Until the late 1990s, the Australian government owned and operated the nation’s telephone network through an agency called Telecom. This agency was later privatized and renamed Telstra. As a government enterprise, Telecom held a monopoly over telecommunications services in Australia, which led to a gradual but significant decline in the network's infrastructure and the quality of services offered to consumers.

Rather than take decisive action to address the widespread and chronic deficiencies plaguing telephone services, the government created an arbitration process. This system was ostensibly designed to resolve disputes and assist consumers but often obscured the underlying issues. The government knew that the problems with telephone services were systemic and deeply entrenched, yet it chose a route that maintained the facade of concern without enacting substantial change.

The government included confidentiality clauses in the arbitration agreements to further this goal. These clauses prevented individuals from publicly disclosing the outcomes of their arbitration cases, effectively silencing complaints about ongoing issues. As a result, even when arbitrators ruled in favour of the claimants, the persistent problems that led them to arbitration remained unaddressed.

This situation created a hostile and uneven playing field for a small group of Australian citizens who called themselves the Casualties of Telstra (COT). These individuals, facing significant challenges in proving their claims against a powerful, monopolistic corporation, were at a distinct disadvantage. The systemic issues with Telstra’s services continued unabated, leaving the COT members frustrated and without recourse. This highlighted the inadequacies of the arbitration process and the government's failure to protect its citizens' interests.

However, in the case of Ruper Murdoch and Foxtel, that was a different matter, as the following Rupert Murdoch -Telstra Scandal - Helen Handbury shows. 

By hovering over the Confidentiality Agreement image, it's clear that the arbitrator for the initial four arbitrations, Dr. Gordon Hughes, made the unprecedented decision to exonerate his arbitration consultants and legal counsel from any liability for negligence or wrongdoing prior to the start of the proceedings. This decision severely disadvantaged the claimants, effectively stripping them of any recourse should the special counsel or arbitration consultants engage in inappropriate conduct, as occurred in my arbitration. Refer to Chapter 1 - The Collusion Continues and Chapter 2 - Inaccurate and Incomplete.

On the date we executed the arbitration agreement (refer to Open letter File No 54-B), clause 10.2.2 and the $250,000 liability caps specified in clauses 25 and 26 had been removed, and clause 24 had been amended. We were informed that there would be no arbitration if we did not accept these late modifications. My position remains that our legal representatives believed we were signing the arbitration agreement from the first of the four COT Cases, which Maureen Gillan had signed two weeks prior, and that still included all the original clauses. None of the consultants had been absolved of liability.

I agreed to remove clause 10.2.2, assuming we could navigate its implications. However, given that our banks were prepared to seize our assets if we could not demonstrate imminent settlements, I felt compelled to agree. No amount of pressure would lead any rational individual to accept such an extensive compromise.

Modifying clause 24 and eliminating clauses 25 and 26 prevented us from pursuing legal action against the TIO-appointed arbitration consultants for negligence. As a result, the arbitration's legal counsel and the professional consultants became effectively insulated from accountability and could act without oversight, as the confidentiality agreement precluded any recourse.

For a comprehensive account of these events, you can visit the website absentjustice.com. By clicking on the Confidentiality image above, you can also observe the unethical conduct exhibited by the arbitrator and his consultants even before the process began. Secret meetings were held to discuss these late changes without our representation, although two legally minded arbitration officials represented the defendant, Telstra.  

Altering clause 24, removing the $250,000 liability caps in clauses 25 and 26, and adding an annexe to the confidentiality agreement significantly changed the arbitration agreement that at least two Senators and the claimant's legal team had approved. This fraudulent manoeuvre had far-reaching implications, particularly within a government-endorsed arbitration process. Unfortunately, the Australian government did not recognize the seriousness of the fraud committed and failed to acknowledge its impact on my arbitration proceedings. This gross oversight compromised the integrity of the arbitration process. It caused substantial and lasting damage to my business activities as Chapter 4, The New Owners Tell Their Story, and Chapter 5, Immoral - Hypocritical Conduct, illustrate that the phone faults continued to persist until at least November 2006, a full eleven years after the arbitration was finalized. as the following two absentjustice.com links show.

After the commencement of the first four arbitrations in April 1994, it became clear three-quarters of the way through the arbitration process that Telstra had influenced the original agreed-upon arbitration technical consultant, DMR (Australia). Telstra was attempting to introduce Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd (Australia) as a replacement. However, Lane Telecommunications had worked extensively with the government on other telecommunications projects, and its owners were former Telstra executives. As a result, the COT Cases refused to accept Lane.

To resolve the situation, a compromise was reached on March 9, 1995, in which Paul Howell from DMR Group Inc. (Canada) was appointed as the principal technical consultant. For a more detailed account of how Paul Howell was manipulated during this process, you can refer to absentjustice.com.

As the narrative progresses, it becomes increasingly apparent that the COT Cases were justified in rejecting Lane as the principal technical consultant. Before April 13, 1995, when Paul Howell arrived from Canada, Lane conducted all investigative activities related to my claims. This period was pivotal, as the Ericsson telephone equipment installed in Telstra exchanges was the foundation for the arbitration claims brought forth in the COT Cases.

As the investigations advanced, it became evident that the underlying issues contributing to the claims of the COT Cases were not isolated to singular events; instead, they indicated broader systemic deficiencies associated with Ericsson's telephone technology throughout Australia. Notably, at a critical juncture in the arbitration process, Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd, the entity responsible for compiling and analyzing the relevant fault data, was acquired by Ericsson. This acquisition raises significant concerns regarding the integrity of the arbitration proceedings.

 

PLEASE NOTE  → The Canadian Flag will be slotted here between either 24 or 26/02/2025, and a statement will be made concerning Canadian Seamen and their unwavering ethics. 

 

Consequently, upon the acquisition, all fault data gathered from the COT Cases—including data from the initial four arbitrations and the subsequent twelve arbitration and mediation processes—became the property of Ericsson. This situation poses a troubling conflict of interest, as one of the principal witnesses and investigators in a government-endorsed arbitration was effectively transferred to the corporation under investigation. Refer to Chapter 5 - US Department of Justice vs Ericsson of Sweden.

Remarkably, the Canadian government provided support in a situation that was beyond their jurisdiction. Additionally, a Canadian technical consultant traveled from Canada to assist the arbitrator assigned to my case after informing them that my claim was incomplete. Despite this, the arbitrator submitted the report as the completed final document, as illustrated in the image and story below

 

On April 6, 1995, I presented David Read of Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd with clear evidence that the CCS7 testing equipment referenced in the Cape Bridgewater report could not be utilized in the Cape Bridgewater or Portland telephone systems. 

If Paul Howell had received my April 6, 1995, BCI submission outlining the true extent of my ongoing telephone problems—and the fact that BCI could not have conducted their testing as claimed by them and Telstra in their arbitration defence—he would have been obligated to investigate my BCI evidence. However, the government and the arbitration administrators refused to assist me in addressing this BCI fraud.

In contrast, I received crucial support from the Canadian government on July 7, 1995, which notes 

"In view of the facts of this situation, as I understand them, I believe you are taking the most appropriate course of action in contacting BCI directly with respect to the alleged errors in their test report, should you feel that they could assist you in your case." 

On May 31, 1995, at 2:45 p.m., I received an unexpected phone call from Paul Howell, a representative of DMR Group Inc. in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. He wished me a speedy recovery from my suspected heart attack, which had resulted in a five-day hospital stay. Although we had never spoken before, his gesture was both surprising and appreciated, highlighting the concern regarding my situation and my reports to him and his colleague, David Read, about the impractical tests conducted by Bell Canada International Inc. in Cape Bridgewater.

As the independent arbitration technical consultant, I had previously provided Paul Howell and David Read (Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd) with clear evidence that Telstra and their arbitration lawyers, Freehill Hollingdale & Page, were relying on the BCI test to support their claim that my business was not experiencing ongoing telephone problems, which needed further investigation.

Mr. Howell informed me that the arbitrator would not grant him any additional time to investigate my ongoing billing issues directly related to the falsified BCI report from Cape Bridgewater.

The following statement at point 2.23 in Paul Howell's report jointly prepared by Mr Howell (DMR Group Inc. (Canada) and Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd (Australia) submitted to the arbitrator on April 30, 1995, clearly indicates that my ongoing 008 billing claims had not been diagnosed. As a result of DMR & Lane not diagnosing these ongoing arbitration complaints, DMR & Lane to state the fault causes would remain "Open" (not my emphasis).

Point 2.23: “Continued reports of 008 faults up to the present. As the level of disruption to overall CBHC  service is not clear, and fault causes have not been diagnosed, a reasonable expectation that these faults would remain ‘open’,”  (See Exhibit 45-c -File No/45-A)

“One issue in the Cape Bridgewater case remains open, and we shall attempt to resolve it in the next few weeks, namely Mr Smith’s complaints about billing problems.

“Otherwise, the Technician Report on Cape Bridgewater is complete.” (See Open Letter File No/47-A to 47-D

For further clarification, please refer to Chapter 1—The Collusion Continues. It highlights that only 23 assessments were conducted out of more than 200 fault complaints I filed between December 1992 and October 1994. This amounts to less than eleven per cent of my claim being evaluated. I would like to quote the DMR & Lane report at Point 3, which states: Chapter 1—The Collusion Continues 

"About 200 fault reports were made over December 1992 to October 1994. Specific assessment of these reports other than where covered above has not been attempted".

Consequently, the arbitrator considered less than eleven per cent of my fault complaints during the arbitration, which cost me more than $300,000 in professional preparation fees. Therefore, the telephone call I received from Paul Howell on May 31, 1995, at 2:45 p.m. (see above) represented a significant development in this terrible denial of justice.

Following that telephone conversation, I submitted a statutory declaration to the government concerning my case. This declaration contained statements from Mr. Paul Howell, who had been brought in from Canada to assist with the COT arbitrations. In his remarks, Mr. Howell characterized my situation as the most severe he had encountered throughout his professional career. He underscored the unethical nature of my arbitration process, asserting that such conduct would be deemed unacceptable in Canada.

In simple, two Canadian stalwarts of justice, the Canadian Government and DMR Group Inc., also from Canada, were prepared to state what they did. In contrast, the Australian Government has continued to bury their heads when justice for their citizens should have been a priority.

I need to take the reader back to June 28, 1967, when a representative from the British Seamen's Union in Melbourne approached me. I had just completed my third voyage to the island of Nauru in the Pacific Ocean, where we loaded phosphate onto the ship Triaster, an Australian vessel heading to Geelong, Victoria. I was now being asked to sign on to the British ship Hopepeak, which was bound for Canada. With the money I had saved from my three voyages to Nauru, I could pay off my second block of land and have a new ship as my home. I eagerly signed on the dotted line (Refer to British Seaman’s Record R744269 -  Open Letter to PM File No 1 Alan Smiths Seaman. 

After a night filled with celebrations and very little sleep, I signed on board the Hopepeak, accepting what the Navy terms sea articles. It wasn’t long before I discovered that our voyage was not heading toward the familiar shores of Vancouver as I had believed. Instead, we sailed to Albany, Western Australia, transporting 13,600 tons of wheat to Communist China. This country was, alongside Russia, actively supporting North Vietnam in its conflict against the United States, New Zealand, and Australia.

The events that unfolded during my time in The People's Republic of China and the sights and experiences shared with my fellow shipmates are crucial to understanding my story. It was startling to witness that the Australian wheat we offloaded from the Hopepeak in China was being directed toward North Vietnam, supplying the enemy Australia was fighting against.

While this troubling issue related to Communist China is addressed throughout absentjustice.com, I feel it is imperative to share that many individuals who are aware of my experiences have often asked whether my China episode and the bold statements I made against the USA—uttered under the harrowing threat of losing my life—could partly explain the treatment I received from Australian government bureaucrats during my arbitration and for decades thereafter. I invite you, the reader, to contemplate whether this is a plausible possibility.

 

 

My story demonstrates how the government has consistently deflected the truth regarding its misguided judgments in world affairs, dating back to the Vietnam War. It even provided covert assistance to North Vietnam—the very nation that Australia, New Zealand and the USA were actively engaged in conflict against. This narrative illustrates the depth of this deception.

It is essential to thoroughly investigate the wheat deal with The Peoples Republic of China, orchestrated during the Menzies Liberal-Country Party government in the mid-1960s. This contentious agreement had significant implications primarily hidden behind a well-crafted government campaign aimed at discrediting the credibility of certain British merchant seamen and myself. These brave individuals brought to light a disturbing reality: a portion of the wheat, after being offloaded by Chinese peasants, was being repurposed by The People's Republic of China to support North Vietnam during its intense conflict with the United States, New Zealand, and Australia.

Despite the gravity of these revelations, the Australian government actively sought to divert attention from the alarming findings I presented, along with the reports submitted by several British seamen to the Australian Commonwealth Police (now called the Australian Federal Police) and various government officials upon their discharge in Sydney and subsequent return to England. This tactic of undermining our credibility was not simply a means of shifting public focus; it represented a deliberate strategy that effectively silenced opposition voices and obscured the troubling truths surrounding this trade.

The last time an entire crew of British seamen refused to sail with their ship was on the Bounty. Historians recognize the crew's sacrifice for standing up against a British captain; it resulted in a life sentence for them, never to see their beloved England again. 'The Mutiny on the Bounty' may seem like a distant event, but it highlights a significant issue—something had to be fundamentally wrong for almost an entire crew to refuse to take a ship to sea, regardless of the consequences.

The British seamen on the Hopepeak faced a similar situation. They refused to return to China just weeks before because of what they had witnessed there: a British ship transporting Australian wheat to a country supplying that same wheat to whom Australia was at war, a betrayal. They expressed this sentiment to the Hopepeak captain, as I did. Interestingly, thousands of nautical miles away, Canadian seamen also rejected the manning of vessels trading wheat to China despite Canada's not being involved in the Vietnam War.

Seamen worldwide uphold a strong code of ethics regarding their moral obligations and sense of right and wrong. As I near my 81st birthday in May 2025, I am reaching out to see if any Canadian seamen who courageously refused to man their ship might come across this message. I would be grateful if they—or anyone who knows their names, should they still be alive—could connect with me through absentjustice.com. A simple telephone call would mean a great deal to me.

As the only Australian seaman on board, alongside my British crewmates, we faced a difficult but unanimous decision: we would refuse to sail on the Hopepeak to China if any portion of the wheat was destined for North Vietnam. The Captain and the Australian government would not commit to any deals regarding whether more of Australia's shipped wheat would end up in the bellies of our enemies in North Vietnam. When I stepped away from the ship on September 18, 1967, I was proud to hold Australian citizenship, which I obtained on May 11, 1965. The thought of sailing on the Hopepeak felt like an impossible contradiction. How could I participate in this voyage with a clear conscience, knowing the dark consequences of some of her cargo and its ultimate destination?

As stated in the Senate, refer to https://shorturl.at/ovEW5: "The Australian Government does not exercise control over the ultimate destination of goods purchased by foreign buyers."

At that time, Sir Robert Menzies served as Prime Minister, and Sir John McEwen was the Minister for Trade. Their complicity in allowing trade with Communist China and North Vietnam to persist was deeply troubling. In other Western nations, such actions might rightly have been viewed as bordering on treason. Enraged by the indifference of those in power, I feel it is vital to speak out, even decades later.

This situation underscores the importance of documenting the misleading and deceptive practices enacted by the Australian government. My experience with the Bell Canada International Inc. (BCI) COT Cases testing process exemplifies this broader issue. I demonstrated that the testing process, which was purportedly conducted to assess the telephone exchanges servicing Telstra's casualties, was impractical. In reality, no testing occurred at the locations that Bell Canada International Inc. claimed in their official reports. These reports were submitted as evidence in government-endorsed arbitrations resembling Kangaroo Courts, lacking the transparency and objectivity expected in such serious matters.

The stark discrepancy between what the Bell Canada International Inc. report claimed and the actual circumstances calls into question the integrity of the government and its public servants, who persistently refused to investigate or acknowledge my evidence. Rather than engaging with my substantial claims and initiating a genuine inquiry into these pressing concerns, the government opted to discredit me. They framed me as an unreliable source, attempting to undermine my credibility despite the overwhelming factual evidence I provided to both the government and the arbitrator involved. This pattern of behaviour echoed my experiences in 1967 when I was nearly shot for spying—a situation in which I was caught red-handed.

It is crucial to connect the alarmingly parallel issues surrounding The Peoples Republic of China and Bell Canada International Inc., even though they occurred twenty-five years apart. This connection reveals that public servants in the Australian government have been responsible for disseminating serious falsehoods to the citizens of Australia to shield the government's interests at any cost—even if it meant compromising the safety and well-being of troops deployed in North Vietnam. The implications of these actions are profound and warrant serious reflection on government accountability and the importance of transparency in public service.

My presence in China was more accidental than intentional; I served as a crew member on a British tramp ship, the Hopepeak. Our vessel was engaged in the humanitarian task of unloading Australian wheat, which we had loaded at the port of Albany in Western Australia. This shipment was not just ordinary trade; it was sent with the noble intention of alleviating hunger in the suffering nation of China. However, a significant and troubling twist emerged: some of this wheat was redirected to North Vietnam, providing sustenance to the very Vietcong forces who were at war with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States

My involvement in the COT Cases arbitration disaster appears deeply intertwined with events from June to September 1967, marked by significant turmoil. During this time, I was serving in the Australian Merchant Navy, navigating the challenging waters of international waters and geopolitical tensions. During this tenure, the British Seamen's Union approached me with an unexpected opportunity: to join a British-registered ship called Hopepeak in Melbourne as a Cook- Steward following the sudden illness of a previous crew member.

Accepting this position was particularly pivotal for me, as it offered a chance to erase my previous registered Bad Discharge, 'Voyage Not Completer,' stamped in my seaman's book from the Port Lyttleton ship five years prior (British Seaman’s Record R744269 -  Open Letter to PM File No 1 Alan Smiths Seaman). This resolution meant I could navigate a more promising path, allowing me to operate under two registrations—one British and one Australian—enabling me to work on ships and in various ports across the globe.

Without thoroughly investigating the nature of Hopepeak’s journey, I eagerly accepted the role. I later learned that the ship was headed to Communist China to deliver a substantial shipment of Australian wheat, approximately 13,600 tons. This was a significant and ironic twist, especially given that during this period, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand were deeply involved in the Vietnam War. This conflict should never have occurred. Meanwhile, Communist China and Russia were actively supporting that war. The implications of this journey weighed heavily on my conscience, contributing to a complex moral landscape that I would struggle with for years to come.

 

 

As noted in footnote 83, the Minister of Trade and Industry obscured the genuine reasons for our refusal to return to the People’s Republic of China. Even more troubling, the official Senate Hansard https://shorturl.at/ovEW5, also discussed below, reveals that government ministers from the Australian Liberal-Country Party Coalition showed little concern about the destination of Australia’s wheat once it left our shores. In contrast, seamen in Canada, upon discovering that the grain they had just loaded was headed for Communist China, refused to sail with the ship and were even willing to face imprisonment, as indicated in footnote 169 by Tianxiao Zhu.

 

 

The following three statements are from a report prepared by Australia's Kim Beasly MP on 4 September 1965 (father of Australia's former Minister of Defence Kim Beasly). 

Vol. 87 No. 4462 (4 Sep 1965) - National Library of Australia https://nla.gov.au › nla.obj-702601569 

"The Department of External Affairs has recently published an "Information Handbook entitled "Studies on Vietnam".  It established the fact that the Vietcong are equipped with Chinese arms and ammunition"

If it is right to ask Australian youth to risk everything in Vietnam it is wrong to supply their enemies. The Communists in Asia will kill anyone who stands in their path, but at least they have a path."

Australian trade commssioners do not so readily see that our Chinese trade in war materials finances our own distruction. NDr do they see so clearly that the wheat trade does the same thing."  

As the Hopepeak navigated its way back to Australia after offloading 13,600 tons of Australian wheat, I found myself and other crew members grappling with an overwhelming sense of guilt and betrayal. Our consciences grew heavier when we considered that some of the Australian-grown wheat we had left behind in China was likely on its way to the North Vietnamese. This realization filled us with unease; the very grains cultivated in Australia, meant to sustain and nourish, could be transformed into a tool of conflict.

I envisioned the potential consequences of this exchange: this wheat could inadvertently fortify an adversary, ultimately threatening the lives of brave individuals—New Zealanders, Americans, and Australians—who were risking everything in the service of their countries. The chilling thought that these soldiers might become casualties of a war they were fighting, possibly facing severe injuries or even death as a result of our actions to supply our enemies with food, weighed heavily on our minds. This led us to reflect deeply on the ethical implications of the journey we had previously taken. 

It is essential to advise new visitors to this website absentjustice.com that they can access the comprehensive narrative I am refining for enhanced clarity by hovering your cursor over the two provided links. "Flash Backs – China-Vietnam and Chapter 7-Vietnam Vietcong".

These links offer critical insights relevant to my side of the "Casualties of Telstra" narrative and the intertwining of both. I was unaware that other crew members from other ships and nations had refused or were about to refuse to go back to China or be a party to the delivery of wheat to China, which was then redeploying this precious cargo to other communist countries at war with the West. 

These links illustrate that, in 1967, during the Vietnam War, the Liberal-Country Party government continued to trade with Communist China despite awareness that this wheat was being redirected to North Vietnam. Additionally, the government disseminated misleading information regarding the circumstances under which I and several British seamen declined to embark on a subsequent voyage. This misinformation was perpetuated by the Trade Minister, Sir John McEwen, who later served as Australia’s 18th Prime Minister. 

Our direct accounts of the events drew considerable attention from the Australian Senate, as documented in the Senate Hansard on September 6, 1967 - https://shorturl.at/ovEW5 shows. Dr Patterson (minister in opposition) asked Mr Aldermann, Primary Industry Minister. 

"What guarantees has the Australian Government that Australian wheat being sent to mainland China is not forwarding China to North Vietnam 

Mr Adermann, on behalf of the Liberal and Country Party government that had authorised this three-year wheat deal to China - answered Dr Patterson as follows:

"The Australian Government does not exercise control over the ultimate destination of goods purchased by foreign buyers"

I can only assume that Mr Alderman did not have a sibling fighting in North Vietnam when he made that statement on behalf of the Australian government.

Despite the gravity of the situation, no one in the Australian Government— including the former Prime Minister—was willing to confront the reality that engaging in trade with the enemy represents one of the most reprehensible actions a country can take. This reluctance to acknowledge the implications of such actions is clearly illustrated in the content of the following image, which highlights the serious moral and ethical dilemmas involved in supporting adversaries.

One of the most extraordinary and troubling issues I faced regarding the ongoing trade with China involved Malcolm Fraser, the Minister of the Army at the time and later became Australia's 22nd Prime Minister. On September 18, 1967, the day I returned from this terrible ordeal, I carefully composed a letter to Mr Fraser outlining my significant concerns about the implications of this trade. The situation escalated when the Commonwealth Police, now known as the Australian Federal Police, boarded the Hopepeak when she that docked.

Australian media and government officials showed a strong interest in my previous arrest by the Red Guards on spying charges, adding a compelling layer of intrigue to my situation. Given these circumstances, I took the initiative to request that the Commonwealth Police ensure Mr Fraser received my correspondence, which included vital information about the coerced statements I had made under the threat of being shot (refer to Chapter 7-Vietnam Vietcong).

In April 1994, during an in-depth discussion regarding my earlier correspondence, Mr. Fraser expressed uncertainty about whether his office had received my letter, which frustrated me over the communication lapses. I clarified that Bell Canada International Inc. (BCI) had been brought to Australia to investigate the COT cases, which were intricately linked to the telephone exchanges used for their business operations. I emphasized that the test results from this investigation were fundamentally flawed, raising serious concerns about the government bureaucrats involved in my government-endorsed arbitration. Mr. Fraser suggested that I seek assistance from the Australian Government to address my concerns. I later realized that the restricted information in Telstra's internal memo, which Malcolm Fraser discussed with the media concerning his telephone conversations with me, might have originated from my original contact with him on September 18, 1967, about Australia’s trade with its adversaries. 

The documentation in File 114 AS-CAV Exhibit 92 to 127, dated 12 November 1994, provides a comprehensive account of the considerable efforts undertaken by John Wynack, the Director of Investigations for the Commonwealth Ombudsman, to assist me in gaining access to my Telstra arbitration file through a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. This file is particularly significant as it references three Telstra employees who claim I had previously discussed my private telephone conversations with them concerning my previous telephone calls to Malcolm Fraser, the former Prime Minister of Australia. In my sworn testimony, which I provided to Mr. Wynack, I categorically stated that such conversations did not occur with these individuals. Despite exhaustive efforts to investigate this matter, the names of these employees were never released to Mr Wynack or myself.

During the second interview conducted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) at my business on 26 September 1994, they asked me 93 questions as part of their investigation into the bugging issues refer to Australian Federal Police Investigation File No/1. The transcripts explicitly states,

"... does identify that you were live monitored for some time. See, we're quite satisfied that there are other references to it.

Moreover, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) informed me that my telephone conversations were subjected to interception over a prolonged period. This unauthorized monitoring may have allowed Telstra to incorporate specific details from my conversations into their official records, thereby raising serious concerns about the veracity of the information utilized against me during the arbitration process. Relevant excerpts from the AFP transcripts of my second interview, conducted on September 26, 1994, illuminate my interactions with Malcolm Fraser and the threats issued by Telstra's Paul Rumble throughout my arbitration.

Regrettably, the appointed arbitrator, the administrator overseeing the arbitration process, and the Australian Federal Police could not effectively address the threats of Paul Rumble of Telstra. These threats emerged following Telstra's submission of a formal defence regarding my case on December 12, 1994, and they significantly compromised the integrity of my arbitration claims process, thereby undermining my pursuit of justice.

In a significant development, Mr. Wynack continued his investigations, which began on November 11, 1994, and concluded on October 4, 1997. He aimed to identify the three Telstra employees who claimed I had extensively discussed (with them) my conversations with former Prime Minister Mr Fraser. This allegation was why Mr. Fraser's name appeared in restricted file notes related to my matters, which I obtained from Telstra under the Freedom of Information Act. This three-year investigation conducted by the Commonwealth Ombudsman highlighted the need to clarify whether the references to Communist China and North Vietnam in the restricted Telstra file notes were related to my disclosure to the government in September 1967 about what I witnessed in the People's Republic of China, or my government-endorsed arbitration.

Mr. Wynack expressed scepticism in his letters regarding Telstra's assertion that my arbitration file had been irretrievably destroyed. (Refer to (Home Page File No/82)

Hover your cursor over the image below to understand the significance of the Canadian government's positive response. This response was crucial in effectively addressing the issue, especially after the Australian government refused to take action against corrupt practices in Australian-administered arbitrations. Please note the Canadian Government's interest in the BCI issues has also been briefly mentioned above. 

I believe you are taking the most appropriate course of action

I received a letter of support dated July 7, 1995, which acknowledged the situation.

"In view of the facts of this situation, as I understand them, I believe you are taking the most appropriate course of action in contacting BCI directly with respect to the alleged errors in their test report, should you feel that they could assist you in your case."    

In May 1995, I experienced a suspected heart attack that forced me to confront numerous ongoing issues related to my telephone service. This incident occurred just days after the arbitrator issued findings concerning these problems, but unfortunately, the underlying issues remained unresolved. As a result of my situation, I had to hire a caretaker to assist me during this challenging time. She informed me that she had received three separate calls that day from various groups expressing their ongoing complaints about telecommunications problems.

During this same period, on 31 May 1995, at 2:45 p.m., I received an unexpected phone call from Paul Howell, a representative from DMR Group Inc. in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. He wished me a speedy recovery even though we had never spoken before. His gesture was both surprising and appreciated, as it highlighted the concern surrounding my situation.

Following that telephone conversation, I submitted a statutory declaration to the government concerning my case. This declaration contained statements from Mr. Paul Howell, who had been brought in from Canada to assist with the COT arbitrations. In his remarks, Mr. Howell characterized my situation as the most severe he had encountered throughout his professional career. He underscored the unethical nature of my arbitration process, asserting that such conduct would be deemed unacceptable in Canada.

Accessing Chapter 1 - The Collusion Continues provides valuable insights into the severely flawed testing process employed by Bell Canada International Inc. (BCI) concerning the telephone and switching exchange at Portland and Cape Bridgewater. This section highlights irrefutable evidence that Paul Howell and Lane Telecommunications submitted their findings without receiving the additional weeks they specifically advised the arbitrator were necessary on April 30, 1995, to conclude their investigations into the 008 billing discrepancies adequately. The arbitrator's decision to deny this request for an extension resulted in the persistence of my 008 faults for several years following the conclusion of the arbitration process.

The COT case revealed evidence that Bell Canada International Inc. was specifically commissioned from Canada to investigate claims of systemic issues affecting Telstra's telecommunications network. Unfortunately, we encountered dishonesty and mistreatment throughout this process, culminating in the COT arbitrator's refusal to examine our assertions that our telephone problems persisted even as the arbitration concluded.

In my case, the testing allegedly occurring over five days in November 1993 was not conducted on the telephone and switching devices at Portland and Cape Bridgewater. Nonetheless, Telstra's attorneys submitted erroneous test results from Cape Bridgewater during the arbitration, misleading the arbitrator. These false results were ultimately utilized to obscure Telstra's deficiencies.

Despite my persistent efforts, the government refused to investigate my allegations that Telstra and AUSTEL were using the BCI tests to conceal Telstra's systemic and ongoing telephone problems. The only person who showed concern about this fraudulent conduct was the communications minister in Canada. 

On 12 July 1995, Cliff Mathieson, a government representative speaking on behalf of AUSTEL (now ACMA), responded to my inquiries regarding the authenticity of the BCI testing by saying:,

"The tests to which you refer were neither arranged nor carried out by AUSTEL. Questions relating to the conduct of the test should be referred to those who carried them out or claim to have carried them out." (Refer to File 186 - AS-CAV Exhibit 181 to 233)

This unusual response prompted me to follow up on the BCI testing at Cape Bridgewater. However, it was widely known and documented in the AUSTEL COT Cases Report dated 13 April 1995 that AUSTEL had allowed BCI to limit their testing (Refer to page 243 - point 11.8 in the government-prepared report). In response, I researched Mr. Cliff Mathieson and discovered a secret letter he had written to Telstra on December 9, 1993, six months before my arbitration began (Refer to File 20-A BCI Telstra’s M.D.C Exhibits 1 to 46). This letter was not included in the arbitration schedule list of recorded documents provided to the arbitrator before the COT arbitrations. This omission indicates that the Australian government, Telstra, and their lawyers, Freehill Hollingdale & Page, withheld crucial evidence from the arbitration process they had endorsed. Consequently, the government played a role in jeopardizing the lives of those involved in the COT Cases and their loved ones.

What circumstances influenced Dr Gordon Hughes AM, the arbitrator responsible for my case and currently the Principal Partner at Davies Collison Cave in Melbourne, to refuse a comprehensive investigation into my legally submitted arbitration claim?

The information presented in the following image prompts critical questions about why Dr. Hughes AM and Warwick Smith AM have not been publicly called upon to clarify why the arbitrator was allowed to proceed with the COT arbitrations, despite lacking control over the process, which was clearly conducted outside the agreed-upon procedures.

The analysis of Telstra's Falsified BCI Report 2 reveals a troubling pattern of deceit by the current Corporate Secretary, Sue Lava. She has deliberately misled the Senate about the accuracy of the Cape Bridgewater BCI testing results. This misrepresentation is particularly concerning given the Senate's explicit directive on 26 September 1997, which required Telstra to provide truthful information 'On Notice.'

Despite this clear mandate, Telstra has persistently denied the existence of the false BCI information submitted at the Senate's request in October 1997. Such actions undermine the integrity of the Senate and amount to profound contempt of its authority. Providing knowingly false information to the Senate, especially in a formal context, 'On Notice,' is not merely a procedural issue; it constitutes a chargeable offence, 'Contempt of the Senate, ' which carries a potential maximum sentence of two years in prison. 

I find it perplexing how someone as significant as Sue Lava, who occupies a prominent role within the Telstra Corporation, can consciously uphold a lie or misrepresentation for nearly three decades. Given her position, one would expect a commitment to transparency and integrity. It raises serious questions about the ethical implications of allowing falsehoods to persist, especially when they have been instrumental in undermining my valid claims regarding the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp. Telstra and their arbitration lawyers have relied on these inaccuracies to support their defence, effectively jeopardizing the truth.

Moreover, I can't help but reflect on whether my vocal opposition to the Australian government's readiness to provide resources and support to adversaries—those who aimed to sabotage our troops in the Vietnam conflict—has resulted in my mistreatment throughout the government-endorsed arbitration with Telstra. This context adds layers to my experience and raises concerns about the fairness of the process I underwent.

Furthermore, the situation prompts me to ask why Sue Lava and Telstra continue to disregard the truth surrounding the impractical tests conducted by Bell Canada International at Cape Bridgewater. This lack of accountability not only undermines Telstra's credibility but also suggests a broader issue of transparency in corporate governance. Why are they still allowed to ignore the facts that have significant implications for the trust of their stakeholders?

In this complex scenario, grave injustices were perpetrated against us in sixteen COT Cases, all Australian citizens who, through the government-endorsed arbitration and mediation process, faced attacks on their integrity and reputations. The emotional toll was substantial; many saw their livelihoods devastated, resulting in losses amounting to millions of dollars. Additionally, their mental health suffered due to the prolonged stress and uncertainty—yet those who committed these wrongs remain entrenched in positions of power today.

A dark cloud of secrecy surrounds the COT story, as efforts to reveal the truth have been persistently suppressed. This narrative involves egregious crimes, unscrupulous individuals, and a network of corrupt politicians and lawyers who orchestrated the arbitration process to protect Telstra from scrutiny. This system allowed the reality of Telstra's failing telecommunications network to remain hidden, revealing the collusion between influential stakeholders.

The type of corroded copper wire that the COT Cases and more than 120,000 other COT-type Australian citizens experienced reflects the serious shortcomings in the government's investigation of our arbitration claims. My concerns, including those related to the lack of action from the government regulator AUSTEL (now ACMA), were warranted, especially given that the arbitrator and Telstra did not address the systemic billing claims during the arbitration process. This situation highlights the significant issues within Australia's copper network, as documented on absentjustice.com and in sources like Delimiter’s "Worst of the worst: Photos of Australia’s copper network | Delimiter. 

The actions taken by these individuals during the arbitration are characterized by terms like "shameful," "hideous," and "treacherous," reflecting the profound moral failings involved. Corruption and misleading conduct hindered justice throughout the COT arbitrations, as arbitrators ignored unethical behaviour. Understanding who played a role in these crimes is crucial, as is recognizing how they influenced the arbitrators who were supposed to ensure fair outcomes.

Moreover, the narrative unveils the pervasive corruption within government bureaucracy that complicated the COT arbitrations. It is essential to explore who was responsible for these egregious acts and where they currently stand within the Australian political Establishment and legal system that permitted these injustices to fester. By examining the complexities of corruption in arbitration, readers can gain deeper insights into the intricate issues surrounding this critical topic known as Absent Justice. 

In the world of political and media misinformation that is attached to the National Broadband Network (NBN), there is one crucial issue that hasn’t been fully addressed – Did Australia’s copper network meet the original mandatory government regulatory requirements when the government privatised the first part of Telstra in 1997? When the COT arbitrator was officially provided (in my case) nine separate sworn Telstra witness statements that my service was now up to network standard, i.e., no more ongoing telephone problems, were these nine sworn statements made under oath true or false? 

If this question is answered honestly, it would not only directly affect billions of dollars in Commonwealth spending but also mean the arbitrator hearing my cases was lied to so that Telstra could minimise their liability towards me. As seen from the following exhibit, my phone problems continued for eleven years after the arbitrator found them in favour of Telstra, i.e., they had now fixed their network.

For the government regulator, AUSTEL (now ACMA), to reduce their findings from 120,000 COT-type complaints to read 50 or more COT-type customer complaints in their public report is one ‘hell of a lie told to the citizens of Australia’ (Refer to Open Letter File No/11).

Telstra had so much power over AUSTEL (the then governemnt communications regulator (now ACMA) that it forced AUSTEL to drastically reduce the numbers, as shown in the official government regulatory COT Case April 1994 Report, from some 120,000 COT-type customers who had similar CAN and Ericsson AXE problems, right around Australia (see Falsification Report File No/8) to 50-plus. Telstra was also somehow able to force AUSTEL to submit fabricated SVT reports to the minister via their third quarterly COT Cases Report of 2 February 1995.

Of course, since the arbitrator was protecting the government during our arbitrations, he found that there were no more ongoing problems affecting the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp and his award of 11 May 1995 only reported on old, historic, anecdotal Telstra-related faults and ignored the still-ongoing faults that were still occurring.

Were these 120,000 COT-type customers who were having similar major problems right around Australia (see Falsification Report File No/8) also related to the Ericsson AXE telephone exchange problems that were worrying AUSTEL, as well as the CAN and Ericsson AXE problems? The information I supplied to AUSTEL between June and August 1993 (inadvertently left inside the allusive briefcase at my premises) showed this was possibly the case (refer to Chapter 1 - Can We Fix The CAN).

For a government regulator to reduce their findings from 120.000 COT-type complaints to read just 50 or more COT-type customer complaints is one hell of a lie told to its citizens. This lie allowed for the ongoing telephone problems to be ignored by the arbitrator, resulting in continuing issues until at least 2015, 2017, and 2018, as the following three examples show.

Had AUSTEL (now ACMA) dealt with the truth in 1994 when the COT Cases exposed how bad the phone system was, instead of ignoring the faults, the problems might have been fixed two days again; this non-action by ACMA supported the COT cases that our arbitrations should be reinvestigated to learn what went wrong?

23 June 2015: Had the arbitrator appointed to assess my arbitration claims correctly investigated ALL of my submitted evidence, he would have had to value my claim as an ongoing problem, NOT a past problem, as his final award shows. It is clear from the following link dated > Unions raise doubts over Telstra's copper network; workers using ... that when reading in conjunction with Can We Fix The Can, which was released in March 1994, these faults copper-wire network faults have been in existence for more than 24-years.

9 November 2017: Sadly, many Australians in rural Australia can only access a second-rate NBN. This didn’t have to be the case: had the Australian government ensured the arbitration process it endorsed to investigate the COT cases’ claims of ongoing telephone problems was conducted transparently, it could have used our evidence to start fixing the issues we uncovered in 1993/94. This news article https://theconversation.com/the-accc-investigation-into-the-nbn-will-be-useful-but-its-too-little-too-late-87095 and absentjustice.com/Introduction again shows that the COT Cases claims of ailing copper wire network were more than valid.  

Almost two decades after this cover-up had been executed, with the government spin doctors successfully branding my claims as frivolous and me as a vexatious litigant, I have been left the government stopped financing the roll-out of the National Broadband Network (NBN), which still utilises part of the existing, seriously degraded copper network. In fact, “28 April 2018: This ABC news article regarding the NBN see >NBN boss blames Government's reliance on copper for slow ... needs to be read in conjunction with my own story because had these lies told under oath by so many Telstra employees had not occurred then the government would have been in a better position to evaluate just how bad the copper-wire Customer Access Network (CAN) was just 7-years ago.

Why did Wayne Maurice Condon of Freehill Hollingdale & Page submit a witness statement prepared by Ian Joblin, in which Mr Condon attests that the witness statement and report authored by Mr Joblin, Telstra's clinical psychologist, were signed off, even though neither document had been signed? Furthermore, why was Mr. Condon the sole individual to provide a signature on these two combined documents? It is also pertinent to inquire why Telstra permitted Freehill Hollingdale & Page to submit the inaccurate Bell Canada International Inc. (BCI) Cape Bridgewater test results to Mr. Joblin. BCI asserted that 13,590 test calls were successfully transmitted to the Cape Bridgewater telephone switching exchange, even though the nearest exchange capable of accommodating the specialized BCI equipment utilized for these tests was located in Warrnambool, 115 kilometres away.

Of course, Mr Joblin thought I was mentally disturbed when I was told 13,590 test calls were generated over different periods of the day over five days. Why didn't Freehill Hollingdale & Page (now rebranded as) Herbert Smith Freehills apologize for providing Ian Joblin with this false Cape Bridgewater BCI report before Mr Joblin interviewed me? 

On 21 March 1997, twenty-two months after the conclusion of my arbitration, John Pinnock (the second appointed administrator to my arbitration) wrote to Telstra's Ted Benjamin (see File 596 Exhibits 589 to 647) asking: 

1...any explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the attestation of the witness statement of Ian Joblin .

2...were there any changes made to the Joblin statement originally sent to Dr Hughes compared to the signed statement?" 

I have not received a response from Telstra's Ted Benjamin regarding John Pinnock's official request. See also Telstra-Corruption-Freehill-Hollingdale & Page 

Explore the second phase of Australian Federal Police Investigations, where intricate cases and deeper insights are rigorously examined. However, one must question whether this scrutiny remains consistent when the government-owned corporation in question is Telstra

Multinational law firm,

 

When the government engages prominent legal firms such as Freehill Hollingdale & Page, now operating under Herbert Smith Freehills, a well-established Multinational law firm, to represent its public servants, bureaucrats, and various government-funded agencies, ordinary citizens face significant challenges in accessing justice. This engagement often results in an unequal playing field, where these legal entities' substantial resources and expertise can overshadow individual citizens' voices and legal capabilities.

I want to raise two critical questions:

Firstly, when Freehill Hollingdale & Page became aware that Wayne Maurice Condon had sworn under oath that he had seen Ian Joblin’s signature, a clinical psychologist, on both the witness statement and the accompanying report—even though no such signature was present—why did they not remove these statements from Telstra's arbitration defence after Condon made this sworn declaration?

Secondly, when Freehill Hollingdale & Page discovered that the Cape Bridgewater BCI report they provided to Ian Joblin contained significant flaws and was fundamentally unsuitable for its intended purpose, why did they not take immediate and decisive action to have this report removed from the arbitration, especially considering that Telstra had also supplied the arbitrator with a copy?

The original introduction to this Home page comprised twelve chapters. As the story evolved and the supporting evidence expanded, I recognized the need to restructure the narrative into these twelve distinct chapters. At 81 years old, I am committed to having these chapters fully edited and finalized by the end of February 2025