Freehill Hollingdale & Page - The underbelly of Telstra 

INTRODUCTION 

Page 5169 at point 29, in SENATE official Hansard – Parliament of Australia, states:    

29. Whether Telstra was active behind-the-scenes in preventing a proper investigation by the police is not known. What is known is that, at the time, Telstra had representatives of two law firms on its Board—Mr Peter Redlich, a Senior Partner in Holding Redlich, who had been appointed for 5 years from 2 December 1991 and Ms Elizabeth Nosworthy, a partner in Freehill Hollingdale & Page who had also been appointed for 5 years from 2 December 1991.  

One of the notes to and forming part of Telstra’s financial statements for the 1993- 94 financial year, indicates that during the year the two law firms supplied legal advice to Telstra totalling $2.7 million, an increase of almost 100 per cent over the previous year. Part of the advice from Freehill Hollingdale & Page was a strategy for "managing" the "Casualties of Telecom" (COT) cases.

According to government records dated 5 October 1993, Robin Davey, the Chairman of AUSTEL, communicated with Telstra regarding the AUSTEL-drafted commercial assessment process, previously referred to as the "Fast Track Settlement Proposal." At point 40 in the Prologue Evidence File No/2, Mr Davey made it clear to Telstra's General Manager of Commercial, Ian Campbell, that the government would have grave concerns if Freehill Hollingdale & Page continued to be involved in the COT Cases dispute with Telstra.

The question that neither Telstra nor AUSTEL (now called the Australian Communications Media Authority - ACMA) had given the COT Cases a reason as to why Freehill Hollingdale & Page was used against the COT Cases as Telstra's arbitration legal counsel when the government assured the COT Cases Freehill's would not be used. 

The government has not provided any clarification to the COT Cases regarding the involvement of Ms. Elizabeth Nosworthy, a respected partner at the law firm Freehill Hollingdale & Page and a member of the Telstra Board during the period of the COT arbitration. Specifically, it remains unclear whether Ms. Nosworthy sanctioned the decision to appoint her firm as Telstra’s legal representative in this complex arbitration process. This choice is particularly significant, as it could have entailed overseeing a substantial number of arbitration cases—potentially sixteen or more—which would have likely resulted in considerable financial gain for Freehills.

Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the government’s prior assurances that Freehill Hollingdale & Page would not be engaged in these arbitrations, thereby raising critical questions about the integrity of the arbitration process and the transparency of the relationships between the government entities (bureaucrats) who allowed this to happen.

 

Senator Kim Carr criticised the handling of the COT arbitrations on 11 March 1999, as the following Hansard link shows. Addressing the government’s lack of power, he said:

“What I do make a comment on is the question of civil liberties and the rights of citizens to approach this parliament and seek redress for their grievances when corporate power, particularly in a publicly owned corporation, has been abused. And there can be no question that that is what is at the heart of this issue.”

And when addressing Telstra’s conduct, he stated:

“But we also know, in the way in which telephone lines were tapped, in the way in which there have been various abuses of this parliament by Telstra—and misleading and deceptive conduct to this parliament itself, similar to the way they have treated citizens—that there has of course been quite a deliberate campaign within Telstra management to undermine attempts to resolve this question in a reasonable way. We have now seen $24 million of moneys being used to crush these people. It has gone on long enough, and simply we cannot allow it to continue. The attempt made last year, in terms of the annual report, when Telstra erroneously suggested that these matters—the CoT cases—had been settled demonstrates that this process of deceptive conduct has continued for far too long.” (See parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/displaychamberhansards1999-03-11)

Please note: I refer to myself in the following segment as either Alan or Alan Smith. 

 

On 5 June 1995, William Hunt (Graham's solicitor - COT Cases spokesperson) records in his file note:

Re Schorer & Cot Cases. Pursue Schorer & Thorpe to get authority to write to the Commonwealth Ombudsman about the inability or refusal to provide us with the tests conducted for both Schorer and Smith. In particular, I am concerned that the material has not been made available for inspection, and it should be because it belongs to Telecom, not to Bell Canada. (our emphasis) File 220 - GS-CAV Exhibit 216 to 257

From William Hunt’s Golden Messenger arbitration files, it is clear that Graham Schorer (COT spokesperson) tried to access the BCI raw data test results to support his claim that the tests were fundamentally flawed and, therefore, should not have been provided to Dr Hughes by Telstra.  

Six weeks after Dr. Hughes delivered his findings regarding Alan's case, a fax was sent from the TIO's office to Peter Bartlett in response to a letter Alan had sent to Dr. Hughes on June 20, 1995. This letter concerned Alan's claim that the Bell Canada International tests were impracticable and Dr. Hughes' subsequent response on June 21, 1995.

"Peter, could you please review Dr. Hughes' letter to John Pinnock, dated June 21, 1995, regarding Alan Smith? John wants to discuss it on Monday, specifically the approach for parties seeking to revisit issues after arbitration. His position is to avoid “opening a can of worms,” but he would like to discuss strategy with you regarding Pia" (File 184 AS-CAV Exhibit 181 to 233) 

This document, which refers to the “can of worms,” is closely related to the Cape Bridgewater and BCI information that Alan received on May 23, 1995—two weeks after Dr. Hughes had decided on Alan's claim. It also pertains to Alan's request to Dr. Hughes, the COT arbitrator, on January 24, 1995, for the same BCI information. This was referenced by the TIO, John Pinnock, in a letter dated June 28, 1995, to Alan (File AS 665-a - AS-CAV Exhibits 648-a to 700 ). In that letter, he noted that the file did not indicate that Alan had pursued the matter further, despite Alan’s fax journal for January 24, 1995 (AS 665-a) showing that the fax he sent was received at the arbitrator's office. There are multiple reasons for Mr Pinnock's reluctance to investigate Alan's valid claims, as he fears it may "open a can of worms." By June 1995, Dr Hughes, Telstra, and Mr Pinnock were all aware that Dr Hughes received Alan's fax on January 24, 1995, but chose to ignore it.

One can only conclude that if it had been found that Alan’s claims were correct, as it has since been proved (see  Telstra's Falsified BCI Report 2 and BCI Telstra’s M.D.C Exhibits 1 to 46), and that Bell Canada International could not possibly have generated the tests into Cape Bridgewater that they claim they generated, then the results declared by BCI about tests carried out for other COT claimants were, most likely, also flawed.  In simple terms, this means that if Alan’s evidence of BCI’s failure to conduct the tests correctly had been thoroughly and transparently investigated, as it should have been, then all the other COT arbitrations, including Graham’s, would have been put on hold until a similar set of tests were carried out in consultation with the arbitrator's technical consultants at the exchanges that the COT claimants’ business lines were connected to.  By not ‘opening the can of worms’, however, but instead concealing Alan’s proof that the BCI Cape Bridgewater tests were impracticable, those involved in administering the COT arbitrations, including the arbitrator himself, contributed to Telstra’s perversion of the course of justice. 

It is clear from William Hunts' Golden Messenger arbitration file dated 19^th March 1996, noted

At or about the same time Bell Canada had Telstra doing reports on its service in relation to Golden’s receipt of same. At or about the same time similar tests were being done on the Telstra equipment relating to Smith and the results of those cover the demonstration that they could not have been done. …

As to the second Bell Canada test Schorer has on disk the Telstra abandoned certain tests as to part from certain exchanges. One can only assume that the reports were unsatisfactory to Telstra or supportive of Schorer. (File 240) - AS-CAV Exhibit 324-a to 420)

On 21^st March 1997, Mr Pinnock wrote to Telstra's Mr Benjamin regarding his concerns that Telstra’s Forensic Psychologist Ian Joblin had not signed his witness statement (File 596 - AS-CAV Exhibits 589 to 647 ), noting:

"I would appreciate your advice concerning the matters raised by Mr Smith, in particular and arising out of your letter of 23 December 1994 to Dr Hughes: any explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the attestation of the witness statements of Ian Joblin were there any changes made to the Ian Joblin statement originally sent to Dr Hughes, compared to the signed statement"?

Dr Hughes did not address why Telstra allowed their lawyers, FHP, to sign a statutory declaration without the witness being present during Alan’s arbitration.

More importantly, did someone other than Mr Joblin change the original assessment (of Alan’s mental state) after Mr Joblin had signed and submitted the report? Was this why Mr Joblin’s witness statement was forwarded to Dr Hughes without Mr Joblin’s signature? 

Senator Bill O’Chee (was most concerned that John Pinnock had not provided me any response to his letter on 21 March 1997 to Telstra’s Ted Benjamin). It was this no response that prompted Senator Bill O'Chee to write to Telstra's Graeme Ward, regulatory and external affairs (see File 293-B -GS-CAV Exhibit 258 to 323 on 26 June 1998, stating

“I note in your letter’s last page you suggest the matter of the alteration of documents attached to statutory declarations should be dealt with by the relevant arbitrator. I do not concur. I would be grateful if you could advise why these matters should not be referred to the relevant police."

There was no transparent outcome to this matter. What did occur from Senator O'Chee's statement regarding Telstra stating it was up to the relevant arbitrator to deal with the unlawful conduct of altering statutory declarations is that when an investigation by the COTs concerning why Dr Gordon Hughes allowed this type of conduct to occur unchallenged is that he as a partner of another legal firm withheld vital Telstra documents from COT Case Graham Schorer when he was Dr Hughes client in a Federal Court Action against Telstra four years previous as Chapter 3 - Conflict of Interest shows,  

It is 2025, and Alan Smith has still never seen a copy of the advice that John Pinnock was officially entitled to receive from Telstra regarding this unsigned arbitration witness statement by Ian Joblin, clinical psychologist - re Maurice Wayne Condon of Freehill Hollingdale & Page attesting to seeing the signature on the witness statement when it was not there at all. 

Refer also to the 21 March 1997 letter of John Pinnock (the second appointed administrator to my arbitration), to Telstra's Ted Benjamin (see File 596 - Exhibits 589 to 647) written twenty-two months after the conclusion of Alan Smith's  arbitration where Mr Pinnock asks: 

1...any explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the attestation of the witness statement of Ian Joblin .

2...were there any changes made to the Joblin statement originally sent to Dr Hughes compared to the signed statement?" 

Alan Smith has not received any response from John Pinnock or Ted Banjain of Telstra regarding the serious legal matter involving Ian Joblin's witness statement.

 

 

The following exhibit Senate Evidence File No 12, shows Alan Smith has been threatened twice, once on 16 August 2001 and again on 6 December 2004, that if he was to disclose the 6 and 9 July 1998 In-Camera Hansard, which secretly exposes Telstra's unethical conduct to the COT Cases, the Senate Chair will have him charged with contempt of the Senate, even though these Hansards could well have won sixteen arbitration and mediation appeals. These secret government-privileged reports named the Senators, who said that only compensation for the five COT Cases currently under investigation and not all of the remaining sixteen would be an injustice to the sixteen COT Cases. Nothing has been done to rectify this injustice.  

If Alan Smith had been allowed to use these Hansard records, he could have justified the investigation of his case, especially when considering Files GS 286 and GS 290. These documents reveal several discrepancies between the version of a Statutory Declaration provided by Telstra to Graham Schorer, the COT spokesperson, and the version used by Telstra in their defence during the arbitration of Mr Schorer's claims. It appears that the COT Cases involved not only Telstra and Freehill Hollingdale & Page's refusal to sign witness statements as a singular issue. Unsigned and altered witness statements were integral to the strategies employed by both Telstra and Freehill.

It is essential to iterate:

The most alarming points concerning Ian Joblin’s Witness statement are:

1. Before Mr Joblin met with Alan, Telstra provided Mr Joblin with a copy of the Bell Canada International (BCI) addendum report, which stated that some 13,590 test calls that were carried out over a staggered five-day period into the Cape Bridgewater RCM, using the TELELEC CCS7 monitoring equipment, had a success rate of 99.5%;
2. Telstra asked Mr Joblin to assess Alan’s mental state after he had read the BCI report.
3. Neither Mr Joblin nor the arbitrator was told that the nearest exchange that could accommodate the TELELEC CCS7 equipment was the Warrnambool exchange, 120 kilometres from Cape Bridgewater.

One would imagine that if Ian Joblin had known that the 13,590 test calls allegedly carried out by BCI had not terminated through the TELELEC CCS7 monitoring system at Cape Bridgewater, as the reports provided to him by Freehill Hollingdale & Page suggest because the unmanned Cape Bridgewater RCM and Portland’s central exchange could not accommodate the CCS7 system, then his assessment of Alan’s mental state might have been somewhat different, he might have been distressed himself, if he had been aware that Telstra had misled and deceived him concerning the alleged BCI Cape Bridgewater tests.