The independent arbitration consultants exhibited a marked lack of impartiality during the COT arbitrations. Rather than providing objective and unbiased insights, they delivered advice to the arbitrator that was often evasive, misleading, and occasionally false, resulting in considerable detriment to the claimant's case.

 

The Bell Canada International Inc BCI tests saga continues to haunt me.

We must take a closer look at Chapter Five, especially regarding the concerning potential that Freehill Hollingdale & Page, the legal firm representing Telstra in the arbitration, sought to portray me as mentally unstable. It’s crucial to connect this firm with Telstra's current Corporate Secretary for 2024, Sue Laver, who allowed the falsified Bell Canada International Inc. (BCI) Cape Bridgewater tests to remain concealed. This was a deliberate move to prevent the Senate from uncovering the truth behind Telstra’s use of these unreliable test results, which only fuelled assumptions of my paranoia regarding their criminal actions.

This situation is even more significant when considering that Telstra had previously invoked the Queensland Mental Health Act to confine Sandra Wolfe, another individual involved in the COT (Claim of Truth) cases, in an attempt to make her appear unstable while she bravely spoke the truth about her experiences with Telstra.

Ian Joblin was horrified that Freehill Hollingdale & Page, acting on behalf of Telstra, had provided him with misleading material (the BCI report) before he evaluated whether I was mentally unstable or a determined Australian citizen committed to exposing the truth about my ongoing telecommunications struggles.

The statement made by DMR & Lane at point 2.23 in their 30 April 1995 report provided to the arbitrator as their final report when it was not complete has haunted me ever since the conclusion of my arbitration i,e,  

“Continued reports of 008 faults up to the present. As the level of disruption to overall CBHC  service is not clear, and fault causes have not been diagnosed, a reasonable expectation that these faults would remain ‘open’,”  (see Exhibit 45-c -File No/45-A)

Dr. Gordon Hughes, the appointed arbitrator, took the unusual step of barring his arbitration consultants from delving into the ongoing telephone inquiry at 008/1800, as detailed in the DMR & Lane segment. When the discussion turned to the troubling corruption link, it was revealed that DMR & Lane needed additional weeks to address these critical faults thoroughly. (Refer to Chapter 1 - The Collusion Continues).  However, their request was met with a swift denial of their needed extra time. This situation begs the question: what hidden influence could impede an arbitrator from pursuing the truth and bringing transparency to this matter?

Page two of this report (provided as the final report) Open Letter File No/47-A to 47-D shows no mention of my billing claim document being discussed in my version. However, page three in the arbitrator’s version notes:

“One issue in the Cape Bridgewater case remains open, and we shall attempt to resolve it in the next few weeks, namely Mr Smith’s complaints about billing problems.

“Otherwise, the Technician Report on Cape Bridgewater is complete.” (See Open Letter File No/47-A to 47-D)

It is crucial to emphasize that the failure to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the billing discrepancies, which the established arbitration procedure should have examined, ultimately led to the submission of an incomplete report that was wrongly presented as a final document. Both DMR and Lane have clearly articulated this issue. In this context, I find it necessary to question the rationale behind the finalization of my claim, particularly when it was evident from the language used by DMR and Lane that their findings were still marked by ambiguity and uncertainty. Additionally, I seek to understand the motivations that compelled Paul Howell of DMR Group Inc. Canada to affix his signature as the principal consultant. By doing so, he asserted that the report constituted a definitive assessment of my claim despite his awareness that such an endorsement was obstructing the pursuit of justice and undermining the integrity of the arbitration process.

It was not of Mr Joblin's hand 

It bore no signature of the psychologist

As shown in government records, the government assured the COT Cases (see point 40 Prologue Evidence File No/2), Freehill Holingdale & Page would have no further involvement in the COT issues the same legal firm which when they provided Ian Joblin, clinical psychologist's witness statement to the arbitrator, it was only signed by Maurice Wayne Condon, of Freehill's. It bore no signature of the psychologist.

Did Maurice Wayne Condon remove or alter any reference to what Ian Joblin had initially written about me being of sound mind?

On 21 March 1997, twenty-two months after the conclusion of my arbitration, John Pinnock (the second appointed administrator to my arbitration), wrote to Telstra's Ted Benjamin (see File 596 AS-CAV Exhibits 589 to 647) asking: 

1...any explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the attestation of the witness statement of Ian Joblin (clinical psychologist’s).

2...were there any changes made to the Joblin statement originally sent to Dr Hughes (The arbitrator)  compared to the signed statement?" 

The fact that Telstra's lawyer, Maurice Wayne Condon of Freehill's, signed the witness statement without the psychologist's signature shows how much power Telstra lawyers have over the legal system of arbitration in Australia.

What has shocked most people who have read several other witness statements submitted by Telstra in various other COT Cases arbitration processes, as well as mine, is that although the senate was advised that signatures had also been fudged or altered in my case, changing or altering a medically diagnosed condition to suggest I was mentally disturbed is hinging on more than just criminal conduct. Maurice Wayne Condon must have attested to seeing a signature on an arbitration witness statement prepared by Ian Joblin, a clinical psychologist, when no signature by Ian Joblin was on this affirmation, proving that the COT story must be investigated.  

On September 12, 1994, as part of the arbitration proceedings, I was compelled to meet with Ian Joblin, a forensic psychologist—Telstra’s appointed consultant—who was tasked with evaluating my mental health in the context of their defence strategy. During our session, I made it a point to emphasize the psychological trauma I had endured at the hands of Freehill Hollingdale & Page, the firm that had engaged him. The psychologist seemed to listen as I recounted my experiences, particularly heinous. I was genuinely required to submit any complaints about my phone service in writing to Telstra’s lawyers before they even considered investigating them.

I vividly explained the distressing reality I faced, where it was not uncommon for me to lose as many as six incoming calls within a single day. Drafting letters to a lawyer to articulate my frustrations over lost calls felt demoralising and nearly crushed my spirit. The psychologist expressed his astonishment at the burdensome protocol imposed by Telstra and its legal representatives, readily agreeing that such practices could have devastating effects on my mental state over the extended period I was forced to navigate this situation.

Despite these revelations, when Telstra’s lawyers—who were assured by the government would not be involved in our arbitration (as noted in Prologue Evidence File No/2)—submitted by Ian Joblin, Telstra's clinical psychologist’s witness statement to the arbitrator, it was signed only by a lawyer from the firm. This statement notably lacked the psychologist’s signature. It omitted his grave concerns regarding my requirement to communicate in writing with the legal firm before Telstra would address my ongoing telephone issues. Within that witness statement, alarming assertions emerged, including phrases like, “In my professional opinion, his preoccupation has become a clinical obsession,” which only added another layer of distress to an already tumultuous experience.

The most concerning aspects of this unsigned witness statement are as follows:

1Before the psychologist met with me, Telstra's lawyers provided him with a copy of the Cape Bridgewater Bell Canada International (BCI) addendum report, which claimed that 13,590 test calls were conducted over five days into the Cape Bridgewater RCM exchange using the TEKELEC CCS7 monitoring equipment. This report stated that the test calls had a 99% success rate.

However, neither the psychologist nor the arbitrator was informed that routing these tests through the Cape Bridgewater exchange would have been impractical. The nearest telephone exchange capable of accommodating the TEKELEC CCS7 equipment used for these tests is 120 kilometres away at the Warrnambool exchange (see Telstra's Falsified BCI Report 2.).

The importance of this meeting lies in the fact that when I presented Mr Joblin with evidence demonstrating that the 15,590 test calls could not possibly have connected to the Portland or Cape Bridgewater unmanned exchanges, he realized he had been misled and deceived by Telstra and their lawyers. This deception aimed to portray me as insane and paranoid, ultimately devaluing my claim. Mr. Joblin stated that he would include this information in his witness statement, acknowledging that I had proven these tests impracticable. He agreed that knowing this was just as distressing as experiencing the faults firsthand, and he emphasized that I should not have to endure the false claims made by Telstra.

Mr Joblin did not bring this matter to the arbitrator's attention in either his unsigned witness statement or the subsequent statement sent two weeks later, which curiously included his signature added across a section that had been unsigned in the initial document I received.

 

On 6 December 1995, Derek Ryan, my arbitration accountant, wrote to the Shadow Minister for Communications, Senator Richard Alston, stating:

“Over the last 2 years I have acted as an independent accountant for Alan Smith and I prepared the independent assessment of his losses and damages which formed part of his submission to the arbitrator, Dr G Hughes.

“In response to accounting documents and evidence submitted to the arbitrator, he appointed Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory (Vic) Pty Ltd.(‘FHCA’) to support him in assessing the losses and damages.

“The FHCA report was inaccurate and incomplete. I have since been advised by a staff member of FHCA that a large amount of information was excluded from their final report at the request of the arbitrator. This has left the report in an incomplete state and it is impossible for anyone to re-calculate or understand how the FHCA loss figures were determined. This effectively meant that it was impossible to challenge the assumptions, calculations and the time periods used in the FHCA report.” (See Open letter File No/45-E)

On the 22 December 1995, Derek Ryan wrote to TIO John Pinnock, noting:

“The Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory (Vic) Pty Ltd (‘FHCA’) report was dated 3 May 1995 and I received a copy of the report on 5 May. After discussions with Alan Smith it was decided that I should reply to the report as soon as possible.

“I worked all day Saturday and Sunday with Alan Smith trying to interpret the FHCA report. After this work I considered that the report was incomplete as the calculations of the FHCA loss figures were not included in their report. …

“In 17 May I telephoned John Rundell and he stated that he was unable to discuss anything with me until the appeal period had expired. … He then stated that he understood my problems and that FHCA had excluded a large amount of information from their final report at the request of the arbitrator.” (See Open letter File No/45-E)

John Rundell's letter to John Pinnock TIO dated 15 November 1995, File 45-A Open letter File No/45-E states DMR & Lane did not leave the billing issues open when they were left open, and DMR & Lane advised this was the case. In other words, John Rundell misled and deceived John Pinnock when the Institute of Arbitrators Australia began investigating my claims. 

 

 

On the day we signed our arbitration agreements, the official threatened the last three original COT claimants, Ann Garms, Graham Schorer and me. We were told that if we did not agree to exonerate the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman financial unit FerrierHodgson Corporate Advisory (FHCA), which included John Rundell, the Arbitration Project Manager, and technical arbitration consultants DMR (Australia), from all liability for their involvement in the arbitration process,  then there would be no arbitration. As a result, the claimants would be left with only one alternative: the enormous costs involved in taking Telstra to court.

As small businesses, we faced a daunting legal battle against a government-owned corporation with seemingly endless resources to fund its defence. Despite our best efforts, we were forced to exonerate FHCA and DMR (Australia) from all liability. Once clauses 25 and 26, i.e., the $250,000 liability caps, were removed, we could never pursue legal action against them for any negligence or intentional wrongdoing. Refer to Part 2 → Chapter 5 Fraudulent conduct.

Simply put, we three COT Cases were threatened to sign an altered version of their arbitration agreement, different from the one the arbitrator had faxed to Graham Schorer's solicitor, William Hunt and Alan Goldberg QC. This threat was made just 36 hours after the previous two versions of the agreement were faxed separately to the two named legal practitioners.

As noted by the arbitrator in his written findings, I had no legal counsel leading up to or during my arbitration. On April 21, 1994, I signed my arbitration agreement; I was under the understanding it was an exact mirrored copy of the agreement Maureen Gillan, the first of the four claimants had signed on April 8, 1994, which had been and the copy that had been faxed to Mr Schorer's solicitor William Hunt and Alan Goldberg QC on April 19, 1994, which we had read and discussed throughout the previous 24 hours.

I reluctantly agreed to only one change in the agreement: clause 10.2.2. I believed that only clause 10.2.2 had been removed and accepted its removal because I wanted to proceed with arbitration as quickly as possible. However, it was suicide to sign an arbitration agreement in which the professionals administering the arbitration could not be sued for negligence or deliberate maleficence.

Mr Rundell has never refuted Derek Ryan’s statement in a letter he wrote to John Pinnock (the TIO) about my arbitration financial losses, which noted that:  “On 17 May I telephoned John Rundell and he stated that he was unable to discuss anything with me until the appeal period had expired”, even though that statement: “… until the appeal period had expired”, reveals the true calibre of Mr Rundell’s attitude, i.e. he recognised the advantages for Telstra if the COTs were forced to wait for the appeal period to elapse before they even began to expose the truth.  This sort of unethical conduct is currently being exposed in the media worldwide concerning KPMG, of which John Rundell was soon to become a partner. 

The Third Damning Letter 

Corruption in Arbitration 

John Rundell's correspondence reveals a discernible pattern of inconsistency and lack of accurate detail integrity. Expressly, his letter dated 18 April 1995 wrongly stated that any technical report prepared by Lanes would be signed off and appear on the letter of DMR Inc. In his letter of 15 November 1995 to Mr Pinnock, he inaccurately declared that the billing issues were not left "open" despite subsequent confirmation. Lastly, his letter to Mr Pinnock on 13 February 1996 acknowledged that the final report did not cover all material and working papers, in contrast to his prior assertion. These inconsistencies suggest that John Rundell was not the most appropriate Project Manager for my arbitration.

Had the arbitration liability caps in clauses 25 and 26 of my agreement not been removed, I could have sued John Rundell for negligence. However, no information was provided to me until after the statute of limitations period so that I could use this letter and the removal of the liability clause in an appeal against Dr. Hughes’ award. Mr Pinnock concealed it until 2002, outside the statute of limitations.

However, between 18 October 1995 and 4 October 1997, with the assistance of Mr John Wynack, Director of Investigations on behalf of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, I sought, under Freedom of Information (FOI Act) from Telstra, a copy of their arbitration file, which would have shown who had been involved in stopping me at all cost in proving my claims and why only AUSTEL received a copy of the Portland/Cape Bridgewater but not my arbitration team. Home Page File No/82 confirms Mr Wynack did not believe Telstra’s claim that it destroyed the file. 

Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory and Dr Hughes collaborated with Telstra to disregard the losses incurred by my singles club, which was my second business, as a separate business loss. Instead, the losses were only valued at the lower tariff I charged for school groups. This was unfair to my business as it caused a significant revenue loss that was not taken into account by the arbitrator. I provided detailed information about my singles club to FHCA in February 1995, but the working notes were removed from the report under instruction by Dr Hughes. These notes would have detailed the information about my singles club that I provided to FHCA. Unfortunately, this single club material was never returned after finalising my arbitration. I would appreciate your assistance in obtaining the justice that my business deserves. Please consider visiting my website to learn more about the losses associated with my singles club patronage that were never considered by the arbitrator Open letter File No/45-E, 

Single Club Losses Ignored

Corruption in Arbitration 

The final FHCA financial report referred to by Derek Ryan and John Rundell only provides statistics from the school-camp bookings for valuing my losses. There is no reference to profits from the adult social club and singles club bookings, even though they made up 47 per cent of my business and were charged more than four times the school rate. When FHCA eventually returned my claim documents, FHCA had a number of my singles club flyers, along with copies of various newspaper adverts regarding the adult weekends and copies of numerous testimonials from prospective adult patrons explaining their frustration at not being able to contact my venue by phone to make bookings. However, the more detailed calculation of the type of revenue earned from these single club weekends was not among the returned information.

On page seven of its final, 3 May 1995, financial-evaluation report, which both Telstra and I received, FHCA states:

“An analysis of the clientele of CBHC  shows that only 53% were in fact schools.” (See Open Letter File No 57-A to 57-D)

There is an enormous difference between $30.82 for a two-night stay for school groups and $120.00 to $165.00 for a two-night stay for social club patrons. Knowingly downgrading my losses by a large percentage is verging on fraudulent, criminal conduct.

The potential Over Forties Single Club patrons’ testimonials are also referred to in the AUSTEL report of 3 March 1994:

“As Mr Smith points out, the RVA message had the potential to severely damage his business. An important point in relation to the possible financial impact of the RVA message on the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp service is the camp’s dependence on group bookings. In June 1992 the camp tariffs ranged from $1500 to $6000 per week, so the loss of even one booking because of the RVA problem could mean a substantial financial loss.” (See p33, point 85, Open Letter File No/6)

I also demonstrated to AUSTEL when their representatives visited my venue that singles club customers regularly bought souvenirs before they left: printed Cape Bridgewater t-shirts, sweatshirts, postcards, headscarves, and crafted driftwood plant arrangements. Schoolchildren didn’t have that sort of money and typically only bought postcards. FHCA ignored all the income I lost from lost singles club bookings, i.e., the profit I made on the souvenirs and the $120 to $165 tariff per person for these customers.

John Rundell’s statement to Derek Ryan Open letter File No/45-E) that “FHCA had excluded a large amount of information from their final report at the request of the arbitrator” ties in with the excluded single club material, and my Echo tourism venture losses, which I provided, under confidentiality, to FHCA in February 1995, when it visited my busi ess. The submission of this singles club evidence into arbitration under confidentiality is discussed on this website. What has not wildly been discussed is it took six years after John Rundell made this statement that (Open letter File No/45-E) came to light.