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Learn about horrendous crimes, unscrupulous criminals, corrupt politicians, and the lawyers who control the arbitration system in Australia - Chapter 11 - The eleventh remedy pursued. Visitors to this website have drawn parallels between its content and a comprehensive portrayal of criminal activities encompassing fraud. Learn about lesser-known whistleblowers who have quietly enacted positive change.

Until the late 1990s, the Australian government entirely owned Australia’s telephone network and the communications carrier, Telecom (today privatised and called Telstra). Telecom held the monopoly on communications and let the network deteriorate into disrepair. Instead of our very deficient telephone services being fixed as part of our government-endorsed arbitration process that became an uneven battle we could never win, they were NOT fixed as part of the process, regardless of the hundreds of thousands of dollars it cost the claimants to mount their claims against Telstra. Crimes were committed against us, and our integrity was attacked and undermined. Our livelihoods were ruined, we lost millions of dollars and our mental health declined, yet those who perpetrated the crimes are still in positions of power, today. Our story is still actively being covered up.

Read about the bribery, corruption and horrendous crimes committed against small business operators who all had one thing in common: the only telecommunications provider in Australia supplied their telecommunications landline system. This government-owned telecommunications landline infrastructure only worked when other telecommunications subscribers were not using the phone system.

The holiday camp I operated had historically relied on landline telephones as the sole means of communication, apart from incidental trade. Upon our initial appreciation for the property, we overlooked the obsolete telephone system prevalent at that time. Mobile network coverage was nonexistent during that period, and business transactions were not conducted via the Internet or email. The camp was connected to a roadside switching facility that routed calls to the central telephone exchange 20 kilometres away in Portland. This facility, which had been in place for over 30 years, was designed for low-call-rate areas and was equipped with only eight lines to service 66 families, amounting to 132 adults and children.

Consequently, only four lines were available for the remaining 128 adults and their children. During peak periods—such as weekends and holidays—when visitor numbers surged at the seaside resort, the demand for telecommunication increased substantially, resulting in recurring line congestion.

After three and a half years of operating with this outdated infrastructure, Telstra finally installed a new system. Regrettably, they neglected to connect it to the central telephone exchange in Portland for an additional twenty months. This unacceptable oversight is further documented in a government report dated March 1994, AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings, which identifies issues from points 2 to 212. 

The findings in that report stem from the fault reports extracted from the Portland Telstra telephone exchange logbook. Unfortunately, as I previously mentioned, I was denied access to this logbook during my arbitration. By utilising that source, AUSTEL could only have reached such precise conclusions in the 69-page, 212-point report. 

My business was connected to this outdated telephone exchange for the first 3½ years after I purchased it—3½ crucial years in which I had expected to establish the business on firm ground. 

The ongoing loss of business and revenue is undeniable. As highlighted in point 153 of AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings, it’s evident from the statement issued by the government technical consultants who compiled the 68-page, 212-point report that, despite the installation of the new RCM facility at Cape Bridgewater by Telstra, there was a significant oversight for eighteen months Telstra failed to program the alarm system in the RCM, which should have notified the Portland technicians—18 kilometres away—of any faults affecting one, two, or even three of the 132 residents relying on this roadside box for connectivity to the outside world.

Point 153 –“A feature of the RCM system is that when a system goes “down” the system is also capable of automatically returning back to service. As quoted above, normally when the system goes “down” an alarm would have been generated at the Portland exchange, alerting local staff to a problem in the network. This would not have occurred in the case of the Cape Bridgewater RCM however, as the alarms had not been programmed. It was some 18 months after the RCM was put into operation that the fact the alarms were not programmed was discovered. In normal circumstances the failure to program the alarms would have been deficient, but in the case of the ongoing complaints from Mr Smith and other subscribers in the area the failure to program these alarms or determine whether they were programmed is almost inconceivable.”

To aid newcomers to this website, absentjustice, I have highlighted twelve significant findings from the government's investigation see (AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings, which are marked in red below. These findings were derived from the Telstra Portland/Cape Bridgewater telephone exchange logbook, which Telstra withheld from me during my arbitration process. This concealment hindered my ability to comprehensively demonstrate my claims, particularly those that continued to adversely affect my business during the arbitration. Those who compare the highlighted twelve points with the findings in (AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings will recognize their alignment. I encourage individuals interested in further examination of these transcriptions to download (AUSTEL’s Adverse Findings. Your understanding of this matter is essential.

The government only released this 68-page, 212-point report to me on November 2oo7, twelve years after the completion of my arbitration on May 11, 1995.

Point 23 – “It is difficult to discern exactly who had responsibility for Mr Smith’s problems at the time, and how information on his problems was disseminated within Telecom. Information imparted by the Portland officer on 10 February 1993 of suspected problems in the RCM [Cape Bridgewater unmanned switching exchange]“caused by a lighting (sic) strike to a bearer in late November” led to a specialist examination of the RCM on March 1993. Serious problems were identified by this examination.”

Point 25 – "It should also be noted that during the period of time covered by this chronology of significance events it is clear 

• Telecom had conducted extensive testing 
• Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp frequestly reported problems with the quality of telephone service
• both the camp and Telecom were receiving confirmation of reported from other network users
• major faults were identified more through persitense reporting of probles by customer than through testing of the network 
• customers in the Cape Bridgewater area also complaining of similar problems

Point 32 – "Telecom's communications with Mr Smith in the months prior to settlement uniformaly argued that the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp was at an acceptable level and that Telecom was capable of rapidly rectifying faults as they occured."

Point 42 – “Some important questions are raised by the possible existence of a cable problem affecting the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp service. Foremost of these questions is why was the test call program conducted during July and August 1992 did not lead to the discovery of the cable problem. Another important question is exactly how the cable problem would have manifested in terms of service difficulties to the subscriber.”

Point 44 – “Given the range of faults being experienced by Mr Smith and other subscribers in Cape Bridgewater, it is clear that Telecom should have initiated more comprehensive action than the test call program. It appears that there was expensive reliance on the results of the test program and insufficient analysis of other data identifying problems. Again, this deficiency demonstrated Telecom’s lack of a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to resolution of Mr Smith’s problems.” 

Point 46 –“File evidence clearly indicates that Telecom at the time of settlement with Mr Smith had not taken appropriate action to identify possible problems with the RCM . It was not until a resurgence of complaints from Mr Smith in early 1993 that appropriate investigative action was undertaken on this potential cause In March 1993 a major fault was discovered in the digital remote customer multiplexer (RCM) providing telephone service to Cape Bridgewater holiday camp. This fault may have been existence for approximately 18 months. The Fault would have affected approximately one third of subscribers receiving a service of this RCM.  Given the nature of Mr Smith’s business in comparison with the essentially domestic services surrounding subscribers, Mr Smith would have been more affected by this problem due to the greater volume of incoming traffic than his neighbours.”

Point 47 –“Telecom's ignorance of the existence of the RCM fault raises a number of questions in regard to Telecom's settlement with Smith. For example, on what bases was settlement made by Telecom if this fault was not known to them at this time? Did Telecom settle with Mr Smith on the bases that his complaints , of faults were justified without a full investigation of the validity of these complaints, or did Telecom settle on the basis of faults substantiated to the time of settlement? Wither criteria for settlement would have been inadequate, with the later critera disadvantaging Mr Smith, as knowledge of the existence of more faults on his service may have led to an increase in the amount offered for settlement of his claims".

Point 109 – The view of the local Telecom technicians in relation to the RVA problem is conveyed in a 2 July 1992 Minute from Customer Service Manager – Hamilton to Managers in the Network Operations and Vic/Tas Fault Bureau:

• “Our local technicians believe that Mr Smith is correct in raising complaints about incoming callers to his number receiving a Recorded Voice Announcement saying that the number is disconnecte. They believe that it is a problem that is occurring in increasing numbers as more and more customers are connected to AXE. (AXE – Portland telephone exchange)”

Point 115 –“Some problems with incorrectly coded data seem to have existed for a considerable period of time. In July 1993 Mr Smith reported a problem with payphones dropping out on answer to calls made utilising his 008 number. Telecom diagnosed the problem as being to “Due to incorrect data in AXE 1004, CC-1. Fault repaired by Ballarat OSC 8/7/93, The original deadline for the data to be changed was June 14th 1991. Mr Smith’s complaint led to the identification of a problem which had existed for two years.”

Point 158 – “The crucial issue in regard to the Cape Bridgewater RCM is that assuming the lightning strike did cause problems to the RCM om late November 1992 these problems were not resolved till the beginning of March 1993, over 3 months later. This was despite a number of indications of problems in the Cape Bridgewater area. Fault reports from September 1992 also indicate that the commencement of problems with the RCM may have occurred earlier than November 1992. A related issue is that Mr Smith’s persistent complaints were almost certainly responsible for an earlier identification of problems with the RCM than would otherwise have been the case.”

Point 169 –" Documentation reviewed indicates that other network users attached to the Cape Bridgewater exchange did report problems similar to those experienced by Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp. It is also clear that problems identified in the area would have impacted on other network users as well as Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp."

Point 209 – “Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp has a history of service difficulties dating back to 1988. Although most of the documentation dates from 1991 it is apparent that the camp has had ongoing service difficulties for the past six years which has impacted on its business operations causing losses and erosion of customer base.”