison’s office altered the Arbitration Agreement less than 36 hours before Graham and Alan signed the agreement?

Graham and Alan believe that, in 1994, AUSTEL would have immediately called for an Official Government investigation into this unlawful act if they had known these changes were made.

Warwick Smith, Dr Hughes, Peter Bartlett and John Rundell (FHCA) were all involved to some degree, because they did not provide Alan’s Fast Track Settlement Process claim material, dated 27th January 1994, to the Technical Resource Team, DMR and Lane, for assessment.  We do know however that Alan’s original Fast Track Settlement Process claim never reappeared and the official Arbitration Agreement was altered.

When Alan went into this alleged-independent assessment process, Graham was still suffering from depression and was worn out mentally and physically.  While exhibits GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 420 to GS-CAV 426, GS-CAV 431, GS-CAV 434 and  GS-CAV 436-A, confirm Senator Coonan’s independent assessment process was nothing but a sham, Alan believed, at the time, the Coalition Government would finally review his long outstanding Telstra issues.

2nd February 2008:  Alan writes to the Hon David Hawker, Speaker in the House of Representatives:-

“This attached document is a copy of an email from Ronda Fienberg, my Melbourne-based secretary and it is startling information, directly related to my allegations regarding Senator Coonan’s allegedly ‘independent’ assessment process.

As you can see, yesterday (1st February 2008) Ronda received confirmation from Senator Coonan’s office that they had deleted (without opening or reading) two emails Ronda had sent directly to Senator Coonan on my behalf in 2006. Both these emails related to Senator Coonan’s so-called ‘independent’ assessment – the process in which these documents should have been assessed. One of the documents is dated 23 April 2006 and the other 25 July 2006, but they were deleted yesterday, 1st February 2008 at 15:56:23 and 16:56:35 respectively.

Perhaps the correspondence I have recently sent to ACMA, Senator Joyce and your office, in relation to DCITA’s misleading and deceptive conduct, has been forwarded to the Minister’s office for investigation and this may have prompted Senator Coonan’s advisors to shred documents and delete emails regarding my unresolved Telstra matters. Whatever the reason for deleting unread claim related emails, it seems that Senator Coonan’s people were not aware that deleting the emails without opening them could automatically send a message back to the sender (in this case, my Melbourne-based secretary) to notify the sender that the message had been deleted without being opened (see attached document).” (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 441-A)

GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See  GS-CAV 441-B is a copy of the email information showing the deletions on 1st February 2008.  (Alan’s letter to the Hon David Hawker contains mistakes concerning the time the emails were deleted.  GS 441-b shows the correct times were 16:56:23 and 16:56:36.)

Please note GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 442 to 445 support the issues raised in Alan’s letter to the Hon David Hawker MP regarding Mr Hawker’s representations on behalf of Alan, during Senator Helen Coonan’s (alleged) independent assessment process.

4th February 2008:  Ms Lizzie Hallam, electorate officer to the Hon David Hawker MP emails Alan:-

“I acknowledge receipt of your latest email of Mr Hawker whom is presently out of the office.”

“Thank you for raising these concerns.”

“I shall bring same to Mr Hawker’s attention at the earliest convenience.” ( GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 446)

SUMMARY

This report shows why, before Graham and Alan signed the Arbitration Agreement, Graham doubted the integrity of the process.  Alan, on the other hand, having been duped by a previous Telstra-manipulated settlement process, believed a legally administered arbitration process would have to be conducted within the Australian justice system, and would therefore be carried out transparently. Alan was wrong; Graham was right!

Throughout Graham’s arbitration he continually asked to see Telstra’s proposed Rules of Arbitration, but the arbitrator (Dr Hughes) and both TIO’s (Warwick Smith, then John Pinnock) refused his requests.  Mr Pinnock, however, did provide a copy of these rules, under confidentiality, to the Senate secretary, Pauline Moore ( GS-CAV Exhibit 258 to 323 - See GS-CAV 318), while still refusing to give Graham a copy.  It has now been proven beyond all doubt, the arbitration rules were secretly altered, without Graham and Alan’s knowledge, and the COT claimants’ dealings with the TIO and the TIO Board and Council have continued to be muddied – rather than being the transparent process, the claimants were led to expect of the arbitration process.

Why did the TIO, the arbitrator and the TIO’s Special Counsel allow the defendants to provide the rules they wanted to be assessed under, then hide that from the claimants throughout their arbitrations?  Why was Mr Pinnock still hiding the Telstra rules from Graham even during the Senate investigations?

During the DCITA allegedly ‘independent’ assessment process, Alan asked Mr Pinnock (GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 426-B) to provide arbitration procedural information to help with Alan’s submission.  Alan never received a response to this written request.  A DCITA file note (see next paragraph) was received from another COT claimant and could shed some light on this issue.  The COT claimant who provided this document was also on the list Senator Joyce provided to Senator Coonan in relation to the proposed independent commercial assessment process.  The Terms of Reference for the DCITA independent assessment process required claims to be submitted before the end of February 2006.  Before Alan signed the agreement, he asked David Lever (DCITA) for an extension of time as he needed to access documents from the TIO, under the TIO Privacy Policy Act, to use in support of his claim.  Mr Lever extended the deadline for Alan to 17th March 2006, but Alan was still concerned that this was not enough time.  Alan suggested that he might still have trouble submitting all the supporting material he needed by the new deadline, which would mean that DCITA would not be able to evaluate all his material.  Mr Lever advised Alan that he should submit the main section of his claim before the due date and then, if other material was submitted after the due date, the assessors could decide if that new material was relevant.  Alan accepted this compromise and duly signed the agreement.

The DCITA FILE NOTE in question states:-

“Telecommunications Ombudsman, Mr Pinnock contacted David Lever on 22 March 2006 regarding [name blanked]. Mr Pinnock requested confirmation that [name blanked] was involved in the Independent Assessment process and was advised by Mr Lever that he was. Mr Pinnock advised David Lever that [name blanked] had contacted him requesting documents that he wished to forward to the Department for consideration in the Independent Assessment process.”

“Mr Lever advised Mr Pinnock that the Department had already requested that [name blanked out] forward any documents for the Independent Assessment Process to the Department by 17 March 2006.”

Alan believes that Mr Lever’s reference to a due date of 17th March 2006 and the information in  GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 - See GS-CAV 447 confirms Alan contacted Mr Pinnock in relation to the independent assessment process and proves it is Alan’s name that is blanked out in this document.  The main issue here is Alan wrote to Mr Pinnock on 3rd March but Mr Pinnock waited almost three weeks, until 22nd March, before he queried the situation with DCITA.  It may not be possible to prove that this delay was deliberate and, as stated above, Alan never received a reply from Mr Pinnock anyway.

IMPORTANT COMMENTARY

The dates of discussions, before Graham Schorer and Alan Smith, signed the Fast Track Arbitration Process agreement, are important.  (GS-CAV Exhibit 155 to 215 - See GS 186) and Graham Schorer Relevant Information file, exhibit 17, show Caroline Friend (Dr Hughes’ secretary) faxed a copy of the Fast Track Arbitration Procedure agreement to Mr Goldberg on 19th April 1994 at 12:29 pm, and to William Hunt on the same day at 1:59 pm. The formal agreement was discussed at a meeting between Graham, Alan and William on 20th April 1994.

This meeting was held late in the afternoon and Alan vividly remembers thinking Graham seemed quite angry with Mr Hunt.  Alan’s impression was later confirmed to be correct.  At this meeting, William raised the idea of the $250,000 limit for liability for the Resource Unit, in clauses 25 and 26.  Graham became extremely angry, claiming there should be NO limit in the agreement for any of them, noting his own claim was worth millions and he had lost years off his life.  He couldn’t see how anyone had any right to put a cap on how much he should be able to sue the Resource Unit for, in the event of negligence or misconduct.

William Hunt’s interim account for 24th June 1994 notes:-

“In April, lengthy discussions with Mr Schorer re steps, obtaining appointment with Mr A. H. Goldberg Q.C., preparing Brief for advice, appointing and attending conference with Mr Goldberg and then attending on short notice at the office of Minter Ellison in general conference before (Dr Gordon Hughes) re working out items of the Fast Track procedure.”

William Hunt’s meeting with Dr Hughes before Alan and Graham signed the Fast Track Arbitration Procedure, could only have been held on 20th April.

William Hunt’s records for 3rd May 1994 note:-

“On a date to be determined (last week or the week before) spending from 9:30 to 3:30 at the pre-conference with Dr Gordon Hughes and Bartlett of Minter Ellison etc.” (See Graham Schorer Dr Hughes Exhibit 3-b, Arbitration LGE 3 target)

This is further confirmation of the meeting on 20th April.

GS-CAV Exhibit 155 to 215 - See GS-CAV 186 and Graham Schorer Relevant Information file, exhibit 17 also establishes that, sometime between the afternoon of 19th April 1994 (when the agreement was faxed to Mr Hunt and Mr Goldberg) and the morning of 21st April, 1994 (when Graham and Alan signed the agreement) someone with access to Minter Ellison’s office removed clauses 24 and 25 and altered clause 26 of the agreement.

However, the William Hunt file note for 3rd May 1994 and his interim account for 24th June 1994 confirms he had a morning and afternoon FTAP meeting with Dr Hughes and Peter Bartlett after he received the formal 19th April 1994 FTAP (agreement), so the alterations to the FTAP (Agreement) had to have taken place after William Hunt’s meeting of 20th April 1994.

In summary:-

1. 19th April 1994: after 12:29 pm, the agreement document was faxed to Mr Hunt and Mr Goldberg.
2. 20th April 1994: between 9.30 and 3.30, Mr Hunt met with Dr Hughes and Peter Bartlett at (the “short-notice” meeting referred to in Mr Hunt’s notes of 24th June 1994) to discuss the agreement faxed to Mr Hunt the previous day. (See Graham Schorer Dr Hughes Arbitration LGE 3-b Exhibit 3)
3. 21st April 1994: between 10 am and close of business, Graham and Alan attended Minter Ellison’s offices to sign the agreement.

So, the changes made to the agreement had to have been made by someone with access to Minter Ellison’s offices after Mr Hunt left Minter Ellison’s offices at 3.30 pm on 20th, but before Graham and Alan arrived at Minter Ellison to sign the agreement on 21st April, at 10 am.

IMPORTANT 1

Attached to the Graham Schorer, Dr Hughes Arbitration LGE 3 target, at exhibit 4, is a letter dated 22nd March 1994 which Peter Bartlett faxed, with attachments, to Graham.  This letter headed Fast Track Settlement Proposal notes:-

“Attached are the comments on the Telecom draft I delivered to Gordon Hughes on Friday 18 March. Clearly a number of amendments suggested by Telecom are unacceptable. If Gordon can receive your comments on the Telecom draft, he can form an opinion as to what, in his view, is fair and reasonable.”

On page four of this letter, Mr Bartlett goes on to say, regarding Clause 10.2.2:-

“This is potentially the most difficult clause. Clause 2(f) of the FTSP provides: ‘that in conducting the review the assessor will make a finding on reasonable grounds as to the causal link between each of the COT Cases claims and alleged faults or problems in his or her telephone service.”

“Clause 10.2.2 of the Minter Ellison procedure provides that: ‘the Arbitrator will make a finding on reasonable grounds as to the causal link between the claimant’s claims and the alleged faults or problems with the relevant telephone service’.”

“Telecom has deleted ‘on reasonable grounds’ from the first line. Those words come from clause 2(f).”

Whether the words “each of the Claimant’s claims” were left out of clause 10.2.2 deliberately, or by mistake, it is clear clause 10.2.2 was still under discussion on 22nd March 1994 and, because Mr Bartlett does not refer to this part of clause 10.2.2 being deleted, we presume “each of the Claimant’s claims” was still included in the agreement at this point.  On page 8 of this letter, however, Mr Bartlett refers to clauses 24, 25 and 26 as still being under discussion.

When Dr Hughes wrote to Graham on 31st March 1994 (see exhibit 5, above), nine days after Mr Bartlett, he simply noted:-

“I am enclosing the latest draft of the Fast Track Arbitration Procedure which has been forwarded to me today by Messrs Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher…”

He does not make any reference to changes in clauses 24, 25 and 26 – as can be seen, all three clauses are still intact – although the wording, “each of the Claimant’s claims” had been removed, without advising the COT cases.

We again summarise:

1. Peter Bartlett writes to Graham on 22nd March 1994 suggesting clauses 24, 25 and 26 need further discussion.
2. Dr Hughes writes to Graham on 31st March 1994 attaching the agreement, without any mention of any alterations to clauses 24, 25 and 26, or that the wording “each of the Claimants claims” in clause 10.2.2 has been removed.
3. Peter Bartlett writes to Ann Garms, attaching the same FTAP agreement Dr Hughes sent to Graham, still with no mention of any alterations to clauses 24, 25 and 26, and 10.2.2.
4. Dr Hughes’ secretary, Caroline Friend, faxes William Hunt and Alan Goldberg the same FTAP agreement Dr Hughes sent to Graham and Peter Bartlett sent to Ann Garms, again with no mention of any changes to clauses 24, 25, 26 and 10.2.2.

We previously established William Hunt used the agreement faxed to him by Caroline Friend in discussion with Minter Ellison on 20th April 1994 (the day after he received it) and there is no record of Ann Garms, Graham or Alan agreeing to the removal of, or alterations to, clauses 24, 25, 26 and 10.2.2.  The changes made secretly, without the claimants’ knowledge or consent, appear to have been done with the full knowledge of those who benefitted from these deletions, i.e. Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory and the Special Counsel, Minter Ellison.

IMPORTANT 2

It appears the clauses referred to were either removed or changed with the full knowledge of the defendants.  Telstra did not sign the agreement at the same time as Graham, Alan and Ann Garms signed it and Peter Bartlett informed them the agreement was to be couriered to Telstra for signing by Steve Black because he was unavailable at the time.  Peter Bartlett later sent Graham a copy in the mail.  Graham received it on 29th April 1994, although the letter was dated 22nd April,1994 and the agreement confirms Steve Black signed it on 21st April 1994.

IMPORTANT 3

Alan Smith received four official FOI schedules around 21st June 1996.  These are attached to the Graham Schorer – Dr Hughes Arbitration LGE 3 target, at exhibits 1 and 2; they list the official correspondence exchanged between Dr Hughes and Telstra, both in the lead-up to Alan signing the Arbitration Agreement and during Alan’s arbitration.  Exhibit 1 is the list of official correspondence from Telstra to Dr Hughes between 17th February and 23rd September 1994.

Example (a), Telstra FOI folio L68976-L68977 of 1st March 1994 notes:-

“Fax from Steve Black, Group General Manager, Telstra, to Gordon Hughes, Hunt & Hunt, confirming changes to the proposed Fast Track arbitration procedure.”

Telstra FOI folio L68978 (the next document) was sent by Telstra’s Steve Black to Dr Hughes on 8th September 1994 confirming Telstra did not write to Dr Hughes in relation to changes to the FTAP agreement after 1st March 1994.

Exhibit 2 is the list of correspondence from Dr Hughes to Telstra between 27th January and 21st September 1994.

Example (b), Telstra FOI folio L69119 – L69138 of 31st May 1994 notes:-

“Fax from Gordon Hughes, Hunt & Hunt, to Steve Black, Group General Manger, customer Affairs, Telstra, enclosing draft of Fast Track Arbitration Procedure.”

Telstra FOI folio L69139 – L69414 (the next document) was sent by Dr Hughes to Telstra on 1st September 1994 confirming Dr Hughes did not write to Telstra in relation to changes to the FTAP agreement after 31st March 1994.

WE again raise Questions:

After 31st March 1994, no official arbitration correspondence was exchanged between Telstra and Dr Hughes, in relation to the FTAP agreement.  The copies received by Ann Garms on 13th April 1994 and William Hunt and Alan Goldberg, on 19th April 1994 do not refer to the agreement as a draft.  Where are the signatures of Ann, Graham, Alan and Telstra, agreeing to the late alterations to the agreement signed on 21st April, 1994?

1994-2008 unread claim documents

There are many similarities between the 21st April 1994 TIO-administered arbitration process with the 13th March 2005 independent-assessment process administered by Senator Helen Coonan.

AGREEMENTS ALTERED AND DOCUMENTS NOT ASSESSED:

1. Arbitration: We have shown the TIO-prepared agreement was altered at the last minute without alerting the claimants.
2. Arbitration: The TIO and Telstra arranged for the TIO-appointed Resource Unit to vet arbitration documents and decide which documents should be given to the arbitrator and the claimants and which should be withheld.
3. Arbitration: In the Allen Bowles fax-interception file, dated December 2006 at exhibit 1, we provide evidence of 43 separate claim documents, faxed to the TIO-administered arbitration process in 1994, that were not assessed during the process.
4. DCITA Assessment: The Minister’s office altered the independent-assessment agreement after Senator Barnaby Joyce gave his vote for the privatisation of Telstra.
5. DCITA Assessment: It is confirmed, as late as 1st February 2008 that, in the Government-facilitated independent assessment process, at least two sets of claim-related documents were not assessed.
6. DCITA Assessment: It is likewise confirmed, as late as January 2008, the Minister’s appointed assessors admitted, in their internal emails, they intended to only assess the DCITA claimants’ claims on their merits.

IMPORTANT Food For Thought

During Graham and Alan’s arbitration procedures they were never informed Grant Campbell defected to Telstra’s Customer Response Unit.

As discussed for the date of 29th December 1997, Dr Hughes wrote to William Hunt on Blake Dawson Waldron letterhead noting:-

• “due to a perceived conflict of interest arising from my commencement at
• Blake Dawson Waldron, I shall forthwith cease to act as arbitrator.”

“I noted the following reservations and qualifications expressed by the parties:

• Mr Schorer has reservations as to whether the arbitration should continue;
• Mr Benjamin has some reservations as to whether a mediation should be commenced;
• Mr Schorer’s objects to the involvement of Mr Howell as a technical expert (although this is an issue which has previously been addressed by me).”

(GS-CAV Exhibit 324 to 367 - See GS CAV 344)

Question:

Was Dr Hughes aware, at the time he wrote this letter, that:-

• Blake Dawson Waldron and Ted Benjamin were also investigating another COT case 1800 billing issues along with the TIO?
• These were the same type of 1800-billing complaints that Ted Benjamin told Dr Hughes on 8th December 1994 he would address in the Alan Smith’s arbitration.
• Should Warwick Smith, as the administrator of Graham and Alan’s arbitration, have advised them not to forward arbitration material through Grant Campbell, because he had defected from Telstra?
• In 1994, Alan supplied the TIO office with FTSP material regarding the 008/1800 and fax problems as part of his claim material (which he later received back from the TIO in 2001, under the Privacy Policy Act).  Was some of this material removed by Grant Campbell when he defected to Ted Benjamin’s Customer Response Unit before it was assessed by the TIO-appointed technical consultants?
• Because of the detailed way in which Alan provided his 008/1800 claim documents to the TIO, was some of this material used by Grant Campbell, after he left the TIO office in his effort to further investigate this known systemic billing problem?

 

https://www.google.com/search?Furious%20MP%27s%20plan%20to%20introduce%20bill%20...%20-%20The%20West%20Australian

Telstra’s Acronyms & Jargon

AOMP:  An Ericsson TMOS Network Management System tool for handling Operations & Maintenance functions for one or more AXE exchanges – particularly suited for use as an O&M centre for a number of rural exchanges which are spread over a large geographical area. Please note: while the AOMP has not operated in the Cape Bridgewater location Alan Smith has documented here because documents at hand have discussed this tool.

AOTC: Australian and Overseas Telecommunication Limited – former name of Telstra Corporation Limited – comprising the merged Telecom Australia and Overseas Telecommunication Corporation

ARE-11: Ericsson Analogue Crossbar Controlled Exchange. Please note: this type of exchange was operational during a period Graham Schorer had his problems.

ARF: Urban or large crossbar exchange by Ericsson

ARK: Rural or small crossbar exchange (Ericsson ) Please note: In the Casualties of Telecom (COT) report dated 13th April 1994, AUSTEL reported that the Cape Bridgewater exchange up and until the RCM was installed was an ARK, when in fact the system at Cape Bridgewater was an ‘old’ outdated RAX see below. An ARK crossbar exchange was manufactured approximately 20 years after the RAX system. Portland during the early nineties until August 1991 was an ARK which fed calls to the Cape Bridgewater RAX system.

ATUG:  Australian Telecommunication User Group was operating well before the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman (office of complaints) was formed in June 1993. ATUG was a voice for small businesses and as such paled a roll in enhancing services in the communication industry. Graham Schorer was a member of ATUG. Deputy TIO Wally Rothwell, before being appointed as Deputy TIO was Chief Executive Officer of ATUG for ten years.

AUSTEL: Australian Telecommunication Regulatory Authority. Please note: in July/August 1992, the then General Manager of AUSTEL’s Consumer Affairs, Amanda Davis, became involved with helping the COT group establish themselves as being responsible small business people who had legitimate phone complaints. It was through Amanda Davis’ stand in helping beyond the normal role as an officer of a regulator that she was literally forced to terminate her position.

AXE:  Stored Programme Controlled (SPC) Digitally Switched exchange developed by LM. Ericsson, large numbers exist in the Australian network; used also for ISDN

AXE 104:  LM Ericsson Digital Switch (Rural). Please note: This is the digital exchange that was installed in Portland in August 1991, cutover from the ARK system (see ARK above). In the AUSTEL COT Report p 167 and questions raised by Senator Alston in the Senate Estimates 25th February 1994, relating to the problems being experienced by Alan Smith while connected to the AXE 104. The Senate Hansard referred to here can be located in Ted Benjamin (Appendix 16(a).

BS: Base station.

Busy Hour:  The hour of the day when the average traffic of an exchange is highest. In Telstra Australia practice, it is defined at the two busiest consecutive half hours commencing at the hour of half hour. NETWORK – The hour during which the total traffic flows through the network under consideration is highest. Please note:  The Bell Canada International (BCI) tests were supposed to be generated through the Busy Hour. In the case of Alan Smith it has now been confirmed that the BCI tests (if they were done at all) were not generated through the Busy Hour.

C & BI:  Charging and Billing Integrity. Please note:  Alan Smith has seen reference to this in his Telstra related billing files (somewhere) and therefore has included the acronym here.

CABS:  Charging AND Billing System (CABS) is an automatic system for billing customers. CABS was replaced by FLEXCAB (when Mr Smith is not sure when) however, FLEXCAB was supposed to have improved the billing capabilities.

Call Trace:  A feature that allows the Customer to cause the last call received to be traced.

Can: Customer Access Network. The part of the network between the telephone exchange main distribution frame and the Service Delivery Point at the customer premises. Please note: on page 243 in the AUSTEL COT Report point 11.8: “…AUSTEL had written to Telecom informing it that the claim in the Bell Canada International report to the effect that Telecom’s customers received a grade of service that meets global standards goes to far because the study was an inter-exchange study only and did not extend to the customer access network – AUSTEL had agreed to the study being so limited on the basis that other monitoring it had requested Telecom to undertake on AUSTEL’s behalf should provided AUSTEL with the data on the efficacy of the customer access network – See Verification issues LGE 7.

CANES:  Customer Access Network Evaluation System – C&C system – provides a complete fault registration, recording, diagnosis & analysis environment aimed at improving responsiveness to reported fault – uses A1 technology – interfaces with SULTAN. Please note:  this is another system for fault finding by way of intercepting telephone conversations.

CCAS: Call Charge Analysis System – monitoring charging of selected services in analogue exchanges. CCAS type systems can not detect the answer signal & hence can not determine if the call was effective or what the chargeable time is on an effective call – the CCAS records are still of considerable use i.e. to allow comparison of CCR & CCAS records on a-party number b-party number, date, call clearance time. Please note: The CCAS data which was not provided to Alan Smith during the SVT testing, now confirms that the SVT tests were not generated as stated in Telstra’s arbitration defence – see Verification issues LGE 7

CCAS ELMI: This is the monitoring equipment that Telstra used under direction from Telstra to test Alan Smith’s service lines during 1992/93. Gordon Stokes, a local Portland technician had this equipment attached to Alan Smith’s 055 267267 service on the 13th October 1992, but denied to senior Telstra executives that this equipment had been in use during the day it detected incoming call losses to Alan’s business – see Chronology for this date.

CENTOC: Centralised Traffic Occupancy – computerised traffic recording & monitoring for analogue exchanges. Please note: this information was never provided under FOI by Telstra to either Graham Schorer or Alan Smith during their respective arbitrations. While neither Graham nor Alan actual asked by name they required CENTOC data, as the information being sought under the respective FOI requests, they did ask for all ‘network monitoring’ information. Both Graham and Alan have been advised Telstra’s guards the CENTOC, which is some times referred to as CENTOCTRAXE with armed guards as this data does not lie and will determine whether there are network problems affecting certain locations.

 CHARMS:  Charging Maintenance System – provides locations, rates & charging scales for Telstra’s customer charging – does not store unique customer details, but significant information to classify customer groupings attached to any exchange within the Telstra network.

CLI:  Calling Line Identification – a customer facility in crossbar and SPC exchanges for billing and surveillance purposes – identifies the number of the calling party’s line.

CPE: Customer Premises Equipment. All telecommunications terminal equipment located on the Customer premises, encompassing from the analogue telephone to the most advance data terminals and Customer switches. Please note: Page 53 of the Coopers & Lybrand report acknowledged that Telstra had a habit of blaming CPE for faults instead of proper investigation.

DNF:  Difficult Network Fault, Please note: in the Coopers & Lybrand and AUSTEL COT Report, they jointly refer to the COT Cases as DNF customers.

DOTAC: Department Of Transport and Communications. Please note: the abbreviation for the Communication’s Ministers Office being used by telcos  DCITA – Department of Communications Information Technology and the Arts.

ELMI:  Portable Telephone Charge Analyser. Brand of CCAS equipment used mainly in country area’s.

EOS: End of selection code – used to monitor switching & congestion loss. Please Note: this equipment allows the person operating the monitoring switching device to listen in on conversations. See Gordon Stokes witness statements for Telstra’s arbitration defence of Alan Smith’s claims.

FLEXICAB: A system similar to CABS (see above) but, with many more processes and capable of producing very meaningful management reports. Please note: neither Graham Schorer or Alan Smith was provided with any FLEXICAB and/or CENTOCTRAXE data information under their FOI requests (during their respective arbitration’s). This update information would have assisted both the TIO appointed technical consultants as well as the claimant's consultants in determining if the SVT testing was authentic or not.

IRS: Inter-network Routing Service.

ISDN:  Integrated Services Digital Network (CCITT) – A switched digital transmission network that provides, through a single digital access point, speech, data and other telecommunication sciences. The hierarchy of digital switching & transmission methods.

LEOPARD:  Local Engineering Operations Processing and Analysis of Recording data – a plant recording & maintenance system for telephone services; a computerised system to cater for all field technical records associated with provision and maintenance of services. Please note: While Alan Smith has not fully looked into Graham Schores’s technical information regarding Mr Schorer’s registered fault complaints, Alan has been able to determine that even after Mr Smith had supplied fault information to either 1100 or the designated special fault centre at Waverley (Victoria),Telstra did  not all ways registered those faults in Leopard.

LOOP: Pair Gain Signalling System

Macrolink:  Telstra’s Primary Rate Access ISDN services that provide a high speed service for speech and data.

MCT:  Malicious Call Trace: Please Note: During May to August 1993, Telstra connected Alan Smith’s incoming 055 267 267 service as well as his 008/1800 free-call service to MCT. Also during May to September 1993, Telstra connected Alan’s facsimile service line 055 267230 to MCT. The side affect-problem with MCT is that it does not allow any other intended incoming call to connect for a 90 second period – see witness statement of Telstra’s Dave Stockdale.

MDF:  Main distribution Frame. Structural hardware, on one part of which terminate the permanent outside lines entering the Customer’s premises and on another part of which terminate the subscriber line multiple cabling, used for associating any outside line with its corresponding internal exchange wiring.

MOSAIC: Trouble Management system – replaced the Leopard system of fault recording.

Multiplexer:  The combining of multiple channels onto a single transmission medium; any process through which a circuit normally dedicated to a single user can be shared by multiple users. Please note: The telephone system that service Alan Smith from August 1991 to 2001, operates using a multiplexer system.

MUX: Multiplexer.

NASM: National AXE System Manger.

NCC:  Network Control Centre.

Neat System:  Network Evaluation and Test System. A test call system consisting of remote transponders, each connected at the network exchange MDF point as a normal customer, and central management and control unit. This system can conduct a schedule of test calls between transponders to measure call set-up, and hold performance, together with transmission, noise, post dialling delay, and other tests. Please note: During the AUSTEL COT Case investigations, AUSTEL implemented through Telstra that all the DNF problem customers had to have Neat Testing performed at their local exchanges. In the case of Alan Smith, it has now been confirmed (see CAV targets) that NEAT testing was performed at the Cape Bridgewater RCM as shown in the AUSTEL report. The NEAT Ericsson equipment used in the Cape Bridgwater tests October/November 1993, allowed for each test to remain open for a minimum of 120 seconds, allowing for transmission testing for noise, post dialling delay faults. This type of Neat transmission testing was used for the SVT tests carried out on Mr Smith’s service during his arbitration (see CAV targets 7 and the Brian Hodge MBE report for more information.

NODE:  A point of a network where various links come together and which generally contains a switching element to direct traffic.

NRR:  Not Receiving Ring. Please note:  the NRR fault was a major problem uncovered by the COT Cases during late 1992 and into 1994. Example: A caller rings a service and does not get connected either receiving a dead-line, or piecing sounds like a facsimile type noise even though no facsimile is connected at the calling end. In the case of Alan Smith, numerous complaints registered to him by customers (when they finally getting through) or by writing to Alan, was the only way he became aware that a customer was lost.

OAS:  Operator Assisted Service.

OFMUX:  Optical Fibre Multiplexer Equipment.

OMP: Operations Maintenance Processor.

OPAS: Operations Performance and Support. Please note: from what Alan Smith has observed from reading a number of technical documents is, that OPAS is the last resort used by local rural technicians.

Outrage:  Is the time that Service to the customer will be unavailable for. Please note: this type of happening to a customer should be kept to a minimum however, Telstra in the case of Graham Schorer and Alan Smith, their customers experiencing (RVA see below) was an outrage from them twofold.

PABX:  Private Automatic Branch Exchange. A small switching system located on a customer’s premises which serves speech and data extensions within a business complex and provides access to the public network. Please note: during the COT arbitrations’ Golden Messenger was operating off of a PABX. System.

PSTN: Public Switched Telephone Network. Public telephone network which generally provides switching and signalling for local, long-distance, and international voice and low-speed data.

RAX: An outdated communications system that only operated in low call rate locations, designed in the 50s. Please note: the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp was connected to an RCM until August 1991.

RCM: Remote Customer Multiplexer – digital pair gain system. Please note: The Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp operates off of an RCM which is housed in a hut. This system is not an exchange and is totally unmanned.

REARK:  Private company which produces TELCATS reports. Please note: often –quite often, from 1992 through to 1994, REARK was used by Telstra to enable them to provide reports to the Minister of the day, including the regulator AUSTEL

RUBAS: Traffic figure based on the 50 highest half-hour average traffic figures over a 7 day period. Please Note: like the CENROC TRAXE and CABS data, the traffic information obtained from RUBAS in the Warrnambool and Portland locations (South West Victoria) was also not supplied to Alan Smith under FOI during his arbitration.

RVA:  Recorded Voice Announcement. A recorded message is played through to a caller (who might have dialled the right number) but is confronted with a recorded message stating that “the number you have called is not connected.”  Please note: Telstra has recognised that the RVA fault was a known National Network Software problem that came about when they implemented the 1800 number. The RAX and RCM system installed at Cape Bridgewater, which suffered congestion, gave the same type of (recorded message) to the caller into Cape Bridgewater when the system was congested.

 SMART 10:  Subscriber Monitoring & Registration Terminal. This system operates similar to the CCAS see above.

SPC 1 Stored Processor Controlled (Exchange) e.g. AXE, ARE

SULTAN:  Subscriber Line Test Access Network – provides test information vital for diagnosis of customer fault reports and network performance monitoring – used with LEOPARD and CANES –C&C system. Please note: this is another tool for voice interception.

TIMS:  Telephone Information Management System.

TRAFFIC:  A term applying to simultaneous calls in progress, not to total calls generated over a period of time.

AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings

TRAXE:  Traffic Recording for AXE – data acquisition system – uses Data General minicomputers located in each State – apart from traffic analysis. Please note: Alan Smith has already mentioned above, that CENTOC TRAXE data information should have been provided to him under FOI during his arbitration. The Customer Remote Multiplexer RCM at Cape Bridgewater was service via an AXE in Portland.

Please note: any of the exhibits (which we might have missed in the text of the chronology of events above) can be accessed by placing the cursor over the following relevant number range in order to access that exhibit.

The matters discussed on this website absentjustice.com are said according to my interpretation of the  Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013

AS-CAV Exhibit 1 to 47 – AS-CAV Exhibit 48-A to 91 – AS-CAV Exhibit 92 to 127 – AS-CAV Exhibit 128 to 180 – AS-CAV Exhibit 181 to 233 – AS CAV Exhibit 234 to 281 – AS-CAV Exhibit 282 to 323 – AS-CAV Exhibit 324-a to 420 – AS-CAV Exhibit 421 to 469 – AS-CAV Exhibit 470 to 486 – AS-CAV Exhibit 488-a to 494-e – AS-CAV Exhibits 495 to 541 – AS-CAV Exhibits 542-a to 588 – AS-CAV Exhibits 589 to 647 – AS-CAV Exhibits 648-a to 700 –  AS-CAV Exhibit 765-A to 789 – AS-CAV Exhibit 790 to 818 – AS-CAV Exhibit 819 to 843 – AS-CAV 923 to 946 –  AS-CAV Exhibit 1150 to 1169 –AS-CAV 1103 to 1132 – AS-CAV Exhibit 1002 to 1019 – AS-CAV Exhibit 996 to 1001 – GS-CAV Exhibit 1 to 88 – GS-CAV Exhibit 89 to 154-b – GS-CAV Exhibit 155 to 215 – GS-CAV Exhibit 216 to 257 – GS-CAV Exhibit 258 to 323 – GS-CAV Exhibit 410-a to 447 – GS-CAV Exhibit 448 to 458 – GS-CAV Exhibit 459 to 489– GS-CAV Exhibit 490 to 521 – GS-CAV 522 to 580 – GS-CAV Exhibit 581 to 609

© 2017 Absent Justice

 Download Attachments

AS-CAV Exhibit 488-a to 494-e

AS-CAV Exhibit 1150 to 1169

AS-CAV Exhibits 1103 to 1132

AS-CAV Exhibit 1002 to 1019

AS-CAV Exhibit 996 to 1001

 

The following 35 links have been chosen from several files being prepared on this website absentjustice.com, and similar links copied from another website are being set up and will be a Fast Tract way in which the reader to absentjustice.com can assess the various mini-reports and supporting evidence which will give a quick access to the truth behind our story.

1. Contact - Government Corruption
2. Open letter to Prime Minister (Recovered)
3. Julian Assange - Absent Justice
4. Hacked documents
5. Blowing The Whistle-
6. Chapter 4 - Fast Track Arbitration Procedure-
7. Misconduct in Public Office
8. Chapter 8
9. Chapter 1 concealment and forged evidence-
10. Chapter 7 TIO Lies Fraud Deception
11. Read about our dealings with
12. Chapter 5
13. Chronology of Events11
14. WikiLeak exposing the truth--
15. Chapter 5 - The fifth remedy pursued
16. Chapter 6 - The sixth remedy pursued
17. Chapter 10 - The tenth remedy pursued
18. Chapter 6, Falsehood
19. Chapter 9 - Independent Assessment Process
20. Chapter 3 Devious and distant
21. Tampering With Evidence
22. Chapter 4 The New Owners Tell Their Story
23. Bribery Corruption Illicit Dealings
24. Absent Justice Part 1 - Chapter 8 - An Honest Arbitrator?
25. Price Waterhouse Coopers 1--2
26. Chapter 4 - The Seventh Damning Letter
27. Introduction | Fabricated report
28. Summary of Events
29. Absent Justice Part 1 - Chapter 7 - Reinstated liability Clauses
30. Chapter 4 - Telstra’s B003 Arbitration Briefing Documents
31. Chapter 7- Vietnam-Vietcong
32. Chapter 6 - US Securities Exchange - pink herring
33. AFP Investigation -2
34. C A V Part 1, 2 and 3
35. Page Editor

© 2021Absent Justice